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introduction
The publication of the breakthrough report “To Err is Human” by the Institute of Medicine was the 
launch of patient safety initiatives all over the world. In the intensive care unit (ICU) of the Erasmus 
MC-Sophia Children’s Hospital this resulted in the institution of a multimodal patient safety manage-
ment system under the name Safety First in 2005. This system now includes nine major elements, 
representing monitoring and intervention activities. In this thesis we report on the results and the 
implementation of the patient safety management system called Safety First. 
outline of this thesis
In part I the concept of patient safety and the Safety First project are introduced. The rationale for 
selecting the elements of the patient safety management system is explained. As preventable mor-
tality and morbidity are the public focus as outcome parameters for quality and safety of care, we 
have studied very long stay patients in our ICU (chapter 2). The goal of this study was to determine 
characteristics and mortality in these patients as well as modes of death. Chapter 3 presents an eva-
luation of potentially preventable deaths in our ICU. An important question was whether five years 
of patient safety efforts had resulted in fewer potentially preventable deaths. 
Part II reflects on the difficulties in monitoring adverse events. In chapter 4 we present numbers and 
types of adverse events identified with real time physicians’ registration during a 3-month period in 
general pediatric practice. The next chapter is a study into adverse events in the surgical pediatric 
ICU in a 2-year period. We combined the physicians’ registration with the Trigger Tool methodology 
as developed by the Institute for Healthcare, Boston, USA. The goals were to determine the rate and 
nature of the adverse events and to compare the two methods.
In part III a number of elements of Safety First are described, as well as other studies into patient 
safety issues relevant to bedside ICU care. Chapter 6 brings the results of critical incident analysis 
with a focus on the factors contributing to the incident and the resultant recommendations. The 
next study evaluated the availability and reliability of drug formularies used in our ICU, which are 
crucial in safe drug prescription. In chapter 8 we discuss the safety of routine MRI scans in preterm 
infants at 30 weeks gestational age, as reflected by safety incidents and adverse events. In the next 
chapter, safety focused Mortality and Morbidity conference reports were scrutinized for numbers 
and types of recommendations stemming from these meetings. Chapter 10 is a study about nursing 
protocol violations established with the Critical Nursing Situation Index. 
Part IV describes a study of safety culture in the ICU, as it emerged from a safety attitude question-
naire administered to all staff. We aimed to compare findings to benchmark data and explore any 
deficiencies.
In the general discussion in part V the results of the studies are commented on and future directions 
are given, including guidelines for optimal implementation of a patient safety management system 
and future benchmarking.   
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Part 
The why and how of the 
Safety First project
Based on: Patient Safety Management System in Pediatric 
ICUs Van der Starre C, Van der Tuijn Y, Tibboel D. In: Vincent 
JL, editor. Yearbook of Intensive Care and Emergency 
Medicine: Springer; 2006. p. 745-754.
lara’s story: part 1
Our first child!
Thomas and Melissa are going to be pa-
rents! They are expecting their first child, 
a girl, and she will probably be born this 
night. However, she will be premature as 
she is due to be born after 9 more weeks. 
Also, they are extremely worried because 
something was very wrong at the first 
ultrasound. There was too much amniotic 
fluid, and further echo images showed a 
birth defect called esophageal atresia. 
This means her esophagus has not grown 
normally and is blocked, so that swal-
lowed fluid cannot pass through to the 
stomach. Thomas and Melissa have been 
counseled on what to expect after birth. 
They have been told that their daughter 
will be admitted to the ICU and that she 
will need an operation to correct the de-
fect. Of course they are very anxious and 
worried, how will their girl be after birth? 
What will happen to her? How will the 
operation go? Will the doctors know what 
to do and how to take care of their daugh-
ter? How will they know they have chosen 
the right hospital?
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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safety first: patient safety management in a 
pediatric icu
Based on: 
Patient Safety Management System in Pediatric ICUs
Van der Starre C, Van der Tuijn Y, Tibboel D.
In: Vincent JL, editor. Yearbook of Intensive Care and Emergency Medicine: Springer; 2006. 
p. 745-754.
background
Patient safety has become a subject of greater attention since the beginning of the century in health-
care organizations all over the world. The report “To Err is Human” from the Institute of Medicine 
in the United States triggered awareness for the im portance of safer practices in health care. 1 As 
an illustration, the Harvard Medical Practice study found that 4.7% of patients in US hospitals had 
suffered adverse events. 2-3 A number of studies in other countries have identified adverse events 
ranging from 2.9% to 16.6%. 4-9 With regard to adult and pediatric intensive care, from 8% to 62% 
of patients were found to have suffered at least one adverse event during their ICU stay. 10-15 Adverse 
events are not only detrimental to the patient, but also give rise to longer hospital stay and greater 
hospital costs. 16-18 
In 2001, the Institute of Medicine released the following statement: 
“The biggest challenge to moving toward a safer health system is changing the culture 
from one of blam ing individuals for errors to one in which errors are treated not as perso-
nal fail ures, but as opportunities to improve the system and prevent harm”.
It has indeed been recognized that healthcare providers have to step away from the ‘blame and 
shame’ culture that prevents learning from errors. 19-22 Cultural changes are also necessary to succes-
sfully implement innova tions that are designed to improve patient safety. 21, 23 
The Dutch Ministry of Health instructed hospitals and healthcare institutions to have a patient safety 
management system (PSMS) in place by January 1st 2008. The Paediatric Association of the Ne-
therlands in colla boration with the Dutch Order of Medical Specialists thereupon decided to initiate 
patient safety projects. Apart from local initiatives, this has so far resulted in two nation wide pro-
jects, an adverse event registration for pe diatrics and the so- called Neosafe® project for blame free 
incident report ing in neonatal ICUs. 24 
our achievements: safety first project
The level 3 surgical PICU of the Erasmus MC-Sophia Children’s Hospital in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 
is one of the eight academic PICUs in the Netherlands and admits around 550 patients per year. 
Children with the following disorders are admitted to the surgical PICU: major congenital anomalies, 
traumatic brain injury or major trauma, neurosurgery, scoliosis surgery, and renal transplants. In ad-
dition, the unit has a supraregional function for craniofacial surgery and extracorporeal mem brane 
oxygenation (ECMO). In 2008 the surgical PICU integrated with the medical PICU and since then pro-
vides all types of intensive care including cardiothoracic surgery, heart transplants and pediatric ECMO. 
In 2004, we started a patient safety project which we named ‘Safety First’. The first components to 
be implemented were adverse event (AE) registration (2005), Safety First reports (blame free incident 
reporting) (2004), Critical Nursing Situation Index (CNSI) (2005), and Team Resource Management 
(TRM) (2005). Other elements have consecutively been added: retrospective incident analysis (PRIS-
MA) (2006), prospective risk analysis (HFMEA) (2007), Safety Walk Rounds (2007), safety focused 
Mortality and Morbidity conferences (2007), and Simulation training (2007). (Figure 1). 
figure 1   The Patient Safety Management System 
abbreviations:
AEs adverse events 
CIA critical incident analysis
CNSI Critical Nursing Situation Index
HFMEA Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
PRISMA Prevention and Recovery Information System for Monitoring and Analysis
SSTT Sophia Simulation team training
TRM Team Resource Management
Adverse events registration started as a pilot study in general pediatric wards, wards in referral 
hospitals in academic centers, and neo natal/pediatric ICUs. Adverse events were defined as “any 
unfavourable and unintended injury resulting from or contributed to by medical treatment during 
the hospital stay that resulted in adjustment of medical management or damage to the patient”. 
Registration was aimed not only at quantifying the adverse events, but also at getting insight into 
their nature, as a means to direct preventive measures. Incidents were defined as “any unintended 
and unexpected occurrence that could have led or did actually lead to harm for the patient”. In May 
2004 all unit staff members were invited to report from now on anything that would qualify as an 
incident as it did not proceed as it should have or that went wrong. The blame free reporting of all 
incidents would generate more data on preventable causes of adverse events than would looking 
at the actual adverse events alone. Retrospective analysis of incidents using the PRISMA methodo-
logy was started in 2005; the first few critical incident analyses were performed in 2005 as well. 
PATIENT SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
MONITORING TRAINING
Risk 
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The Critical Nursing Situation Index is a validated method to detect nursing protocol violations in 
ICUs and was introduced in 2005 with a twofold aim: scrutinizing and updating nursing protocols 
and analyzing whether (non- ) adherence to nursing pro tocols had any impact on incidents/adverse 
events. Team Resource Management is a training method, adapted from the world of aviation, ai-
med at improving communication and coop eration between team members. In 2005 all physicians, 
nurses, managers, and technicians in the unit were trained by the Centre for Man and Aviation. 
Subsequently, the aviation based training was adapted for the healthcare setting. Prospective risk 
assessment using the Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect analysis was first applied in 2007. Safety 
Walk Rounds were introduced in 2007 in an effort to advance discussion on safety topics between 
front line staff and executives. Mortality and Morbidity conferences were reinstated in 2007 with 
an added focus on patient safety aspects. Next to TRM, a program for simulation team training was 
developed and implemented in 2008.
data analysis
Adverse event registration
We undertook this study to improve quality of care by introducing adverse events as subjects for 
discussions, education and for directing the safety efforts. During a 3 -month period, the medical and 
nursing staff reported on all possible adverse events, which then in turn were evaluated by a study 
group of the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands. The numbers and nature of adverse events 
were registered and the minimum dataset was also determined, i.e., what patient data, treatment 
data, context, etc. are needed for adequate adverse event registration. Over 3 months we re corded 
122 adverse events (8.1 per 100 admission days).  
Safety First Reports 
A new reporting system was created in 2005 to gain more insight into the prevalence of incidents. 
An incident was defined as any unintended and unexpected occurrence that could have led or did 
actually lead to harm for the patient. Under reporting of errors is a serious problem in healthcare 
25-27 and nurses are more likely to report incidents than is medical staff. A blame free en vironment 
for health care workers is a necessity for a successful voluntary incident reporting system. 28 The 
‘classical’ reporting system in many hospitals in the Netherlands was a vol untary reporting system of 
faults or near accidents (FONA). Within this system, only 50-60 incidents per year were reported in 
our department. We introduced a new reporting form in 2004, based on that used in The Hospital 
for Sick Children, Toronto. 29 We set up a so-called Safety First Com mittee for the assessment of all 
the reports. They received a staggering amount of reports, i.e. each month 100-150 forms, a 30- fold 
increase compared to the FONA reports.
table 1 Numbers and categories of incident reports 2005-2010
*PDMS: Patient Data Management System
More than one third of the reports pertained to medication errors, for instance dosing errors, wrong 
infusion rate and omission errors (medication either not prescribed or not given). Ventilator  related 
incidents were reported in approximately 20% of incidents, varying from accidental extu bation to 
wrong ventilator settings. Apart from the nature and number of incidents we also studied the conse-
quences for the patients with the aid of a risk assessment matrix. The person who reports an incident 
is asked to rate the anticipated consequences as either none, minor, major, serious, or unknown. A 
minor consequence is defined as minimal discomfort, without damage, longer stay, or intervention 
needed. A major consequence is discomfort or temporary damage, with minimally longer ICU stay or 
minimal intervention. Serious consequences are considerable discomfort, permanent damage, gre-
atly prolonged stay, major intervention (i.e., resuscitation, surgery) or death. The Safety First Com-
mittee assesses the actual consequences within 2 weeks after the report is submitted. We found that 
only 7% of the incidents resulted in actual major or serious consequences.
table 2   Numbers of potential and actual consequences of reported incidents in 2005-2010. 
category 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 total %
medication 508 557 341 928 649 481 3464 30.6
pdms* 340 339 199 768 485 329 2460 21.7
equipment 188 169 112 464 255 199 1387 12.2
catheters, tubes 194 281 154 237 173 135 1174 10.4
Work environment 139 115 56 176 107 61 654 5.8
Nursing care 51 117 70 202 119 80 639 5.6
Communication 24 40 35 187 123 138 547 4.8
Laboratory 50 72 53 90 34 34 333 2.9
Nutrition 55 57 31 77 35 35 290 2.6
Skin care 11 15 18 35 28 30 137 1.2
Radiology 5 9 3 3 2 4 26 0.2
Fall 0 6 2 2 2 1 13 0.1
Other 35 19 42 62 27 20 205 1.8
1600 1796 1116 3231 2039 1547 11329 100
consequences potential (n) % actual (n) %
None 1290 11.4 9069 80.1
Minor 4711 41.6 1369 12.1
Major 4144 36.6 781 6.9
Serious 1137 10.0 16 0.1
Unknown/
missing
47 0.4 94 0.8
total 11329 100 11329 100
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A possible reason for underreporting in our unit under the FONA  system, but also in other hospi-
tals, was the lack of feedback to the ‘reporters’. The sheer number of reports made it impossible, 
however, to give personal feedback. As an alternative, we published a monthly Safety First Journal 
presenting the top 5 incidents, results of the analysis of major incidents and the preventive strategies 
selected to reduce the incidents. This type of feedback helped to sustain staff motivation to report 
incidents. 
Detailed analysis of the incidents helped to understand how and why incidents occur. PRISMA ana-
lysis has been validated in the nationwide project Neosafe® 24, which promotes blame free incident 
reporting on neonatal ICUs. 30 This method has been adapted from incident analysis systems used 
in aviation and the petrochemical in dustry. It categorizes factors contributing to incidents in human, 
technological, organizational, and patient re lated factors. As a rule each incident has causes in at 
least two different cate gories. Insight into the root causes of the incidents will help to reduce inci-
dents and develop preventive strategies. A total of 203 PRISMA analyses have been performed from 
2005 to 2011. 
Critical Nursing Situation Index 
A Critical Nursing Situation is any observable situation which deviates from good clinical practice and 
which may potentially lead to an adverse event. The CNSI was originally devel oped and validated 
for an adult ICU by Binnekade et al. 31 It is a list of items to be checked at the bedside of patients. 
Each item represents an element from a nursing protocol. Each protocol was checked for being 
up-to- date, evidence based, and/or according to ‘good clinical practice’. When found inadequate, 
a protocol was revised by two experienced PICU nurses and approved by one of the pediatric in-
tensivists. The result was an adapted list of 192 items. Ten PICU nurses volun teered to test the new 
CNSI-picu for interrater  reliability and usefulness on the unit. Paired scoring of 30 CNSIs showed a 
good inter-rater  reliability: Cohen’s kappa 0.76. This pilot study made clear that many nurses were 
afraid to be “caught mak ing mistakes” when their patients were scored. A second pilot study was 
performed in which one of the CNSI trained nurses every day scored a randomly assigned patient. A 
monthly report on the most fre quent protocol violations was published and appropriate action was 
undertaken, for instance education, protocol revision, etc. 
Team Resource Management 
Crew Resource Management (CRM) is a training method that has evolved in aviation over recent 
decades. Aviation has a longstanding history of collecting and analyzing safety data. Over a 7  year 
period, Billings and Reynard analyzed 35,000 reports and found that nearly half resulted from flight 
crew errors 32 Root cause analysis of these in cidents revealed that insufficient communication and 
cooperation between team members contributed largely to the errors. CRM training programs are 
now widely used to improve teamwork of flight crews. 33 In a cross sectional survey Sexton and col-
leagues compared 1033 operating room per sonnel and more than 30,000 flight crew members on 
several items, mainly dealing with attitude towards teamwork, attitude about error and safety, and 
perceptions of stress and fatigue. 34 Medical respondents were more likely to agree to the item “even 
when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical times “, compared to flight crews (60 versus 
26%). There was also a remarkable difference in preference for flat hierarchies. While 55% of the 
consultant surgeons advocated flat hierarchies, as many as 94% of cockpit crews indicated this to be 
their preferred model. This study and other analyses suggest that team training as used in aviation 
may also be useful in health care. CRM appli cations have been incorporated in various health care 
settings, e.g., the operating room, the emer gency department, and obstetric units. This required ad-
justment of the training approaches to better cover the areas in which human factors contribute to 
errors in health care. Our project aims to assess the applicability of CRM for (pediatric) ICUs. Together 
with the Center for Man and Aviation, a tailored Team Resource Management training course was 
developed for health care workers. All employees are to partici pate in the training course. 
figure 2 Representation of the topics of the team resource management training, adapted from the Center 
 for Man and Aviation. 
Although CRM has been adopted in the aviation industry without objective data as to its effective-
ness, we feel it has a high potential in health care. A number of studies have shown its effect on 
team behaviour and some have reported on positive effects on outcomes for patients. 
evaluation 
Medical and nursing staff, but also hospital administrators and managers, need to work together to 
create a safe environment in which reporting and discussing of incidents is a routine procedure. Cre-
ating this safe and blame free working environment is the first step towards safer patient care. The 
next step constitutes eliciting the potential hazards, the adverse events and the outcomes related to 
the adverse events. Then, analysis of adverse events and (near ) incidents must lead to interventions 
to prevent errors/incidents and to mitigate the effect of errors/incidents that do occur. 
Group
processes
Stress-
 management
Communicaton
Information-  
management
Risk
management
Decision making
Leadership
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The patient safety management system developed in our unit is a growing and evolving system. 
There are still controversies about the effects and ef fectiveness of any strategy to improve patient 
safety. We believe that collecting and studying reports on “everything that did not go as it should 
have gone” will reveal all potential hazards and provide baseline data for individual units. After 
implementation of goal directed strategies we hopefully will be able to see a reduction in adverse 
events. So far our nursing and medical staffs have been very motivated to contribute to the Safety 
First project. Furthermore, the involvement of other disciplines has proved to be very useful. For 
instance, good cooperation with the hospital phar macy and medical technology and radiology de-
partments helped reduce the occur rence of incidents. 
conclusion 
The multidisciplinary approach applied in the Safety First project aims to improve patient safety by 
continuous quality assessment and modification guided by real time data. Cost effectiveness of 
patient safety management systems is an important issue, especially in relation to the increasing 
costs of health care; it should be considered as an integral part of such a system and needs to be 
researched. 
Acknowledgements: Peter N. Cox, MB ChB, Department of Critical Care Medicine, Hospital for Sick 
Children, University of Toronto, Canada
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mortality in very long-stay pediatric intensive care unit 
patients and incidence of withdrawal of treatment.
abstract
Background: The mortality for children with a prolonged stay in Pediatric Intensive Care Units 
(PICU) is much higher than the overall mortality. The incidence of withdrawal or limitation of therapy 
in this group is unknown.
Purpose: To assess mortality and characteristics of children admitted for at least 28 days to our ICU 
and to describe the extent to which limitations of care were involved in the terminal phase preceding 
death.
Methods: From the period 2003 to 2005 clinical data were collected retrospectively of children with 
prolonged stay (defined as ≥ 28 days) in a medical/surgical PICU of a University Children’s Hospital.
Results: In the PICU 4.4% of the children (116/2607, equal gender, mean age 29 days) had a pro-
longed stay. Median (range) stay was 56 (28-546) days. These children accounted for 3% of total 
admissions and occupied 63% of total admission days. Mortality during admission for this group 
was 5 times higher (22%) than the average PICU mortality rate of 4.6%. Withdrawal or limitation 
of therapy preceded 70% of deaths. 
Conclusions: Children with prolonged stay at the PICU have a significant high risk of mortality. 
Death is typically preceded by limitation of care. 
introduction:
Critical appraisal of the effectiveness of different modes of treatment and the demands for more 
cost-efficient hospital processes has focused attention upon the duration of care in an intensive 
care unit (ICU), an environment which necessarily provides high levels of care and therefore requires 
substantial operating budgets. 1-3 Median stay for most patients is two days 4, 5, but a small minority 
need to stay much longer and use resources in excess of their numeric proportions. 6 Long stay in the 
pediatric ICU is usually defined as stay longer than 12-13 days. 1, 3, 7 A special subgroup is formed by 
patients with very prolonged stay, longer than 30 days. 7, 8
The few reports available on outcomes of long-stay pediatric ICU patients demonstrate higher morta-
lity and morbidity, compared with short-stay patients. 3, 6, 9, 10 Withdrawal and limitation of medical care 
is associated with 14-75% of deaths in neonatal and pediatric intensive care. 11-12 These issues have 
been extensively discussed in the past decade 8, 11, 13-16 and have been subject to ongoing public dis-
course. The extent to which limitations of care actually contribute to death in very long-stay pediatric 
ICU patients is not known. The aim of the present study was to assess characteristics and mortality of 
very long-stay patients in our unit and to describe how often treatment was limited and/or withdrawn.
methods
Data collection and definitions: The ICU of the Erasmus MC-Sophia Children’s Hospital, Rot-
terdam, is a level III interdisciplinary intensive care unit for children in the Netherlands, providing all 
pediatric and surgical subspecialties (except direct cardiopulmonary bypass). All patients including 
newborns with major congenital anomalies admitted from 1 January 2003 until 31 December 2005 
were retrospectively identified using the computerized patient data management system. Long-stay 
patients were defined as those admitted for at least 28 continuous days. The reason for this cut-off 
point was that 28 days is three times the median length of stay in our unit. Whenever a long-stay 
patient was re-admitted, only the first admission was included in the study. The following clinical 
data: age, sex, presence and number of congenital malformations, reason for admission, and diag-
nosis were collected from hospital medical records and our patient data management system. Both 
data systems are used by nursing and medical staff.
Primary outcome was death during admission. Deaths during operations or other procedures were 
classified as intensive care deaths. Cause of death was categorized as 12: Brain death, Do-not-resus-
citate, failed cardiopulmonary resuscitation, withdrawal or limitation of therapy. 17-20 Retrospectively, 
every patient’s death was classified according to four categories. Brain death (BD): when criteria for 
brain death were fulfilled. Do not resuscitate (DNR): when a previously ordered DNR document was 
available. Failed resuscitation (RES): when failed advance life support. Withdrawal or limitation of 
therapy (W/LT): when by agreement between family and medical staff, present level of life-sustaining 
treatment (LST) was limited and/or inotropes/mechanical ventilation removed.
Main diagnoses were categorized in six groups: disorders of the respiratory system, gastrointesti-
nal disorders, multiple congenital abnormalities, neurological disorders, cardiac disease and others. 
Data on survival, limitations of therapy and withdrawal of therapy were collected. Decisions regar-
ding do-not-resuscitate (DNR), limiting or withdrawing life sustaining therapy (W/LT) were taken by 
a multidisciplinary team (W/LT). As described earlier 21, 22 families were involved in all cases. 
Severity of illness on admission was measured by the PRISM III score according to Pollack et al pu-
blished in 1996, which was calculated from physiological data that included the most abnormal 
values in the first 12 and second 12 hrs of PICU stay.
In the terminal phase patients were not transferred to a different ward. Instead optimal palliative 
care was offered in a separate part of the intensive care unit. When needed or requested by the 
medical team and/or parents, the institutional Ethics Review Board was consulted. Approval from 
this Board for the present study was waived due to its retrospective character. 
Setting: The setting for this study was a 34-bed multidisciplinary tertiary level III pediatric ICU with 
ECMO facilities, including a 6 bed step-down unit. This ICU is part of a 250-bed pediatric university 
hospital with a referral area of 4.000.000 and full-time staffed by intensive care specialists with basic 
training in pediatrics or anesthesiology.
Data Analysis: Data are presented as mean SD or median (IQR or range) where appropriate and 
have been analyzed with SPSS software (SPSS for windows, version 12.0, 2005, Chicago, Ill). 
results
During the study period 2607 patients were admitted on 3700 occasions with a total of 16013 
admission days. Of this group 4.4 % (116/2607) patients were identified as very long-stay patients, 
responsible for 3.4 % (126/3700) of total admissions and consuming 63 % (10055/16013) of admis-
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sion days. One hundred and six long-stay patients were admitted once, seven twice, and three were 
admitted three times. Demographic and care characteristics of long-stay patients are summarized 
in table 1. Clinical diagnoses were: disorders of the respiratory system 29 (25%), gastrointestinal 
disorders 23 (20 %), multiple congenital abnormalities 19 (16%), neurological disorders 18 (15%), 
cardiac disease 18 (15%) and others 9 (8%). 
table 1 Demographic characteristics of long-stay patients
Their median length of stay was 56 (IQR 37-108) days. Distribution as to length of stay is shown in 
Fig 1. Outliers were three patients admitted for more than 300 days, the longest stay was 546 days.
PRISM III scores are shown in Fig. 2. The majority of the long stay patients (58%) had a PRISM III score 
between 0 and 5. Ninety four patients (81%) had a maximum PRISM III score of 10. 
fig. 2 PRISM III score among long-stay patients
During the study period 4.6% (120/2607) of the total patient group died during admission, 21% 
(25/120) of them were very long-stay patients. The mortality rate of long-stay patients was higher 
compared to short-stay patients (22% (25/116) vs.3.8% (95/2491) (p<0.001)). The characteristics 
of long-stay survivors and non-survivors are shown in table 2. Neonates accounted for half of the 
patient population in both groups. The most common diagnoses among the long stay non-survivors 
were multiple congenital anomalies (7/25: 28%) and cardiovascular disease (7/25: 28%). Multiple 
congenital anomalies was the most frequent diagnosis among the long stay survivors as well (25/91; 
27%), followed by diseases of the respiratory system (22/91; 24%). 
table 2 Characteristics of nonsurvivors and survivors
* multiple congenital anomalies
demographic characteristics
long-stay 
patients
n = 116
long-stay 
nonsurvivors
n = 25
long-stay 
survivors
n = 91
Admissions 126 25 111
Fraction of total admissions (%) 3 2.6 0.6
Males (%) 57 60 58
Age median (months) (IQR25) 1 1 1
Mean age (months) 29 29 29
Mortality (%) 22 - -
Surgical patients (%) 37 36 34
Median ventilation (days) (IQR25) 30 33 45
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variables nonsurvivors survivors
Patient numbers 25 91
Patients no./total admissions 25 91/101
Male (%) 60 58
Median age (days) 29 34
Median length of stay (days) 67 54
Patient admission days 2538 7517
Neonate (%) 52 47
Ex-premature (%) 8 5
Diagnosis (%)
  Resp.
  Cardio.
  Gastro.
  Neuro.
  Others
  MCA *
2/25 (8%)
7/25 (28%)
4/25 (16%)
4/25 (16%)
1/25 (4%)
7/25 (28%)
22/91 (24%)
7/91 (8%)
17/91 (18%)
14/91 (15%)
6/91 (7%)
25/91 (27%)
28 29
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The specific primary diagnoses which lead to long stay are demonstrated in table 3.
A total of 101 readmissions were counted for 91 survivors. Comparing different diagnosis between 
survivors and non-survivors showed no statistical significance (p = 0.999)
table 3 Specific primary diagnosis among long-stay patients
Figure 3 demonstrates a flow diagram in which end-of-life categories are shown in non-survivors. 
No patients were included in the category brain death. In 25 deaths, 6 patients had DNR status. 
Active withdrawal of support occurred in 12 patients; 2 with DNR orders and 10 without. Three 
patients were removed from extracorporeal life support (ECLS), one patient after 12 days ECMO and 
2 cardiac patients with refractory shock.
RES:  resuscitation
BD:  brain death
DNR:  do not resuscitate
W/LT: withdrawal/limitation of therapy
LST:  life-sustaining treatment
ECLS:  extracorporeal life support
figure 3 Nonsurvivors end-of-life flow diagram in different patient groups, in which all nonsurvivors are 
categorized according to mode of death. RES: resuscitation, BD: brain death, DNR: do not resuscitate, W/LT: 
withdrawal/limitation of therapy, LST: life-sustaining treatment, ECLS: extracorporeal life support. In addition 
the W/LT and DNR group (n=20) is categorized by different ICU depedent treatment which they had been 
receiving.
Table 4 summarizes characteristics in modes of death categories and end-of-life treatments.
All end-of-life meetings between the medical team and family which resulted in limitations of tre-
atment, DNR or withdrawal were documented. The cause of death was well-documented in all 
the charts, including an electronic patient data management system which has been used by both 
nursing and medical staff members. Consensus between caregivers and medical team regarding the 
end-of life meetings was reached in all cases. All parents were physically present with their child 
when passing away, except one parent couple who with respect to their religious restrictions unfor-
tunately could not be present at the time of death.
primary diagnosis nonsurvivors survivors
Dilated/restricted cardiomyopathy 2 1
Congenital heart disease 
Acquired arrhythmia 
Congenital airway/pulmo. disease 
Acquired airway/pulmo. disease
7
0
1
0
6
1
4
5
Congenital gastrointestinal malformations 3 12
Acquired gastrointestinal disease 
Congenital hypotonia 
Status epilepticus (therapy resist) 
Acquired neurological disease 
Central hypoventilation
Infantile encephalopathy 
Psychomotor retardation eci 
Metabolic disease
Trauma
Sepsis
Malignancy 
Multiple congenital anomalies
Congenital diaphragmatic hernia 
Hematological/vascular disease 
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
7
0
0
4
5
1
1
1
3
1
2
1
1
4
25
12
1
total 25 91
BD + DNR + RES + W/LT
N = 25
RES
N = 5
BS + DNR + W/LT
N = 20
WLT(14) + DNR(6)
N = 20
BD
N = 0
ECLS
removed
N = 3
LST
removed (all DNR)
N = 4 
Ventilaion and/or inotropes
removes
N = 13
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table 4 Characteristics in mode-of-death categories
DNR do not resuscitate    W/LT withdrawal/limitation of therapy
RES (failed) resuscitation     BD brain death
discussion
In this study the group very long-stay patients (LOS ≥ 28 days) forms only a small proportion of the 
total cohort (3%), but they are responsible for a considerable part of admission days (63%). The 
mortality rate for this group was five times higher than that for the total cohort.  
We found that our very long stay patients consumed a high proportion of total admission days which 
is consistent with earlier studies performed in adult and pediatric ICUs (LOS > 12 days) 3, 7, 20 
The overall mortality rate in our ICU is comparable to the reported mortality rates from European and 
North American studies. 1, 4, 12 We reported a much higher mortality rate in very long stay patients 
(defined as ≥ 28 days) compared to short-stay patients. It is difficult to compare this mortality with 
earlier reports, as these were studies of long-stay patients (defined as: 7-30 days). 3, 6, 9, 10 
However, it is still lower than the ICU mortality documented among adults following very long stay 
(32%) 7   
Previous analysis by Marcin et al 1 of diverse PICUs in the United States indicates that among other 
factors, a PRISM III score between 10-33 was predictive of long stay in their population. Given that 
the PRISM III score has not been evaluated amongst European long-stay patients, we considered 
these scores in our study sample. The majority (81%) of our long-stay patients did have a PRISM III 
score between 0-10, which is at the lower range of the score and might be explained by the unique 
case mix of our ICU and the PRISM III score not being population independent.
The few studies available of adults who required at least 28-30 days of ICU care, generally report 
reasonable to relatively good chance of hospital and long-term survival, with some disability during 
daily activities. 7, 23-27 Friedrich et al. 7 reported a 32 % ICU mortality and a 58 % hospital survival 
rate among their very long-stay patients. Most survivors were discharged to their previous place of 
residence, which was considered as an important indicator of quality of life.
A high proportion of deaths in this study were preceded by end-of-life discussions, resulting in with-
drawal or limitation of life-sustaining treatment. So far, however, there are no guidelines or protocols 
to facilitate the decision making process when establishing appropriate boundaries concerning the 
extent of medical care. Once certainty about the diagnosis and prognosis has been obtained, it is 
vital that a prominent member of the interdisciplinary teams informs the parents and evaluates 
whether the treatment given is in the child’s best interest. 13, 16, 28, 29 If disagreement occurs between 
the parents and the view held by the medical team, this conflict can be mediated according to the 
guidelines of the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands which have been reported in the early 
90’s and available to all its members. Fortunately disagreement did not occur in our patient group. 
Optimal palliative care was provided in a separate part of the intensive care without transferring the 
patient to a different ward. In the holistic approach towards our patients we appreciate continuous 
care given by same care providers. Carrying for families with a child awaiting the end of life creates 
a situation where an inevitable death demands the involved care providers to continue close relati-
onships, especially when a long stay has been involved
The retrospective character of the study is a limitation. It was conducted in a mixed ICU population, 
which limits the generalisability and application to other centers. Moreover, our unit’s infrastruc-
ture and the lack of separate high-dependency units within our hospital may have had a decisive 
influence on our findings. Generalisability, given the different population and institutional setting, 
has also been raised by Friedrich et al. in 2006 when evaluating an adult ICU population. 7 They 
described the unique character of their data, which may not be applicable to other centers with a 
different view on health care organization. 7 Having an intermediate/step-down unit and long term 
ventilatory facilities apart from the intensive care might bring other results (for example shorter ICU 
length of stay). The 28 days’ minimum length of stay we defined may limit the applicability of our 
findings to other patient populations with severe congenital malformations with shorter length of 
stay, but also a high mortality. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of this type of investigation, we believe that our data of very long-
stay patients will raise awareness of this matter and contribute towards the improvement and esta-
blishment of appropriate goals of care. Long-term survival, functional outcomes and quality of life 
are important aspects of PICU patients that need more study. Pediatric follow-up data in long-stay 
patients are limited and contradictory. 3, 6
In conclusion, the high mortality rate and frequent application of a “withholding” approach shown 
in this study emphasizes the necessity of timely care assessment, when a patient’s stay in the pedia-
tric ICU exceeds 28 days. A multidisciplinary team should then discuss possibilities of cure and care 
based on current and predicted future suffering. We recommend the use of a transparent individu-
alized protocol to guide the treatment team towards boundaries of care. 
Ongoing investigation is needed to point out the different indications and justifications of limita-
bd dnr w/lt res
Number 0 6 14 5
Age (years) mean (SD) 2.3 (4.9) 2.5 (5.6) 2.4 (5.3)
Age (years) median (range) 0.0 (0.0-3.9) 0.0 (0.0-1.5) 0.0 (0.0-6.0)
LOS (days) mean (SD) 82 (72) 102 (134) 123 (51)
LOS (days) median (range) 48 (39-136) 62 (33-107) 131 (75-167)
Initial ICU admission diagnosis (n)
  Resp
  Cardiac
  Resp + Cardiac
  Resp + Surgery
  Neuro
3
-
-
2
1
7
4
1
2
-
-
-
-
-
-
End-of-life treatments and characteristics
  Ventilated patients (n)
  Ventilation days 80-100%
  Tracheostomy
  Non-invasive ventilation
  Multiple congenital anomaly
  Dialysis
6
4
2
-
4
-
14
12
4
-
5
-
-
-
-
-
-
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tions of treatment for pediatric ICU patients with a prolonged length of stay. Early identification 
of patients at risk of very long stay and recognition of their high risk of mortality and potential 
consequences for future therapeutic modalities should be incorporated into the activities of teams 
working at the pediatric ICU.
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does a patient safety management system in pediatric intensive 
care result in fewer preventable deaths?
abstract
Objective: 
To determine whether 5 years of patient safety activities would have reduced the number of poten-
tially preventable deaths in a single tertiary care intensive care unit in a university children’s hospital.
Design:
An observational study with a before-after design.
Setting:
A level III 28-bed intensive care unit in a university children’s hospital. A patient safety management 
system has been in place since 2005. 
Patients:
Children who died in the ICU in the years 2001-2002 (before introduction of Patient Safety Manage-
ment System); and 2006-2007 and 2009. 
Measurement:
Numbers of potentially preventable deaths, numbers and types of potentially preventable adverse 
events contributing to death and demographic data of these patients.
Main results:
31 of 255 deaths (12%) were classified by five pediatric intensivists independently as potentially 
preventable. A median of 2 adverse events were identified in these 31 cases (interquartile range 2-3; 
total 100). The most frequent adverse events were blood stream infections (35%) and neurological 
damage (14%). Patients in the potentially preventable death group were statistically significantly 
younger (p= 0.003) and had a longer length of stay (p<0.001) than the other deceased patients. 
Numbers of preventable deaths did not significantly change over the time periods studied. 
Conclusion:
There was no detectable reduction in potentially preventable mortality after 5 years of patient safety 
efforts. Harm resulting from adverse events would be a more useful measure to evaluate patient 
safety. 
introduction
Since the publication of the ground breaking report “To Err is Human” concerning the high inci-
dence of preventable deaths in US hospitals, efforts have been directed toward diminishing these 
avoidable deaths. 1 Some of the most striking examples are the “Saving 100k Lives” campaign by the 
Institute for Healthcare Improvement in the USA 2 and “Patient Safety First” by the National Patient 
Safety Agency in the UK. 3 
A Dutch review estimated that approximately 1700 patients, excluding children under 1 year of age, 
die each year in Dutch hospitals from avoidable adverse events. 4 Like in other countries, campaigns 
have been launched in the Netherlands to reduce the preventable mortality. The Ministry of Health 
and the Healthcare Inspectorate have stimulated nation wide patient safety guidelines; the Dutch 
Technical Agreement on Patient Safety delineates requirements for hospital patient safety manage-
ment. In the literature, pediatric intensive care units (PICUs) have been recognized as high-risk en-
vironments where patients are at considerable risk of suffering harm from their care management. 
5-7 In these studies, though not exactly quantified, some of the incidents and adverse events were 
considered to have contributed to fatal outcomes for these children.  
The aim of this study is to determine whether 5 years of patient safety activities in our tertiary care 
pediatric intensive care unit has succeeded in reducing the number of potentially preventable deaths.
materials and methods
Eligible subjects were all children who died in the Erasmus MC - Sophia ICU over three time peri-
ods: January 2001 to December 2002 (before introduction of a patient safety management system 
(PSMS) in 2005), January 2006 to December 2007 (shortly after the PSMS was introduced) and Ja-
nuary 2009 to December 2009 (five years after introduction). Excluded were children whose medical 
records were incomplete. 
Setting and description
The Erasmus MC - Sophia Children’s Hospital is a tertiary care university hospital with a 28 bed in-
tensive care unit and a 6 bed step-down unit. The ICU provides all types of intensive care, such as 
transplant surgery, neonatal and pediatric ECMO, cardiac surgery and care for newborns with major 
congenital anomalies and admits approximately 1400 patients per year. The medical staff consists 
of 8 fully trained pediatric intensivists, one neonatologist and one pediatric anesthesiologist, with 
fellows in training for pediatric intensive care and pediatric anesthesiology. There is full time atten-
dance of a medical team of at least 1 resident, 1 fellow and 1 pediatric intensivist at consultant level. 
The three time periods were selected to represent the before and after situation, as the PSMS was 
launched in 2004. The first components of the PSMS were voluntary incident reporting 8, team 
resource management training 9-10, scoring of nursing protocol violations 11 and registration of ad-
verse events. In order to fully implement and further develop the PSMS a physician (CvdS) and nurse 
(AvdB) were trained in patient safety at the Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston, USA and 
appointed as patient safety officers. Subsequently, safety walk rounds 12, critical incident analysis 13, 
patient safety oriented mortality and morbidity conferences, prospective risk analysis 14 and simula-
tion training were introduced since 2007. 
Data analysis
The medical records were reviewed for adverse events by two investigators. For the purpose of 
this study we defined patients whose deaths were potentially preventable as patients who suf-
fered adverse events that contributed to their death and that were potentially preventable, in line 
with a former publication. 15 Adverse events were defined as unintended and unwanted injuries or 
complications caused by healthcare management. An event was deemed potentially preventable if 
known interventions could have reduced the risk of its occurrence. As the goal of the study was to 
determine the effectiveness of safety measures on the PICU, we excluded the deaths attributable to 
adverse events that occurred outside of the PICU setting. A neonatologist (CvdS) and an intensivist 
(DT), with 5 and 26 years working experience, respectively, independently reviewed the medical re-
cords and scored the deaths as ‘potentially preventable’ or ‘not potentially preventable’. Consensus 
was reached in a subsequent meeting. To improve classification reliability, the records of all deceased 
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patients were randomly distributed among 3 other consultants, pediatric intensivists (MdH, SG,SN) 
with 15, 16 and 4 years of experience, who independently classified the deaths as potentially pre-
ventable or not. Consensus between all was achieved in a separate meeting. 
Statistical analysis
Interrater reliability of classifying potentially preventable deaths was determined with the unweigh-
ted Cohen’s kappa. A value between 0.61 and 0.80 is considered good. 16 Normally distributed vari-
ables are presented as mean (standard deviation) and non-normally distributed variables as median 
(interquartile range). Mann Whitney tests were used to compare background characteristics of the 
potentially preventable deaths to those of the other deaths.  
results
Over the three study periods there were 5462 discharges of which 257 patients died; thus the overall 
mortality rate was 4.7%. Two cases were excluded because the medical records were incomplete. 
The Cohen’s kappa coefficient for the two consultants who first independently classified the 255 
deaths was low (0.36), after a consensus meeting they reached consensus on 35 deaths being pre-
ventable. A second consensus meeting in which the classification by three others was considered 
resulted in consensus on 31 patients (12.1%). Kappa coefficient between the results of the first and 
second consensus meeting was 0.76. There was no significant decline in the number of potentially 
preventable deaths in the consecutive years before and after the introduction of the PSMS (p=0.18) 
(table 1). 
figure 1 Numbers of deaths reviewed
table 1 Numbers of deaths and potentially preventable deaths per year. 
* Admissions may include repeated admissions of the same patients
Abbreviations: CDH congenital diaphragmatic hernia; MCA major congenital anomalies; resusc resuscitation; 
abd/surg abdominal/surgical; card cardiac/circulatory; resp respiratory insufficiency; neur neurological; ECMO 
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation
table 2 Background characteristics of potentially preventable deaths and other deaths
Abbreviations:
IQR: interquartile range; MCA: major congenital anomalies; CDH; congenital diaphragmatic hernia; ECMO: 
extracorporeal membrane oxygenation 
year 2001 2002 2006 2007 2009 Total
new admissions* 1023 1042 1196 1192 1189 5642
number deaths 51 63 45 46 50 255
number 
preventable 
deaths (%)
5
(9.8)
5
(7.9)
10
(22.2)
5
(9.8)
6
(10.9)
31
(12.1)
reason 
admission 
preventable 
deaths
CDH 
sepsis
resusc
CDH
MCA
abd/surg
card
CDH
MCA
resp
ECMO
neur 
resp
CDH 
card
abd/surg
resp
CDH
card
MCA
4
1
2
1
1
1
4
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
preventables
N=31
others
N=224
p-value
boy/girl, n (%)
(%)
18/13
(58/42)
112/112
(50/50)
0.40
age at admission (months) 
Median
IQR
1.5
0 -19.4
13.0
1.1 – 69.0
0.003
length of stay (days)
Median
IQR
19
8 - 51
4
2 -14
<0.001
reasons for admission (%)
- resp insufficiency
- cardiac/circulatory
- resuscitation
- MCA, including CDH (10 resp 13)
- neurological
- sepsis
- trauma
- ECMO
- drowning
- abdominal/surgical problem
- suffocation
5 (16.1)
6 (19.3)
2 (6.4)
13 (41.9)
1 (3.2)
1 (3.2)
-
1 (3.2)
-
2 (6.4)
-
65 (29.0)
36 (16.1)
26 (11.6)
25 (11.1)
17 (7.6)
17 (7.6)
17 (7.6)
7 (3.1)
6 (2.7)
5 (2.2)
3 (1.3)
5462
discharges
257 deaths
255 
reviewed
31 
preventable 
deaths
2 records 
missing
40 41
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The number of preventable deaths in 2006 (n=10) was higher than that in all other years (n=5 or 
6). The children who died of potentially preventable adverse events were statistically significantly 
younger than the other deceased children (p=0.003). Their median length of stay was statistically 
significantly longer (19 days versus 4 days respectively, p<0.001). The primary reasons for admission 
are listed in table 2. Of the preventable death patients, 13 (42%) were admitted because of major 
congenital anomalies. Ten of these (32% of all) had a congenital diaphragmatic hernia. 
100 adverse events were identified that contributed to all preventable deaths and were potentially 
preventable The number of adverse events per patient ranged from 1 to 22 with a median of 2 per 
patient (IQR 2 to 3), significantly higher than the median of 0 (IQR 0-1) for the non-preventable 
deaths (p < 0.001). The patient with 22 adverse events was an outlier; she had trisomy 21 with a 
congenital heart defect, pulmonary hypertension, necrotizing enterocolitis with short bowel syn-
drome and tracheal stenosis; was admitted for 529 days; suffered 17 distinct episodes of blood 
stream infections, cholestatic liver insufficiency; and had 3 unplanned returns to surgery. She died 
from a Candida septicemia complicated by intractable pulmonary hypertension. A number of the 
adverse events she suffered occurred in 2005, but for this study they were recorded in 2006, as she 
died in that year. The most frequent occurring adverse events were blood stream infections (35%) 
and neurological damage (14%); the latter comprised hemorrhage, ischemia and hypoxic damage 
of the brain (table 3). 
table 3 numbers and types of potentially preventable adverse events. 
* 1 patient suffered 17 episodes of blood stream infections
† neurological damage: ischemia, bleeding, hypoxic encephalopathy
†† in the category “other”: accidental extubation, severe skin necrosis, myocardial ischemia, medication error, 
diagnostic delay, cholestatic liver insufficiency, pericardial effusion
discussion
This study in a single high volume level III PICU does not show a decrease of potentially preventable 
deaths 5 years after the introduction of a patient safety management system. 
The percentage of preventable deaths is lower (12.1%) than that reported in a study on the then 
surgical PICU in our hospital in 1991, in which over a 10 year period 22% of the investigated deaths 
were classified as preventable. 15 The latter study, however, also took into account adverse events 
outside the PICU. 
The relative high number of potentially preventable deaths in 2006 appears to be a coincidence, 
as there were no significant changes in patient numbers and characteristics, or in staffing, work 
environment and protocols. There is a notable over-representation of patients with major congenital 
anomalies, in particular congenital diaphragmatic hernia, in the entire group of preventable deaths. 
A possible explanation is that these patients undergo highly technological interventions, such as 
Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO). Thus, the nature of the disease and the inherent 
exposure to invasive interventions, implicate that these children are at high risk of adverse events.
Most of the public attention for patient safety has focused on preventable mortality and there is 
an increasing demand for results after years of safety initiatives. The high proportion of preventa-
ble deaths in our unit in earlier years (22%) was the rationale for investigating whether we could 
demonstrate any such results. There are several explanations for the stable numbers of preventable 
deaths over the years. First, the overall mortality in PICUs reached a plateau, around 6% elsewhere 
17-18 and 4.7% in this study. Therefore, it becomes more difficult to observe trends in mortality rates 
in a single unit. Second, the number of potentially preventable deaths is very low, thus making it 
even harder to achieve a significant decrease. 
Also, due to the small numbers, it is impossible to apply multivariate analysis to identify the rele-
vance of contributing factors such as patient or healthcare management problems. Third, the pa-
tient safety management system had been in place for a relatively short period (5 years). Landrigan 
et al reported in 2010 that 6 years of patient safety activities had not yet resulted in a measurable 
decrease of patient harm in 2341 admissions in acute care hospitals in North Carolina, USA. 19 We 
would argue therefore that incidence of preventable deaths is not a very useful outcome measure 
of safe care in pediatric intensive care settings. Another argument against it lies in the difficulties in 
determining preventability. In our study the interrater reliability was not very high, despite the clear 
definitions published by our group in 1991. Other studies into preventable adverse outcomes have 
also reported low interrater reliability. In our opinion it is more relevant to measure harm in the form 
of adverse events and the consequences they carry in terms of patient/parent suffering, length of 
stay and costs. Furthermore, sharing data on numbers and types of these adverse events will enable 
benchmarking, thus facilitating learning from each other. 
A number of studies have looked into preventable mortality in children. In 2010 Pearson et al repor-
ted on the deaths of all children in a large region of the UK in 2006. 20-21 Avoidable factors could be 
identified in 26% of the deaths, and potentially avoidable factors in 43%, in contrast to the 12.1% 
in the present study. Their data also contained trauma, suicide, drowning and other non-healthcare 
adverse events total
Blood stream infections* 35
Neurological damage† 14
Thrombosis 8
Bleeding 7
Other infections 6
Unplanned return to surgery 5
Technical/procedural problem 4
Pleural effusion 4
Resuscitation 3
Pneumothorax/-mediastinum 3
Renal insufficiency 2
Arrhythmia 2
Other†† 7
total 100
42 43
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factors. They did show, however, that the largest clusters of avoidable factors occurred in hospitals, 
and that the problems were mostly related to pre-PICU issues. Monroe et al recently (2011) studied 
the pre-hospital and hospital management of critically ill children dying in the PICU. 22 They reported 
that adverse events contributing to death had occurred in 36% of 47 deceased children. Ninety-one 
percent of the adverse events had occurred in pre-PICU hospital care, 9% in pre-hospital manage-
ment. They did identify critical incidents in the PICU, but none were judged to have contributed to 
death. The difference with our study is that we have focused on adverse events occurring in the 
PICU, thus, our results can not be compared with the Monroe study. Another difference is that we 
have studied multiple time-periods, in an effort to evaluate the effects of the patient safety manage-
ment system. 
A limitation of our study is the lack of risk of scores for disease severity, as it might be argued that 
the most critically ill are more likely to die if an adverse event occurred. These data were not available 
for the years 2001, 2002 and 2006. However, the case mix of the patients appears to be a repre-
sentation of all types of patients admitted to our PICU, and not a selection of the most severely ill. 
Another limitation to the study is the difficulty we experienced in achieving good inter-rater reliabi-
lity. After the review by the original investigators, the interrater reliability was poor. This appeared to 
be caused by the difficulty in determining whether an adverse event had contributed to the death, 
as causality between adverse events and outcome is hard to establish. Also determining the degree 
of preventability was a challenge. 
The information in the medical records quite often had to be complemented with information re-
trieved from the memory of the investigators. This also increases the risk of hindsight bias, as with 
most retrospective studies. 23 The risk of hindsight bias could be reduced by performing retrospec-
tive review with a team of trained caregivers complemented with medical experts from outside the 
hospital. Preferably this would be a two-step review, where investigators first review cases indepen-
dently and then review the cases together. Reviewing mortality is by its very nature retrospective and 
at risk of several methodological weaknesses. Even though preventable deaths are not adequate as 
outcome parameters, we believe its value in uncovering flaws in the care management outweighs 
these counterarguments, and we would like to argue that reviewing deaths needs to remain part 
of intensive care practice. For instance, thoroughly investigating the preventable deaths in Mortality 
and Morbidity conferences provides opportunities for exploring the adverse events and ways to 
prevent them in the future.  
conclusion
Preventable mortality is not an adequate outcome measure for patient safety activities in pediatric 
intensive care units; preventable adverse events might be a better marker. The number of potenti-
ally preventable deaths per year in our single large PICU was small and did not decrease after the 
introduction of a patient safety management system. Larger projects, such as the Dutch Pediatric 
Intensive Care Evaluation Project (in which annual data of all 8 designated PICUs in the Netherlands 
are collected) are necessary to analyze trends in preventable and non-preventable mortality.
references
1.  Institute of Medicine. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson 
MS, editors. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2000.
2.  Berwick DM, Calkins DR, McCannon CJ, et al. The 100,000 lives campaign: setting a goal and a deadline 
for improving health care quality. JAMA. 2006;295(3):324-327
3.  NHS. Patient Safety First. 2008 [updated 2008; cited 2011 august 9]; Available from: 
 www.patientsafetyfirst.nhs.uk/content.aspx?path=/
4.  Zegers M, de Bruijne MC, Wagner C, et al. Adverse events and potentially preventable deaths in Dutch 
hospitals: results of a retrospective patient record review study. Qual Saf Health Care. 2009;18(4):297-302
5.  Frey B, Kehrer B, Losa M, et al. Comprehensive critical incident monitoring in a neonatal-pediatric intensive 
care unit: experience with the system approach. Intensive Care Med. 2000;26(1):69-74
6.  Tibby SM, Correa-West J, Durward A, et al. Adverse events in a paediatric intensive care unit: relationship 
to workload, skill mix and staff supervision. Intensive Care Med. 2004;30(6):1160-1166
7.  Agarwal S, Classen D, Larsen G, et al. Prevalence of adverse events in pediatric intensive care units in the 
United States. Pediatr Crit Care Med. 2010;11(5):568-578
8.  Snijders C, van Lingen RA, Molendijk A, et al. Incidents and errors in neonatal intensive care: a review of 
the literature. Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed. 2007;92(5):F391-398
9.  Morey JC, Simon R, Jay GD, et al. Error reduction and performance improvement in the emergency 
department through formal teamwork training: evaluation results of the MedTeams project. Health Serv 
Res. 2002;37(6):1553-1581
10.  Dunn EJ, Mills PD, Neily J, et al. Medical team training: applying crew resource management in the 
Veterans Health Administration. Jt Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2007;33(6):317-325
11.  Binnekade JM, de Mol BA, Kesecioglu J, et al. The Critical Nursing Situation Index for safety assessment in 
intensive care. Intensive Care Med. 2001;27(6):1022-1028
12. Montgomery VL. Impact of Staff-Led Safety Walk Rounds (Vol. 3: Performance and Tools). 2008;
13.  Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Chapman EJ, et al. How to investigate and analyse clinical incidents: clinical risk 
unit and association of litigation and risk management protocol. BMJ. 2000;320(7237):777-781
14.  van Tilburg CM, Leistikow IP, Rademaker CM, et al. Health Care Failure Mode and Effect Analysis: a useful 
proactive risk analysis in a pediatric oncology ward. Qual Saf Health Care. 2006;15(1):58-63
15.  Hazebroek FW, Tibboel D, Leendertse-Verloop K, et al. Evaluation of mortality in surgical neonates over a 
10-year period: nonpreventable, permissible, and preventable death. J Pediatr Surg. 1991;26(9):1058-1063
16. Altman DG. Practical statistics for medical research. London: Chapman and Hall; 1991.
17.  Garros D, Rosychuk RJ, Cox PN. Circumstances surrounding end of life in a pediatric intensive care unit. 
Pediatrics. 2003;112(5):e371
18.  Sands R, Manning JC, Vyas H, et al. Characteristics of deaths in paediatric intensive care: a 10-year study. 
Nurs Crit Care. 2009;14(5):235-240
19.  Landrigan CP, Parry GJ, Bones CB, et al. Temporal trends in rates of patient harm resulting from medical 
care. N Engl J Med. 2010;363(22):2124-2134
20.  Pearson GA, Ward-Platt M, Harnden A, et al. Why children die: avoidable factors associated with child 
deaths. Arch Dis Child. 2010;
21.  Pearson G. Why cildren die: the report of a pilot confidential enquiry into child death by CEMACH 
(Confidential Enquiry into Maternal and Child Health). Clinical Risk. 2008;14(5):166-168
22.  Monroe K, Wang D, Vincent C, et al. Patient safety factors in children dying in a paediatric intensive care 
unit (PICU): a case notes review study. BMJ Qual Saf. 2011;
23.  Thomas EJ, Lipsitz SR, Studdert DM, et al. The reliability of medical record review for estimating adverse 
event rates. Ann Intern Med. 2002;136(11):812-816
44
Real time registration 
of adverse events in 
Dutch hospitalized 
children in general 
pediatric units: first 
experiences
c h a p t e r  4
2
Part 
Finding the right outcome 
to study patient safety
Van der Starre, van Dijk, Tibboel
Accepted for publication by European Journal of Pediatrics
lara’s story: part 2
Lara was born!
The doctors said she did very well after 
birth; she was crying and could breathe on 
her own. They put an iv-line in her hand 
and took her to the ICU. She weighs only 
1700 grams but the nurse said that’s good 
for her age. Now Thomas and Melissa will 
have to wait and see how Lara will do. The 
doctors and nurses are keeping a close 
eye on her, and they are going to do blood 
tests and X-rays. A couple of hours later, 
Thomas is getting worried about Lara’s 
breathing. She keeps blowing bubbles and 
she has to work really hard to breathe. The 
nurse will call the doctor to have a look. 
Also they are going to check if the tube in 
her nose that has to keep the fluid out of 
her esophagus isn’t blocked. 
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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real time registration of adverse events in dutch hospitalized 
children in general pediatric units: 
first experiences. 
abstract
The objective of this study to describe number and nature of adverse events occurring in general 
pediatric practice; to describe factors contributing to the occurrence of these adverse events; and 
to report on the experience of pediatricians with reporting adverse events. It is a prospective study 
on 11 pediatric units in a three month period; adverse events were registered for all newly admitted 
patients. Ninety-four adverse events were registered in 88 of 5669 patients, amounting to a 1.6 per 
100 admissions rate and a 0.4 per 100 patient days rate. Ninety percent of the adverse events did 
not cause serious harm. Failed diagnostic procedures were most common. 
Conclusion:
Adverse event registration in general pediatric practice is a first step in assessing quality and safety 
of care. It yields a considerable number of adverse events. Compliance to adverse event registration 
in daily practice is difficult but also key to optimal monitoring of quality of care. 
introduction
Since the publication of the report “To Err is Human” 1, quality and safety of care have been 
improved to decrease harm and adverse events. Nevertheless, a recent report showed little progress 
in reducing harm for adult patients in 10 acute care hospitals in North Carolina. 2 Annual adverse 
event rates of 1 to 3.4 % for hospitalized children have been reported in the US. 3-6 Adverse event 
rates for Dutch hospitalized children cannot be determined from available databases. 
The Dutch Ministry of Health decreed that by January 1st 2008 all Dutch hospitals were to have 
a working patient safety management system. The Dutch Health Care Inspectorate subsequently 
established adverse event registration as a quality indicator for Dutch healthcare. These developments 
triggered the Pediatric Association of the Netherlands in collaboration with the Dutch Order of 
Medical Specialists to develop an easy-to-use reporting system for adverse events. The goal is to 
establish the exact rate and nature of adverse events in pediatric practice. The pediatric registration 
system is modeled after the surgical adverse event registration system and is intended to be used 
by all pediatricians in the Netherlands, so it can serve as a benchmarking tool for patient safety 
management. A previous study by Van den Beuken et al tested the design of the registration system 
7; the system was subsequently approved by the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands. In this 
study we report the first experience with prospective voluntary registration of adverse events in 
general pediatric units in Dutch hospitals. We describe the numbers and nature of the adverse 
events, the contributing factors and consequences of the adverse events and report on the findings 
of the pediatricians using this registration system. 
methods
Study design
We conducted a prospective study in 11 general pediatric units in the Netherlands, geographically 
evenly distributed over the Netherlands, and recruited by open invitation. During a 3 month period 
pediatricians collected general data and adverse events for all newly admitted patients on general 
pediatric units. 
Setting
The units employed an average of 9 pediatricians (range 6 to 15) and a changing number of residents 
in training for pediatrics or not in training. Ten units were located in regional hospitals; one was a 
general pediatric unit in a university hospital, providing the same level of care as the non-academic 
units. Four of the ten regional hospitals are pediatric teaching hospitals. The mean number of beds 
in the regional hospitals was 556 (median 570, range 267 – 1070). 
All the pediatricians in each unit agreed to participate in the study and one to three in each unit 
volunteered to be the primary contacts for the study. 
Registration
The general data collected were patient details (name, date of birth, sex, hospital ID) and dates of 
admission and discharge). An adverse event was defined as any harm inflicted on the patient by 
medical care, whether or not the result of an error, with consequences such as adjustment of medical 
management, (permanent) scarring, or lengthening of hospital stay. As a first step in the registration, 
the localization is recorded, i.e. the body site or organ involved, and second the nature of the 
event, i.e. what actually happened. Furthermore, potentially contributing factors are registered, for 
instance placement of a nasogastric tube or administration of medication. Thus, pneumonia due 
to aspiration caused by vomiting during placement of a nasogastric tube would be registered as a 
respiratory adverse event (pneumonia) with placement of nasogastric tube as contributing factor. 
Finally, the consequence of the adverse event was registered. An adverse event was considered to 
have a serious consequence if it resulted in longer hospital stay (≥ 1 day), (temporary) disability or 
death. If a consequence was adjustment of medical management or temporary discomfort (e.g. 
extra blood sampling) it was deemed minor. The adverse events could be registered in handheld 
computers, in computer databases or on paper.
All 21 participating pediatricians (1 to 3 per unit) were assembled twice and instructed on what 
constitutes an adverse event and were trained in the use of the registration system. Formal testing 
of inter-rater reliability on the assessments of adverse events was not performed. The participants 
were requested to register all adverse events in newly admitted patients in the stated period. They 
were recommended to ask nursing and medical staff during daily rounds and handovers about 
occurrences of adverse events. It was left to the participants how the adverse events would be 
brought to their attention, at what time they registered the event and whether or not to invite 
others to register adverse events as well. At the end of the study period, the data were collected by 
the author and imported in a database. The adverse events were reviewed by the author with the 
pediatricians and in cases where there was doubt whether an event was actually validly registered 
as an adverse event, consensus was reached after discussing the adverse event. The adverse events 
were then classified in the categories “diagnostic”, “therapeutic”, “medication”, “non-surgical 
procedure” and “other”. Four weeks after the study all participating units received evaluation forms 
48 49
c
h
ap
ter 4 c
h
ap
te
r 
4
Real time registration of adverse events in Dutch hospitalized children in general pediatric units: first experiencesPART 2
by mail including both multiple choice and open questions on the use of the registration.
results
In three months, 94 adverse events were registered for 88 of 5669 newly admitted patients. Thus, 
the mean adverse event rate was 0.0165 per admission (range 0.004-0.046, median 0.015) and 
0.4 adverse events per 100 patient days (range 0.05-0.9, median 0.3). The distribution over the 
participating units is detailed in table 1; the rates vary widely, with the number of adverse events per 
unit ranging from 1 to 29. 
table 1 Number of adverse events, % advers events per discharge and number adverse events per 100  
 patient days per unit.
* Missing data
Abbreviations:  AE adverse event
  AEs adverse events
The localizations of the adverse events are listed in table 2. The localization “other” (n=54) related 
to the adverse event of “pain” in 27 cases and to “other adverse event” in 26 cases, for instance 
failures in diagnostic procedures. The categories of the adverse events are detailed in table 3. Most 
were of a diagnostic nature. These include blood sampling failure (n=13), lumbar puncture failure 
(n=6) urine sampling failure (n=6) and missed diagnosis (3 cases of appendicitis and one case of 
urosepsis). 
table 2 Distribution of adverse events in localization, n (%)
table 3 Classification of adverse events
Potentially contributing factors to the occurrence of the adverse event were registered in 48 of the 
94 adverse events (51.8%) (table 4). In 16 cases (17.2%) a failure in the medication process; in 6 
cases lumbar puncture (in 5 cases a dry tap and in 1 case the liquor sample was lost). A urinary 
catheter or catheterization was related to an adverse event in 5 cases: 3 catheterizations failed, 1 
urine sample was lost; and 1 patient developed urinary tract infection while having a urinary catheter 
in situ.
unit a
(n=546)
unit b
(n=629)
unit c
(n=602)
unit d
(n=528)
unit e
(n= 535)
unit f
(n=543)
adverse events
(% of aes per 
discharge)
5
(0.9%)
29
(4.6%)
3
(0.5%)
10
(1.9%)
5
(0.9%)
4
(0.7%)
number aes / 100 
patient days
-* 0.9 -* 0.4 0.2 0.1
unit g
(n=274)
unit h
(n=785)
unit i
(n=493)
unit j
(n=482)
unit K
(n=252)
total
(n=5669)
adverse events
(% of aes per 
discharge)
6
(2.2%)
12
(1.5%)
10
(2.0%)
9
(1.9%)
1
(0.4%)
94
(1.65%, 
median 
1.5%)
number aes / 100 
patient days
0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.05
0.4 
(median 
0.3)
category n=94 (100%)
Diagnostic 38 (40.4%)
Therapewutic 20 (21.3%)
Medication 19 (20.2%)
Non surgical procedures 11 (11.7%)
Other  6   (6.4%)
localization number %
Other  54 57.4
Biochemistry 12 12.8
Skin 9 9.6
Respiratory system 8 8.5
Gastro-enterologic system 5 5.3
Circulatory system 3 3.2
Haematological system 2 2.1
Urinary tract 1 1.1
Total 94 100
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table 4 Specification of potentially contributing factors to adverse events
* father cut umbilical cord below umbilical clamp
As to the consequences, medical management was adjusted in 51% of the adverse events. The 
consequences were serious in 18 cases (20%): 16 patients needed to stay longer in hospital, with a 
median lengthening of 1 day, one was readmitted and one died due to a Gram-negative sepsis. The 
consequences classified as ‘other’ (n=28, 30%) ranged from scarring following a burn, intensified 
monitoring after a fall, to discomfort from extra blood sampling. 
Eight of the 11 participating units returned the evaluation forms. Five of 8 units had no adverse 
event registration system in place before the study. At the time of the study 7 units used a voluntary 
incident reporting system. The adverse events were mostly registered during daily rounds (in 5 of the 
8 units), but also upon discovery, during hand overs or weekly multidisciplinary rounds. In 4 units a 
designated pediatrician registered the adverse events whereas in the other four units all physicians 
(pediatricians and residents) participated in registering. In 2 units the adverse events were registered 
directly in the handheld computer; in 5 units a paper registration was used and the adverse events 
were later entered in the handheld computer. Two units had initiated improvements: a protocol was 
reviewed and a different type of oxygen sensors was purchased because burns had occurred with 
the previously used type.
discussion
In this study, adverse event registration as part of standard care in general pediatric practice yielded a 
considerable number of adverse events. Most adverse events registered were of a diagnostic nature. 
The adverse events resulted in longer hospital stay for 1 in 6 of the patients that suffered an adverse 
event.
This study is the first to register real time data on adverse events in general pediatric practice in the 
Netherlands. Most of the earlier studies used administrative data to retrospectively evaluate harm 
to hospitalized children. Miller and Zahn studied the 2000 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project 
Database that included 5.7 million pediatric discharges. 8 Using the AHRQ’s Patient Safety Indicators 9 
they uncovered 1.2 adverse events per 100 discharges 8, including events related to birth, procedures 
and surgery in all children, whereas our study was limited to general pediatric units, and birth 
trauma and surgical or anesthetic adverse events were not recorded. Woods et al found an adverse 
event rate of 1 per 100 discharges by retrospectively analyzing 3719 pediatric hospitalizations in the 
Colorado and Utah Medical Practice Study. 10 Again, in that study most adverse events occurred in 
newborns and were birth related; 16% of the adverse events were surgical. Dunn and colleagues 
found an adverse event rate of 0.26 per 100 discharges in a retrospective review of 1612 selected 
records. 11
The rate of 0.0165 adverse events per admission in our study is higher than the rates of adverse 
events in those studies – even though obstetrical and surgical adverse events were not registered 
in our study. This may be due to the prospective nature of our study and the commitment of the 
participating pediatricians. Also, our study used real time data, whereas previous studies used 
administrative data to identify adverse events, a method which is neither highly sensitive nor specific. 
12 A striking finding is the wide range of numbers of registered adverse events by the different 
units (1 to 29). We speculate this to be a reflection of the zeal of the involved pediatricians, rather 
than of a difference in level of care, number of admissions or severity of sickness of the patients. 
Part of the differences between units can be explained by the fact that some physicians felt all 
events resulting in harm for the patient were to be considered adverse events, where others would 
consider such an event an anticipated result of a procedure (for instance a dry tap during a lumbar 
puncture). It was argued that in some of these cases, the adverse event might have occurred because 
of poor supervision of inexperienced residents and thus should be registered. Another reason for 
the differences between the units could be that some participants felt that any adjustment of 
management after an event (for instance loss of a blood sample, necessitating more drawing of 
blood samples, thus causing pain to the patient) needed to be registered, where others considered 
this to be (an unfortunate) part of pediatric practice.   
A limitation to this study is the lack of a gold standard for detecting adverse events, and several 
methods have been proven to underestimate the actual occurrences of adverse events. Probably not 
all adverse events were detected with the real time registration, and we did not compare the results 
of the registration with other promising new methods such as the trigger tool methodology. 13
Another limitation to this study is the lack of inter-rater reliability testing. Still, participants were 
taught that only events that led to harm and necessitated a change in medical management were 
to be registered. 
external factor no
% of 
aes
corresponding adverse events no
Medication failure 16 17.2
Hypoglycemia
Hyperglycemia
Hyponatriemia
Hypokaliemia
Bleeding
Other
3
2
2
1
1
7
Lumbar puncture 6 6.4 Diagnostic failure 6
Urinary catheter 5 5.4
Diagnostic failure
Cystitis
4
1
Peripheral venous access 5 5.4
Phlebitis
Hypoglycemia 
4
1
Suprapubic aspiration 4 4.3 Diagnostic failure 4
Endotracheal tube 3 3.2 Hypoxia 3
External heater 2 2.2 Burn 2
Central venous line 2 2.2
Bleeding
Hypoglycemia 
1
1
Mechanical ventilation 1 1.1 Hypoxia 1
Nasogastric tube 1 1.1 Aspiration 1
SpO2 sensor 1 1.1 Burn 1
pH probe 1 1.1 Diagnostic failure 1
Other (scissors) * 1 1.1 other 1
total 48 51.8%
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However, a number of advantages to real time registration can be identified. Real time registration 
as applied in our study is thought more reliable in detecting actual harm than voluntary incident 
reporting. In incident reporting it is encouraged to also report near-misses, which did not reach the 
patient and thus did not cause any harm or errors that did reach the patient but did not lead to harm. 
Also, voluntary reporting is well known for its underreporting, especially of more serious events 
such as nosocomial infections or diagnostic failures. 14-17 Nevertheless, incident reporting has been 
introduced in Dutch pediatric practice under the name NEOSAFE Project and is widely used. 18 The 
NEOSAFE study by Snijders et al reported significant harm in 70 of 4846 incidents reports (1.4%), a 
considerably lower rate than the serious consequences for the patients with adverse events in our 
study (n=18 in 88 patients, 20%).
Herein lies one of the arguments for direct registration of adverse events by the pediatricians 
themselves. By registering adverse events locally, underreporting might be less of an issue. Also, by 
gathering data locally, as opposed to centrally in a national database, the number and nature of the 
adverse events are very accessible and thus provide direct feedback to the pediatricians of the quality 
of the care delivered in their unit and hospital. Moreover, this direct registration provides information 
on the causes of the adverse event and on contributing factors that may be helpful in giving direction 
to improvement initiatives. Last but not least, it allows the focus of further investigations to be 
directed away from the role of the individual in the origin of the event towards the whole care 
delivery system as the source of the adverse event. 17, 19-20 
Another limitation of this study was to keep the physicians engaged in registering adverse events. 
Participants were very motivated, though, but quite often found that their colleagues were less likely 
to report adverse events. This can partially explain the large differences in numbers of adverse events 
per unit. Underreporting prevents good benchmarking of quality of care, so this issue should be 
addressed by each physician, unit or hospital committed to improving quality of care. Prospectively 
registering adverse events could well be a means to engage physicians and convince them that 
studying the adverse events and their causes can guide improvement programs and help assess 
the effects of those programs. 21 Nevertheless, very few improvement initiatives were reported in 
the evaluation forms. A number of pediatricians told they were going to deploy initiatives after the 
study. The prospective registration of adverse events was likely an important step, and for some units 
a first step, in creating awareness of quality and safety issues. 
conclusion
 
We believe that prospective registration of adverse events is a first step towards good monitoring 
of quality of care in general pediatric practice. A nationwide used registration system allows 
benchmarking within pediatrics. The registration system described in this study could be a useful 
tool, provided it is integrated in the daily practice of everybody working in pediatric units: nurses, 
residents and pediatricians. Prevalence, effects and causes of adverse events need to be further 
researched so that the findings may serve to develop programs for the prevention of adverse events 
in hospitalized children. 
acknowledgements
We thank the paediatric units of Albert Schweitzer Ziekenhuis Dordrecht; Catharina Ziekenhuis 
Eindhoven; Diakonessenhuis Utrecht; Flevo Ziekenhuis Almere; Groene Hart Ziekenhuis 
Gouda; Martini Ziekenhuis Groningen; Maxima Medisch Centrum Veldhoven; Medisch 
Spectrum Twente Enschede; Zaans Medisch Centrum Zaanstad; Zuiderzeeziekenhuis 
Lelystad; Wilhelmina Kinderziekenhuis Utrecht. 
54 55
c
h
ap
ter 4 c
h
ap
te
r 
4
Real time registration of adverse events in Dutch hospitalized children in general pediatric units: first experiencesPART 2
references
1.  Institute of Medicine. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS, 
editors. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press; 2000.
2.  Landrigan CP, Parry GJ, Bones CB, et al. Temporal trends in rates of patient harm resulting from medical care. 
N Engl J Med. 2010;363(22):2124-2134
3.  Meurer JR, Yang H, Guse CE, et al. Medical injuries among hospitalized children. Qual Saf Health Care. 
2006;15(3):202-207
4.  Miller MR, Elixhauser A, Zhan C. Patient safety events during pediatric hospitalizations. Pediatrics. 2003;111(6 
Pt 1):1358-1366
5.  Slonim AD, LaFleur BJ, Ahmed W, et al. Hospital-reported medical errors in children. Pediatrics. 
2003;111(3):617-621
6.  Woods DM, Holl JL, Klein JD, et al. Patient safety problems in adolescent medical care. J Adolesc Health. 
2006;38(1):5-12
7.  van den Beuken MGA, Schulpen TWJ, te Pas E, et al. Complicatieregistratie in de kindergeneeskundige 
praktijk. Tijdschrift voor Kindergeneeskunde. 2006;74(6):106-113
8.  Miller MR, Zhan C. Pediatric patient safety in hospitals: a national picture in 2000. Pediatrics. 2004;113(6):1741-
1746
9.  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Measures of Patient Safety Based on Hospital Administrative 
Data- The Patient Safety Indicators. McDonald KM, Romano PS, Geppert JJ, Davies SM, Duncan BW, Shojania 
KG, et al., editors. Rockville (MD); 2002.
10.  Woods D, Thomas E, Holl J, et al. Adverse events and preventable adverse events in children. Pediatrics. 
2005;115(1):155-160
11.  Dunn KL, Reddy P, Moulden A, et al. Medical record review of deaths, unexpected intensive care unit 
admissions, and clinician referrals: detection of adverse events and insight into the system. Arch Dis Child. 
2006;91(2):169-172
12.  Landrigan CP. The safety of inpatient pediatrics: preventing medical errors and injuries among hospitalized 
children. Pediatr Clin North Am. 2005;52(4):979-993, vii
13.  Matlow AG, Cronin CM, Flintoft V, et al. Description of the development and validation of the Canadian 
Paediatric Trigger Tool. BMJ Qual Saf. 2011;20(5):416-423
14.  Capuzzo M, Nawfal I, Campi M, et al. Reporting of unintended events in an intensive care unit: comparison 
between staff and observer. BMC Emerg Med. 2005;5(1):3
15.  Espin S, Wickson-Griffiths A, Wilson M, et al. To report or not to report: a descriptive study exploring ICU 
nurses’ perceptions of error and error reporting. Intensive Crit Care Nurs. 2010;26(1):1-9
16.  Evans SM, Berry JG, Smith BJ, et al. Attitudes and barriers to incident reporting: a collaborative hospital study. 
Qual Saf Health Care. 2006;15(1):39-43
17.  Sharek PJ, Horbar JD, Mason W, et al. Adverse events in the neonatal intensive care unit: development, 
testing, and findings of an NICU-focused trigger tool to identify harm in North American NICUs. Pediatrics. 
2006;118(4):1332-1340
18.  Snijders C, van Lingen RA, Klip H, et al. Specialty-based, voluntary incident reporting in neonatal intensive 
care: description of 4846 incident reports. Arch Dis Child Fetal Neonatal Ed. 2009;94(3):F210-215
19.  Resar RK, Rozich JD, Simmonds T, et al. A trigger tool to identify adverse events in the intensive care unit. Jt 
Comm J Qual Patient Saf. 2006;32(10):585-590
20.  Takata GS, Mason W, Taketomo C, et al. Development, testing, and findings of a pediatric-focused trigger 
tool to identify medication-related harm in US children’s hospitals. Pediatrics. 2008;121(4):e927-935
21.  Michel P, Quenon JL, de Sarasqueta AM, et al. Comparison of three methods for estimating rates of adverse 
events and rates of preventable adverse events in acute care hospitals. BMJ. 2004;328(7433):199
56
Monitoring patient 
harm in a paediatric 
intensive care unit: 
What is the best 
method
c h a p t e r  5
2
Part 
Finding the right outcome 
to study patient safety
Van der Starre, van Dijk, Tibboel
Submitted to BMJ Quality and Safety
58 59
c
h
ap
ter 5 c
h
ap
te
r 
5
Monitoring patient harm in a paediatric intensive care unit: What is the best method?PART 2
monitoring patient harm in a paediatric intensive care unit: 
what is the best method?
abstract 
Objectives:
To determine the best method to detect and monitor adverse events in paediatric intensive care units 
and to identify and characterize events causing harm.  
Design:
A 2 year observational study using an electronic database review process for the presence of trig-
gers and adverse events compared with real time voluntary adverse event registration by physicians. 
Setting:
A 14-bed level III paediatric surgical intensive care unit in a university children’s hospital that admits 
approximately 550 patients per year and delivers all types of intensive care, including extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation, but excluding cardiothoracic surgery. 
Main outcome measure:
Numbers and types of adverse events detected with the trigger tool in electronic databases and 
those registered by physicians during daily rounds. Adverse events were defined as any unfavourable 
and unintended injury resulting from or contributed to by medical treatment during the intensive 
care unit stay that necessitated adjustment of medical management or resulted in harm for the 
patient.
Results:
The two methods together detected 804 adverse events in 279 of 1223 admitted patients (22.8%), 
i.e. 0.66 adverse events per patient. The trigger tool alone detected 70% (n=560) of the adverse 
events; the physician registration 35% (n=282) and 38 events (4.7%) were detected with both 
methods. The most frequently detected adverse events with either method were uncontrolled pain 
and nosocomial infection.
Conclusion:
Application of the trigger tool methodology using electronic databases as a source yielded a high 
number of adverse events but had missed relatively many events, i.e. those reported by the physici-
ans only, representing 30% of all adverse events detected with the two methods combined. These 
are the ones that can be prevented. Thus, voluntary reporting, preferably by both physicians and 
nurses, remains indispensable next to the trigger tool methodology. 
introduction
Ever since the first reports on patient harm caused by healthcare management 1-5, initiatives have 
been launched to reduce preventable mortality and morbidity. 6-8 Adverse events leading to patient 
harm occur regularly in paediatrics 9-12 and paediatric and neonatal intensive care in particular. 13-17 
Detecting and monitoring adverse events in a reliable way is difficult. Methods such as voluntary 
incident reporting, identifying indicators from electronic databases, and medical record review all 
are suspected of underestimating the actual rate of the adverse events. 18-21 Recently, the trigger 
tool methodology developed by the Institute for Healthcare Improvement 22-24 has been shown to 
identify high numbers of adverse events. The Global Trigger Tool has been adapted for various pae-
diatric settings resulting in amongst others the PICU Trigger Tool and the NICU Trigger Tool. 14-15, 17, 
25-26 The trigger tool is a list of ‘clues’ or ‘flags’ that are identified by a targeted search of a sample 
of medical records. If a trigger is found, further evaluation should clarify if it was related to an ad-
verse event, and, if so, whether this adverse event has caused harm to the patient. For instance the 
administration of naloxon is a trigger that can identify an adverse event such as morphine overdose. 
Events that caused no change, or only a minor change in the patient’s physical condition or medical 
management, are not considered to be adverse events. 
Applying the trigger tool to computerized data rather than medical records is suggested to be more 
efficient and reliable. 22, 27 All admitted patients can then easily be reviewed, instead of only a sam-
ple, thus providing a more complete picture of adverse events on a ward.  
The goal of our study was to determine numbers and types of adverse events in a single paediatric 
surgical intensive care unit by applying the trigger tool methodology and to compare findings with 
those obtained with the method of real time reporting by the unit’s physicians. 
methods
Design
This study is a combined approach of evaluation of electronic database data and physicians’ regis-
tration of adverse events in all patients admitted to the paediatric surgical intensive care unit (PSICU) 
in a 2 year period (2006-2007). Adverse events were defined as “any unfavourable and unintended 
injury resulting from or contributed to by medical treatment during the intensive care stay that ne-
cessitated adjustment of medical management or resulted in harm for the patient ”. Adverse events 
occurring elsewhere prior to the ICU admission were not included. 
Setting
At the time of the study, the PSICU is a 14 bed level III unit in a university children’s hospital, with 
around 550 admissions per year. It serves a referral region of 4 million inhabitants and delivers 
intensive care for all surgical subspecialties, except cardiothoracic surgery. Apart from the care for 
newborns with major congenital anomalies, the facilities also include transplant surgery, orthopae-
dic and craniofacial surgery, trauma care and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. The medical 
staff consists of 3 paediatric intensivists, 1 paediatric anaesthiologist-intensivist, 1 paediatrician-
neonatologist, 2-3 fellows paediatric intensive care and 5-7 residents.
A patient safety management system is in place since 2005, which now has come to include adverse 
event registration, voluntary incident reporting 28, scoring of nursing protocol violations 29, team 
resource management training 30, retrospective incident analysis 31, prospective risk analysis 32, safety 
walk rounds 33, simulation team training, and safety oriented mortality and morbidity conferences.
Data collection
Real time adverse event registration 
Since November 2005, the fellow or consultant in charge recorded details of any adverse event that 
was brought to the attention during the daily rounds. Details included the patient’s personal data, 
date of the adverse event, description of the adverse event, and the effects of the adverse event (e.g. 
adjustment of management, temporary scarring, contributing to death). 
If data were not clear or inconsistent, the investigator (CvdS) questioned the involved staff member 
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to resolve these issues.
Retrospective trigger tool application
Because of the specific case mix of the PSICU, including newborns with congenital anomalies, we 
used the PICU Trigger Tool complemented with 4 triggers from the NICU Trigger Tool: “pneumatosis 
intestinalis” (for the adverse event necrotizing enterocolitis), “abnormal cranial imaging” (hemor-
rhage, ischemia, and infarction), “octreotide use” (pleural effusion/chylothorax) and “out of range 
levels of antibiotics” (medication error). 
Using the tool we searched for triggers in the hospital electronic database that contains all the data 
on admission and discharge dates, laboratory results, pathology results, microbiology lab results, 
radiology reports, surgery reports and discharge letters to the referring doctors and the general prac-
titioners. In addition, the patient data management system (PDMS), which records all vital signs, pain 
scores, nursing notes, fluid/medication administration and other relevant nursing care information. 
was screened for the presence of triggers. 
For any trigger found, we further searched the electronic databases for evidence of adverse events. 
For example, as a trigger for resuscitation, we would search the PDMS-database for administration 
of epinephrine, followed by reviewing the discharge letter and PDMS nursing notes for the occur-
rence of resuscitation. 
Two triggers included in the original tool were not searched for: “hypotension” and “drop in hemo-
globin/hematocrite”. It is hard to define abnormal values due to the wide range of ages, weights 
and diseases in our ICU. Also, the PDMS contains numerous false values, i.e. when failing invasive 
or non-invasive measurements of blood pressure were recorded as actual real values. The trigger 
“drop in hemoglobin/hematocrite” (for the adverse event “bleeding”) was replaced by the trigger 
“bleeding” as a search term in discharge letters and PDMS nursing notes.
Statistical analysis
Numbers and types of the adverse events are presented as median with interquartile ranges. Back-
ground characteristics of patients with and patients without adverse events were compared using 
the chi square test or Mann Whitney test when appropriate. A p-value of 0.05 (two-sided) was 
deemed statistically significant. 
results
The number of admissions in the study period was 1491, concerning 1223 patients. The number of 
patient days was 11101. The two different methods (trigger tool and physician registration) yielded 
804 adverse events in 279 patients (22.8% of all patients). Thus the adverse event rate is 0.66 per 
patient or 7.2 per 100 patient days. The trigger tool yielded 560 adverse events (69.7%); the physi-
cian registration 282 (35.1%); the overlap was 38 (4.7%; detected with both methods). 
table 1a   Numbers of adverse events found with either method per patient and per 100 admission days.
table 1b Numbers of adverse events detected with 2 methods and their overlap. 
trigger tool aes (n (%))
yes no 
physician
registration aes (n(%))
yes 38 (4.7) 244 (30.3) 282 (35.1)
no 522 (64.9) - 522 (64.9)
560 (69.7) 244 (30.3) 804 (100)
AE= Adverse Event
The patients in whom adverse events occurred, were statistically significantly younger (median 3.3 
months versus 12.2 months, (p<0.001)) and were admitted longer than the others (median 11 days 
versus 2 days (p<0.001)).  
The most frequent adverse events were uncontrolled pain (26.3%), nosocomial infection (15.8%), 
constipation (9.3%) and malpositioning of endotracheal tube (4.8%). Table 2 lists all occurrences 
of adverse events, broken down by detection method. The top 3 adverse events detected with the 
trigger tool are uncontrolled pain, nosocomial infections and constipation, and these were poorly 
detected with physician registration. Of the adverse events only detected with physician registration, 
catheter complications (n=30), nosocomial infections (n=26), metabolic disturbances (n=19), medi-
cation error (n=16) and accidental extubation (n=15) were the most frequent.
Combined
(n=804)
Trigger tool
(n=560)
Physician registration 
(n=282)
AEs/patient 0.66 0.46 0.23
% patients ≥1 AE 22.8% 19.2% 10.8%
AEs/100 days 7.2 5.0 2.5
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table 2 Number of adverse events, number of triggers, number (%) detected with trigger tool, numbers (%)  
 detected with registration, numbers (%) detected with both methods. 
Abbreviations: AE adverse event, TT trigger tool, AER adverse event registration, Rx therapy
Miscellaneous: Pulmonary edema, fall, right ventricular hypertrophia, developmental delay, hypothyreoidy, cho-
lestasis, compartment syndrome, dehiscence post laparotomy, diaphragm paralysis, corneal lesion, surgical fai-
lure, bowel perforation, pericardial effusion, esophageal perforation, diarrhoea
discussion
The electronic trigger tool methodology and physician registration together detected a large number 
of adverse events. However, the physicians missed 65% of the adverse events; the trigger tool me-
thodology 30%. Physician underreporting was found as well in other studies in adult medical and 
surgical settings 18, 34-35 It is hard to estimate how many adverse events might have been missed by 
applying the electronic search only instead of searching the paper medical records. Adverse events 
such as accidental extubation or catheter complications (accidental removal, blockage, malpositio-
ning) tend to be recorded in medical records but may be hard to find with the trigger search of our 
electronic databases.
The number of adverse events identified with the combined approach (0.66 per patient) was smaller 
than in the studies by Larsen et al 15 and Agarwal et al 17 (1.96 and 2.03 per patient, respectively) 
(Table 4).
table 4 Numbers of adverse event rates in the literature.
Abbreviations: AE  adverse event
  PICU paediatric intensive care unit
  NICU neonatal intensive care unit
A focused review of a sample of patient records compared with a search through an electronic 
database of all admissions is likely to yield a higher number of adverse events. Silas et al reported a 
comparable rate of adverse events as in our study, but included events with little or no harm, which 
we excluded. Our detection rate is higher than that in the prospective studies by Stambouly et al 13 
(0.11 AE/patient) and Tibby et al 36 (0.35 AE/patient), so the addition of the trigger methodology to 
prospective reporting clearly has an added value, as appears also from the studies by Sharek, Larsen 
and Agarwal. 14-15, 17 The Global Trigger Tool has been adapted for different paediatric settings, and 
we found it necessary to adapt the PICU version because of the specific case mix of our unit. 
rank adverse events no. trig no. ae 
tt
(%)
aer
(%)
overlap
(%)
1 Uncontrolled pain 405 212 210 (99.1) 2 (0.9) -
2 Nosocomial infections 660 128 102 (80.3) 43 (33.9) 17 (13.4)
3 Constipation 124 75 69 (92.0) 6 (8.0) -
4 Malposition endotracheal tube 158 37 37 (94.9) - -
5 Catheter complication 9 31 1 (3.2) 30 (96.8) -
6 Hypoglycemia (insulin Rx) 48 27 24 (88.9) 4 (14.8) 1 (3.7)
7 Accidental extubation 12 25 10 (40.0) 21 (84.0) 6 (24.0)
8 Bleeding 30 23 11 (47.8) 12 (52.2) -
9-10
Metabolic dysregulation
Postextubation stridor/tracheal lesion
-
42
19
19
- 
11 (57.9)
19 (100)
10 (52.6)
-
2 (10.5)
11 Pleural effusion 12 18 14 (77.8) 8 (44.4) 4 (22.2)
12 Decubitus/pressure ulcers 16 17 10 (58.8) 8 (47.1) 1 (5.9)
13-14
Medication error
Pneumothorax
61
11
16
16
-
10 (62.5)
16 (100)
8 (50.0)
-
2 (12.5)
15 Thrombosis 52 14 10 (71.4) 7 (50.0) 3 (21.4)
16-17
Narcotic overdose/oversedation
Atelectasis 
12
-
12
12
11 (91.7)
-
1 (8.3)
12 (100)
-
-
18 Respiratory distress - 10 - 10 (100) -
19 Withdrawal 9 9 7 (77.8) 2 (22.2) -
20 Resuscitation 7 8 4 (50.0) 4 (50.0) -
21-24
Brain damage
Hyperglycemia
Thrombopenia
Diagnostic failure
22
-
-
-
6
6
6
6
6 (100)
-
-
-
1 (16.7)
6 (100)
6 (100)
6 (100)
1 (16.7)
-
-
-
25-26
Unplanned readmission
Renal failure
9
175
5
5
4 (80.0)
3 (60.0)
1 (20.0)
2 (40.0)
-
-
27 Hypotension - 4 - 4 (100) -
28-32
Allergic reaction
Unplanned return to surgery
Fluid overload
Skin burn
Hypertension
68
7
-
-
-
3
3
3
3
3
3 (100)
2 (66.7)
-
-
-
-
2 (66.7)
3 (100)
3 (100)
3 (100)
-
1 (33.3)
-
-
-
33-36
Seizures
Anemia
Agitation/delirium
Osteopenia
-
-
-
-
2
2
2
2
-
-
-
-
2 (100)
2 (100)
2 (100)
2 (100)
-
-
-
-
37-51
Miscellanous (n=15)
90 
(pulm 
edema)
15
1 (100) 
(pulm 
edema)
1 (100) -
study (year) setting
ae rate / 
patient
% patients 
with ≥ 1 ae
aes / 100 
days
methodology
Agarwal et al 
(2010)
15 PICUs 2.03 62% 28.6 PICU trigger tool
Larsen et al 
(2007)
1 PICU 1.96 59% 53 PICU Trigger tool 
Sharek et al 
(2006)
15 NICUs 0.74 - 3.2 NICU trigger tool
Silas et al 
(2010)
1 PICU 0.71 26% -
Systematic review and voluntary 
reporting (incl no-little harm 
events)
Tibby et al 
(2004)
1 PICU 0.35 22% 6.0
Voluntary event reporting (incl 
near-misses)
Stambouly et 
al (1996)
1 PICU 0.11 8% 2.7 Daily survey for AEs
Van der Starre 
et al (2011)
1 surg 
PICU
0.66 23% 7.3
Adapted PICU trigger tool and 
AE registration
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As advocated by Resar et al 22 it is a flexible methodology, which allows collection of data in different 
environments so individual units can apply the adapted version that best fits their case mix. The same 
trigger tool must be used, however, for benchmarking purposes. 
In our study, the physician registration yielded relevant additional adverse events that are likely to 
be missed by searching only medical records or electronic databases, such as respiratory distress, 
bleeding or atelectasis. Also, especially those adverse events that are potentially preventable are re-
gistered, such as catheter complications, medication errors and accidental extubations, as was found 
in the study by O’Neil as well. 18 The most effective and reliable way to monitor patient harm seems 
to be a combination of methods, as advocated by previous studies. Silas et al reported a similar small 
overlap of detection of adverse events. Only 9% of the adverse events in a PICU were detected by 
both voluntary incident reporting and systematic review by a physician actively searching for adverse 
events. 16 Naessens et al performed a retrospective chart review in three general hospitals, and 
found very little overlap between 3 different methods for detecting harm (global trigger tool, patient 
safety indicators from the AHRQ and provider reports). 35 Another argument in favour of physician 
registration is that physicians tend to report the most noteworthy and often serious adverse events 
– those that often leave an impression with the care providers. Finally, having physicians reporting 
on (serious) adverse events may make them more aware of the importance of providing safe care. 
The combined methodology in the present study yielded the same types of adverse events as those 
reported in other PICU adverse event studies. 13, 15, 17 Noteworthy are the high incidence of uncontrol-
led pain and the fact that this was underreported by physicians. The trigger uncontrolled pain was 
defined by scores on two validated pain assessment instruments, the COMFORT behaviour scale and 
the VAS. 37-39 The trigger was positive if scores were too high at two consecutive time points with at 
least two hours interval. One of the explanations for the high incidence of uncontrolled pain may 
be the fact that the scores had actually been recorded in a high number of patients, (1567 distinct 
episodes) and the high numbers of surgical patients in our unit. These high numbers of occurrences 
of uncontrolled pain underline the importance of urgent interventions to address this issue. Noso-
comial infections also ranked high, as in other pediatric intensive care settings. 15, 17 Also, as in pre-
vious studies the younger patients were at higher risk of adverse events. This might be explained by 
their great vulnerability and the more hazardous technical interventions they are subjected to. Also, 
our population included a high percentage of newborns with congenital malformations who had 
undergone surgery, which has been shown to increase the likelihood of adverse events. 17 Adverse 
events have been associated with longer PICU stay. 13, 15, 17 It remains unresolved, however, whether 
the adverse events cause longer stay, or whether longer stay increases the risk of adverse events. 
For example, surgical treatment of a major congenital anomaly is associated with a lengthy hospital 
stay in itself; it would be hard to tell whether a nosocomial infection would actually increase length 
of hospital stay. 
Limitations
Several limitations of this study should be addressed. First, the lack of a gold standard to determine 
the number and nature of adverse events limits any study on adverse events. Second, determining 
whether a trigger has led to an adverse event or not may have been subjective. By adhering to the 
definition of an adverse event, that is, an event resulting in an adjustment of medical management 
or harm to the patient, we excluded near-misses and thus detected only actual adverse events. 
conclusion
Monitoring adverse events is best done with multiple methods, for example the trigger tool metho-
dology combined with physicians’ registration. The development of new triggers could be helpful in 
detecting the adverse events that were solely identified with physicians’ registration. The types of ad-
verse events registered by physicians (catheter complications, medication errors and accidental extu-
bations) are prominently those that could be prevented with targeted interventions. While new trig-
gers are developed, further research should also be aimed at improving engagement of physicians 
in registering adverse events; this could be helpful to maximize yield of adverse event monitoring. 
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lara’s story: part 3
Something went wrong! 
Thomas and Melissa were rushed to the 
ICU after Lara had been resuscitated. She 
was taken to the operation room and now 
they are waiting for the surgeon. The IC 
doctors explained that Lara was having 
more and more trouble breathing on her 
own and that they had to intubate her to 
help her breathing. Then, Lara’s condition 
worsened very quickly, and they had to 
use chest compressions and medication 
to keep her alive. Melissa and Thomas 
wonder: what has happened? What went 
wrong? And why? Are they going to make 
sure it won’t happen again, not to Lara 
and not to any other baby? But most of all: 
how will Lara be after all that? 
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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abstract
Objective:
To identify causal and contributing factors of serious patient safety incidents in a paediatric university 
hospital; to report recommendations stemming from incident analyses; to describe barriers to 
incident analysis. 
Methods:
Possible causal and contributing factors identified in 17 incident analysis procedures were classified 
according to a classification by Vincent and colleagues. Proposed recommendations were classified 
accordingly and degrees of implementation were established.
Results:
A median of 5 causal and contributing factors per incident were identified (range 2-10; total 85). Team 
factors and task factors each comprised 22% of all factors, provider factors 20%, work environment 
19%, organizational factors 11%, and patient factors 6%. A median of 5 recommendations per 
analysis were formulated (range 1-8; total 84). Most recommendations related to task factors (36%), 
followed by team factors (21%), organizational factors (19%), work environment factors (15%), 
and provider factors (8%). Patient-related recommendations were not given. The time load of each 
analysis was a mean of 27 hours. One third of the recommendations have been acted upon, mostly 
those related to task factors and team factors.
Conclusion:
Incident analysis is time-consuming but yields valuable information on causal and contributing factors, 
presenting numerous opportunities for quality improvement. Failure to put the recommendations 
into practice diminishes the value of these analyses. It is therefore crucial that senior management 
and clinical leaders act adequately upon recommendations.  
introduction
Reports on paediatric patient safety 1-5 have made clear that children in intensive care units are at 
high risk of incidents and adverse events. Incidents are defined as events that could or did lead to 
harm in patients. As an illustration, voluntary incident reporting in Dutch NICUs yielded 1.3 incidents 
per admission 6; and Agarwal and colleagues reported adverse events in almost two thirds of PICU 
patients in the USA. 5 Other studies have reported from 2.5 to 10 incidents and adverse events per 
admission. 5, 7-12 Patient safety programs 13-16 suggest we first need to learn from the incidents before 
effective preventive measures can be taken. 
Seeking answers to the following three questions is central here: what has actually occurred? 
What causes and circumstances contributed to allow the incident to occur? What measures and 
interventions could prevent recurrence? Root cause analysis may be able to answer these questions 
15, 17-18, notably Reason’s systems approach. 19-20 Errors are usually the result of a chain of events; they 
occur not only because of human failure, but also because there may be no or ineffective barriers to 
prevent an error from reaching its unfortunate endpoint. Reason’s approach focuses on the flaws in 
the system rather than on human failure, and is applied because interventions to avoid the first are 
more effective. 21 
The paediatric and neonatal intensive care units in the Erasmus MC - Sophia Children’s Hospital 
have been patient safety pioneers in this hospital. They were the first to implement voluntary 
incident reporting 6 and incident analysis. The PICU later also put in place adverse event registration 
and scoring of nursing protocol violations. 22 In 2005 the entire PICU staff received crew resource 
management training from the Dutch Centre for Man and Aviation. The patient safety officers have 
adapted this training course to the medical setting and since then have been training new PICU 
employees and all NICU staff. Other patient safety activities implemented in the PICU are: critical 
incident analysis 23, prospective risk analysis 24, safety walk rounds 25, simulation training, and safety-
focused mortality and morbidity conferences. The other departments in our hospital have adopted 
voluntary incident reporting, but so far few of the other patient safety elements have spread to 
other units. We present the results of in-depth analysis of seventeen critical incidents in our hospital, 
focusing on the causal and contributing factors and recommendations stemming from the analyses. 
Methods
Setting 
Erasmus MC-Sophia is a 215-bed university children’s hospital, including a 37-bed obstetrics 
department, a 28-bed paediatric ICU with a 6 bed high care unit, and a 27-bed neonatal ICU with a 
6 bed HC unit. A voluntary incident reporting system has been introduced in 2005 in the ICU units, 
and in 2008 in the medical and surgical medium care units.
Design
Retrospective review of critical incident analyses in the period 2005-2010. 
Patients 
All patients admitted to the children’s hospital, including the obstetrics department were eligible for 
incident analysis. 
Procedural information
A physician (CvdS), a nurse manager (AvdB) and rotating nurses investigate critical incidents on the 
request of the departmental heads of the intensive care units or other departments. The physician 
and nurse manager both have completed the patient safety officer executive development program 
from the Institute for Healthcare Improvement. 26 The rotating nurses are not involved in the actual 
care of the individuals concerned, and have attended a training course in root cause analysis. 19 
The incidents in this study had been reported to the heads of the departments because staff 
considered them severe; structured reporting to management of serious incidents was not yet in 
place at the time of the study. The departmental heads subsequently requested investigation. The 
patient safety officers of the PICU interviewed all staff involved with the incident to supplement the 
information provided in the incident report. If thought helpful, parents were interviewed as well. 
Causal and contributing factors were identified by means of a cause-and-effect diagram or a causal 
tree analysis. 23 The investigating team then proposed recommendations based on the identified 
causal and contributing factors, and the report was sent to the requester and all interviewed parents 
and employees. 
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For this study, we classified the identified factors according to Vincent et al 23, in the categories 
institutional context, organizational and management factors, work environment factors, team 
factors, provider factors, task factors, and patient factors. The recommendations were classified 
accordingly.
results
Eight of the 17 critical incidents occurred on the PICU, 6 on the neonatal ICU and 3 in other 
departments in Erasmus MC-Sophia. The 8 incidents on the PICU had been reported in the voluntary 
incident reporting system, and 6 (75%) had actually caused serious harm. In the study period 11327 
incidents on the PICU had been reported, of which 480 (4.2%) were classified as potentially critical 
and thus eligible for analysis. In the NICU, 773 of 8683 reported incidents (8.9%) were classified 
as potentially causing serious harm and thus eligible for analysis. Data on the numbers of incidents 
and their severity in the other units are not available as they did not yet employ a voluntary incident 
reporting system. 
Figure 1 gives an example of an incident reconstruction; Table 1 provides the causal and contributing 
factors identified in this example and the recommendations made. 
figure 1   Result of analysis of clonidine overdose, presented in the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model developed by 
 James Reason. (CPOE: computerized physician order entry system) (Read from right to left)
table 1 Case example: clonidine overdose (30 fold) during 20 days 
CPOE: computerized physician order entry
The incidents were reconstructed from a median of 6 interviews (range 3-15; total 112). In two 
incident analyses parents were interviewed. Time spent on the interviews, analysis and preparing a 
report amounted to 27 hours per incident. 
The 17 incidents are listed in Table 2. In 7 of the incidents the patient in question died during 
admission; in 3 of these, death was unanticipated and was the incident under investigation. 
One unanticipated death related to a failure to resuscitate a newborn with meconium aspiration 
syndrome; the second concerned a patient with aplasia cutis who died from unnoticed bleeding 
during the night shift; the third was an intra-uterine death due to arrhythmia and hydrops foetalis. 
Causality between incident and death was established in two of the other 4 cases. In the first, a 
1000-fold overdose of alprostadil led to uncontrollable hypotension and pulmonary hypertension, 
case factors
A patient with esophageal atresia had been receiving IV sedatives (midazolam 
and clonidine) for three months. During a weekend round it was decided to 
change the clonidine route of administration from intravenous to enteral. The 
attending resident ordered a daily dose through the computerized physician 
order entry system (CPOE) which later appeared to be a 30 fold overdose. In 
retrospect the patient had been very sleepy the first days of getting the high 
dose. The overdose went unnoticed for 20 days, and was discovered by the 
community pharmacist when preparing patient’s discharge home. The patient 
had been home one hour and was readmitted for monitored weaning of the 
clonidine.
causal and contributing factors:
- resident could order overdose because:
1. CPOE does not check dose for weight 
2. supervisors failed to communicate who was supervising the resident 
at the time of prescription 
3. information on enteral dosing of clonidine for sedation in neonates 
was not available to the resident at the time 
- every 24 hrs a pharmacist checks all newly prescribed medication; this dose 
was within range for children for treatment of hypertension; there was a failure 
to catch the overdose because not being informed on the indication (different 
dose advice for sedation vs hypertension), the pharmacist approved the order
- multiple intensivists and residents did not check the order during consecutive 
rounds because recalculating a dose is not common practice
- after transfer from IC to HC unit, nurses calculated the number of vials to be 
opened for this dose but did not check if the dose itself was correct, so the 
recalculation failed to catch the overdose
Work environment factor
Team factor
Task factor
Team factor
Provider factor
Provider factor
recommendations:
- improve communication between physicians on task distribution (task: 
supervising the resident)
- purchase software/ICT to enable medication check in CPOE
- change preset order in CPOE and insert dose advice 
- pharmacists should check new orders more frequently
- provide formulary with recommended doses of uncommon drugs 
- improve medical record keeping
Team factor
Organizational factor
Work environment factor
Organizational factor
Task factor
Team factor
Clonidine overdose
(30 x) during 20
days
Pharmacist missed
overdose: unaware of
indication enteral
clonidine
No information
available to resident
on enteral dosing of 
clonidine
Resident orders
clonidine 30 x too
high
No check of
dose by CPOE
No check of dose 
during daily
rounds
Supervisors failed to catch order,
task not communicated
Recalculation
failed to catch 
overdose
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followed by death 6 hours post-incident. In the second, ECMO cannulation caused a tear in the right 
atrium followed by bleeding. This was quickly discovered and the tear was surgically repaired, but 
resuscitation failed.
table 2 description of incidents, units where the incident occurred and patient outcomes 
Abbreviations: 
IV intravenous
ECMO extra corporeal membrane oxygenation
ET endotracheal tube
MAS meconium aspiration syndrome
PICU paediatric intensive care unit
NICU neonatal intensive care unit
Of the two patients in whom a clear causal relation between death and incident was not established, 
one had a previously diagnosed untreatable metabolic disorder and it was decided to withdraw life 
support. However, he had been given a 35-fold morphine overdose 12 hours earlier. The other was 
a premature infant who was severely burned when umbilical lines were inserted (the sterile cotton 
covering became soaked in blood and stuck to the skin, upon which the heat from the external heater 
caused a severe burn) and died 6 days post partum due to necrotizing enterocolitis and sepsis. Six other 
patients were (temporarily) harmed, e.g. skin lesions; chest drain inserted on the wrong side. 
One of these 6 patients needed longer hospitalization, and one suffered permanent severe 
neurological damage. Two incidents, near-strangulation with a nasogastric tube during sleep and 
paracetamol overdose, apparently caused no harm. 
A median of 5 causal and contributing factors per incident were identified (range 2 -10; total 
85). Team factors (e.g. loss of information on shift handover or resident’s work not supervised by 
intensivist) and task related factors (e.g. ambiguous protocols) were most frequent: both 19 out of 
85 (22%). Seventeen factors (20%) related to individual providers, e.g. calculation errors or failing to 
adhere to protocol. Sixteen factors (19%) related to work environment, such as a defective IV pump. 
Nine (11%) were organizational factors, such as lack of medication dose check in the computerized 
physician order entry system. The remaining 5 factors related to patient features, such as turning 
during sleep and bleeding from aplasia cutis. 
A total of 84 recommendations were formulated, a median of 5 per analysis (range 1-8). Twenty-
eight of the recommendations (33%) were actually implemented. Recommendations relating to 
organizational factors were least implemented, only 3 of 16 (19%); recommendations pertaining 
to task factors most frequently: 12 of 30 (40%); these were mostly improvements in protocols and 
guidelines. In 5 analyses none of the recommendations (n=16) was followed up. 
discussion
Our analyses provide useful information on the factors that caused or contributed to these serious 
incidents and enabled the investigators to formulate corrective recommendations. However, no 
more than a disappointing one third of the recommendations were actually taken up. 
The median number of 5 causal and contributing factors per incident is more than double that 
reported by others. 27-28 As a possible explanation: most studies on the causes of incidents in 
paediatrics are based on anonymous reports. If relevant information on how and why the incident 
occurred is lacking, it is inherently impossible to retrieve this information. We were able to gather 
more information as reports are not anonymous and everyone involved is interviewed. Furthermore, 
“latent factors” contributing to incidents, such as management decisions or organizational policies 
impacting patient safety, may have been left out of consideration, which was not the case in our study. 
Only 6% of the contributing factors in our study were ascribed to patient-related circumstances, 
versus 45% in 462 paediatric incidents in the ICUSRS database 29, and 32% in 2075 incident reports 
in adult and paediatric ICUs analyzed by Pronovost et al. 27 Bagian et al 30 found that incident analysis 
in general yielded much smaller proportions of patient factors than did focused review (10% vs. 
43%). Root cause analysis by Snijders et al 28 also yielded a low percentage of patient factors (3%) 
contributing to incidents in NICUs. In the present study, none of the patient factors could have been 
prevented, and there was no reason to recommend preventive measures. 
In our study, only 20% of the causal and contributing factors were related to performance of care 
providers. Frey et al. reported that provider performance assumedly played a role in 63% of the 
incidents in NICUs and PICUs. 31 A study of incident analysis in Dutch NICUs concluded that provider 
performance played a role in 64% of incidents. 28 Nevertheless, two other studies both reported 
that – like in our study – only 20% of contributing factors were provider factors. 27, 29 Measures to 
type of incident unit patient outcome
medication errors
Clonidine: overdose 30x PICU Longer hospital stay
Alprostadil: overdose 1000x PICU Death
Paracetamol: overdose 10x PICU No harm
Desmopressin: IV instead of enteral administration PICU Temporary harm
Morphine: overdose 35x NICU Death
Fluconazol: overdose 9x NICU Temporary harm
procedural
Tear right atrium at ECMO canulation PICU Death
Severe skin burn at insertion umbilical lines NICU Death
Chest drain wrong side in pneumothorax NICU Temporary harm
Dislocation septal occluder in pulmonary artery Other Permanent harm
unanticipated death
Failed resuscitation, ET obstructed in MAS NICU Death
Intra-uterine foetal arrhythmia Other Death
Unnoticed haemorrhage in aplasia cutis Other Death
unexpected resuscitation
Respiratory insufficiency in oesophageal atresia PICU Temporary harm
nursing care
Near strangulation with nasogastric tube PICU No harm
Severe skin lesions due to stoma care NICU Temporary harm
Disconnection ventilator tubing PICU Temporary harm
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counter failures of individual providers are hardly effective; e.g. recommending greater attention to 
medication preparation will not be permanently effective to prevent errors. 
Improvements on ‘systems’ factors are more likely to be effective in this respect. Team factors and 
task factors were the most frequent contributing factors found in our analyses. The team factors 
are clear examples of issues that could be addressed by team resource training, i.e. communication, 
situational awareness, and leadership and followership roles. Most of the employees interviewed 
had not yet received team resource training, with the exception of the involved PICU staff other than 
the residents. This training course may prevent faulty teamwork if the team members are continually 
reminded of the principles of teamwork. 
Implementing recommended measures is known to be a difficult undertaking. 17, 32-34 In our hospital, 
only one third of recommendations were acted upon. Recommendations aimed at organizational 
(redesign of processes) and work environment factors (equipment changes) are thought to have the 
highest likelihood of successful prevention of incidents; those aimed at providers (general education) 
and task factors (guideline development) have a lesser likelihood. 17 However, no more than three 
(of 16) recommendations aimed at organizational factors were implemented in our hospital. The 
recommendations not taken up included monitoring of vital signs on a medium care unit and 
purchasing smart pump technology. 35 As a possible explanation, organizational changes are not 
easily achieved in a single care unit in a large university hospital. Another possible explanation is 
that acting upon the recommendations was left to the discretion of the departmental heads who 
commissioned the investigations. A lesson to be learned from this is the necessity of appointing a 
responsible person for the implementation of the recommendations. Failure to act on these serious 
incidents can be very discouraging. Staff can easily perceive this as a sign that the management does 
not give priority to patient safety, thus hampering the development of a culture of learning from 
errors that is essential to improve patient safety. 
A limitation in this report is the small number of incidents analyzed. Apart from these 17 incidents, 
12 other incidents in the PICU had actually caused serious harm. These had not been reported to 
the departmental head, however, and critical incident analysis had therefore not been performed. 
Analysis of all reported critical incidents in the PICU (480 with potentially serious consequences) was 
also not feasible due to time constraints. It seems worthwhile to set up a structure that allows for 
fast detection of serious incidents and enables management to respond quickly and request analysis. 
Analyzing critical incidents should become routine procedure, and not remain coincidental activities.
conclusion
In this report we describe the results of seventeen critical incident analyses conducted in an academic 
children’s hospital by a team of patient safety officers and frontline staff familiar with the working 
conditions. This setup increases the likelihood of identifying all possible factors involved in an 
incident and thus allows articulating recommendations that might prevent similar incidents. Only 
few recommendations were taken up, however, so the worth of critical incident analysis is still 
undecided. To determine whether it really is worth the effort, we need to reach a stage at which 
more incidents are analyzed and more recommendations are implemented. Then we can monitor 
their effectiveness and decide whether incident analysis improves patient safety. 
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evaluation of drug formularies for pediatric intensive care
abstract
Objectives: 
To evaluate availability and reliability of pediatric drug dosing guidelines in selected formularies for 
intensive care patients. Most drugs used in the pediatric intensive care unit are prescribed off-label, 
often on the guidance of limited information from commonly used drug formularies.
Design: 
Availability of dosing information on prescribed drugs in a Dutch intensive care unit from January 1, 
2005 to December 31, 2006 was compared among four selected formularies (Micromedex,
Lexi-Comp, Drug Formulary for Children, Drug Doses). Reliability of dosing guidelines was assessed 
by evaluating labelling status and literature data for the three most (midazolam, acetaminophen, 
and amoxicillin/clavulanic acid) and the three least (bosentan, ketanserin, and iloprost) prescribed 
drugs.
Measurements and Main Results: 
The selected formularies covered 68% to 86% of all 257 prescribed drugs. Guidelines differ widely 
on daily doses per kilogram, dose description, dosing regimen, and age ranges. For the three most 
prescribed and one of the least prescribed drugs (bosentan), dosing guidelines adequately reflected 
labelling status and existing (but scarce) literature. No dosing guidelines were available for iloprost, 
and only one dosing guideline was available for ketanserin.
Conclusions: 
This study shows that four commonly used drug formularies give few and widely differing dosing 
guidelines for drugs prescribed in the intensive care unit. If guidelines exist, they seem to
reflect labelling status (if present) and limited literature available. Findings from this study likely 
reflect the scarcity of drug studies in this population. Physicians should be aware of the limitations 
of these formularies for daily practice in this group of vulnerable patients.
introduction 
Reducing medication errors is an important means for improving patient safety, for which clinicians 
are expected to follow the “the five rights”: the right drug; the right dose; the right route; the right 
time; and the right patient. 1 Getting the dose right is especially challenging in pediatric patients, as it 
needs to be age-appropriate. Also, off-label (outside the terms of the product license) and unlicensed 
(not licensed for the use in children) use of drugs in pediatric intensive care units (ICUs) is a reason for 
concern, as these patients’ lives often depend on adequate treatment. A 2002 study in general practices 
and general pediatric wards and ICUs in the Netherlands showed, however, that 30% to 68% of drugs 
prescribed to children were off-label or unlicensed. 2, 3 Both staff and trainees prescribe such drugs on 
the guidance of dosing guidelines from drug formularies. Although widely used all over the world, the 
availability and reliability of these sources of information have received little attention in the current 
debate on drug prescription in children. Yet, “getting the dose right” depends on the availability of 
adequate dosing guidelines. The objective of the present study was to determine the availability and 
reliability of drug dosing guidelines for pediatric intensive care patients in selected drug formularies.
materials and methods
Availability of Information
Two pediatric residents independently searched four drug formularies for dosing guidelines on all 
drugs prescribed in the ICU of the Erasmus MC Sophia Children’s Hospital, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 
in 2005 and 2006, excluding intravenous fluids and feeds. This 28-bed, level 3 ICU admits all 
pediatric categories of patients, except direct postoperative cardiopulmonary bypass. Information on 
the drugs used was retrieved from the Patient Data Management System. The four study formularies 
were selected from hundreds of formularies as a convenience sample as they are often used in 
our ICU. Selection criteria were easy accessibility/user-friendly format, different geographic origin 
(Netherlands,
United States, and Australia), and different funding sources (commercial vs. public). The selection 
includes Drug Doses 4, Drug Formulary for Children 5, Lexi-Comp (Lexi-Comp, Hudson, Ohio; 
www.utdol.com/home/index.html), and Micromedex (Denver, Colorado; 
www.micromedex.com/products/hcs/). Characteristics are given in Table 1.
table 1 As of March 2008, after we performed the actual study, the Drug Formulary for Children formulary  
 dosing guidelines are incorporated in the Dutch National Formulary, which is available free online  
 (www.kinderformularium.nl).
N/A not available
All information retrieved by the two residents was counter-checked to ensure no errors were made 
in copying the data. If a formulary recommended a >100% higher daily dose per kilogram than the 
lowest dose recommended in the other formularies, the drug in question was tagged as “different 
dosing per kilogram.” A drug was tagged as “different description” on the basis of differences in 
e.g., mg/kg in “x” doses vs. mg/kg/day, in “x” doses or every “x” hrs, mg/kg/hr vs. μg/kg/min, and 
amount per kg vs. amount per square meter. m2 “Differences in regimen” refers to e.g., bolus vs. not 
bolus, bolus-dosing vs. continuous, and differences in the number of doses per day and differences 
in routes of administration. “Differences in age range” refers to differences in recommended age 
ranges or the absence of age ranges. Finally, “lack of pediatric data” was assigned when there was no 
drug doses
drug formulary for 
children*
lexi-comp micromedex
Country of origin Australia The Netherlands USA USA
Consulted version Booklet Booklet
Online- via 
UptoDate®
Online
Target patient group
Pediatric intensive 
care
Office pediatrics
General Medicine + 
Pediatrics 
General 
Medicine
Information sources 
(as presented in the 
actual formulary)
Practice based N/A
Literature 
references
Literature 
references
Book/online/PDA Book/online/pda Book/pda* Online/pda Online/pda
Costs
≈15 USD (PDA)
<10 USD (book)
Free:online
≈ 20 USD
Institutional 
subscription
Institutional 
subscription
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guideline at all, or when no pediatric dosing guideline was available in any of the formularies. These 
“tags” were dichotomized (0 or 1) so that percentages could be calculated. The list of all prescribed 
drugs was divided into quartiles with respect to number of prescriptions. Quartile 1 referred to the 
most frequently prescribed drugs; quartile 4 to the least frequently prescribed drugs. Number of 
prescriptions (following the quartiles) was related to both the availability of dosing guidelines and 
variation of drug doses.
Reliability of Information 
As the availability of information on pediatric drug doses is only a quantitative measure to determine 
a formulary’s usefulness, we assessed quality of the dosing guidelines for the three most and the 
three least prescribed drugs. To that end, we performed exploratory literature searches in PubMed 
(www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez) and EMBASE (www.embase.com). The search strategies were 
similar. The initial search consisted of drug name, followed by the limits Humans, English, and Child 
(0–18 yrs). For the three most prescribed drugs, the search was further limited to Newborn, Infant, 
Preschool child, and Child, and clinical trial or pharmacokinetics or pharmacodynamics. To reduce the 
number of initial, less relevant hits, the search was repeated, using extensive MeSH terms in PubMed; 
drug name, restricted to administration and dosage, pharmacokinetics, pharmacology, therapeutic 
use, and the previously mentioned limits (Humans, English, and Newborn, Infant, Preschool child, 
and Child) for each drug. Extended EMBASE search was performed with limits randomized clinical 
trial, humans, English, Newborn, Infant, Preschool child, and School child for all years. Relevance 
of the hits was evaluated by the availability of used drug doses, as described in the abstract; when 
of interest, “related articles” were searched. Dosing information was preferably obtained from 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs) that supported the efficacy and safety of the drug in question. 
If RCTs were not available, dosing information from pharmacokinetic studies, case series, etc. was 
used. Information regarding Food and Drug Administration (FDA) labelling status was retrieved from 
the Website www.accessdata.fda.gov/ scripts/cder/drugsatfda/index.cfm (last accessed December 1, 
2008), to evaluate if approval status was reflected in the availability of dosing guidelines. Drug doses 
reported in studies and drug labels were compared with the dosing guidelines from the formularies. 
Statistics 
Availability of dosing guidelines of the formularies was compared for all prescribed drugs, by 
calculating the percentage of covered drugs for each formulary. Similarly, percentages for the 
other variables (differences in doses/kg, regimen, administration, age range, lack of pediatric data) 
were calculated. The relationship between number of prescriptions (following the quartiles) and 
availability of dosing guidelines was tested by Kruskal-Wallis test. The variation of drug doses per 
kilogram in relationship to the number of prescriptions was also tested by Kruskal-Wallis test. The 
calculations were performed, using Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15.0 
(SPSS, Chicago, IL).
results
Availability of Information
A total of 257 unique drugs had been prescribed during the study period. For 9.4% of all drugs, 
none of the four formularies provided a pediatric dosing guideline. For 34.7% of drugs, the guideline 
for the daily dose differed by >100% compared with the formulary for the lowest daily dose. For 
61.0% of drugs, dose descriptions differed between formularies, whereas for 53.4%, the dosing 
regimen guidelines differed. Finally, for 34.5% of drugs, recommended age ranges differed. For 
each drug formulary, the availability of dosing guidelines correlated significantly with prescription 
frequency in our ICU (p=0.033). We did not find a relationship between prescription frequency and 
dose variation (p=0.293).
Availability of Information for the Three Most and the Three Least Prescribed Drugs
The three most prescribed drugs were acetaminophen (14,330 prescriptions), midazolam (1646 
units for multiple use), and amoxicillin/clavulanic acid (5174 units). The least prescribed drugs 
were bosentan, iloprost, and ketanserin (each prescribed only once). Table 2 shows the dosing 
guidelines for these drugs in the four studied formularies. The dosing guidelines for the three most 
prescribed drugs were provided in all formularies and were largely in agreement. In contrast, only 
two formularies provided dosing guidelines for bosentan, none for iloprost, and one for ketanserin. 
Reliability of Information
For the three most prescribed drugs, the dosing guidelines in the formularies adequately reflected 
the FDA labelling guidelines (www.fda.gov). The literature search results are shown in Table 3. The 
doses of midazolam 6, 7, acetaminophen 8 –10, and amoxicillin/clavulanic acid 11, 12 used in clinical 
trials or pharmacokinetic/pharmacodynamic studies (>20 for each drug) also corresponded with 
the drug dosing guidelines in the formularies. The amoxicillin/clavulanic acid dosing guidelines can 
be potentially confusing and are prone to error. In the Micromedex, Lexi-Comp, and Drug Doses 
formularies, the daily dose of amoxicillin/clavulanic acid is only based on amoxicillin properties and 
not on the combination. 
As the formulation in the United States and Australia differs from the formulation prescribed 
in the Netherlands (amoxicillin/clavulanic acid ratio in the Netherlands 4:1 vs. 7:1 elsewhere), 
recommendations on dosing differ. These differences disappear once the dose is corrected for 
clavulanic acid. In contrast to the frequently used drugs, no FDA approval for pediatric use has been 
granted for ketanserin, bosentan, and iloprost. For bosentan, dosing guidelines in two formularies 
reflected similar doses used in a small number of retrospective reports and open-label studies. 13 
This only provides limited evidence for dosing; we did not find pharmacokinetic- pharmacodynamic 
studies or RCTs. Similarly, for iloprost, a number of relevant papers 14, 15 for use in children are 
available, but these do not include clinical trials. Finally, the ketanserin study 16 provided information 
only on transplacental passage of the drug to the fetus and no data on pediatric use (Table 3).
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table 2a The 3 most prescribed drugs in 2005/2006 on the ICU and their dosing guidelines following the four  
 studied formularies. For each drug the recommended dose was converted to a dose for 24 hours for  
 easier comparison.
table 2b The 3 least prescribed drugs in 2005/2006 on the ICU and their dosing guidelines following the four  
 studied formularies. For each drug the recommended dose was converted to a dose for 24 hours for  
 easier comparison. When no dosing guideline was available this was noted as such.
Drug
Drug Formulary 
for Children 
Micromedex Drug Doses Lexi-Comp
acetaminophen
Oral 60-90 mg/kg/
day in 4-6 doses, 
first doses double 
dose
Rectal 60-90 mg/
kg/d in 3 doses
Oral 10-15 mg/kg/
dose every 4-6H
Rectal (1-3y) 80 
mg every 4H
Oral 20 mg/kg 
stat then 15 mg/
kg/dose 4H 
Rectal 40 mg/kg 
stat then 30 mg/
kg/dose 6H
Oral 10-15 mg/kg/
dose every 4-6H 
Rectal 10-20 mg/
kg/dose every 
4-6H
Acetaminophen 
dose calculated 
per mg/kg/day 
(mg/kg/d)
Oral 60-90 mg/
kg/d
Rectal 60-90 mg/
kg/d
Oral 40-90mg/
kg/d
Rectal 30-50  mg/
kg/d 
Oral 90 mg/kg/d
Rectal 120 mg/
kg/d
Oral 40-90 mg/
kg/d
Rectal 40-120 mg/
kg/d
midazolam  0.05-0.2 mg/kg/h 
0.06-0.12 mg/kg/
hour
1-4 mcg/kg/min 0.4-6 mcg/kg/min
Midazolam dose 
calculated per mg/
kg/day
1.2-4.8 mg/kg/d
1.44-2.88 mg/
kg/d
1.44-5.76 mg/
kg/d
0.58-8.64 mg/
kg/d
amoxicilin/
clavulanic
acid
Oral 50/12.5-
100/25 mg/kg/d in 
3 doses
Oral 25-45 mg/kg/
day divided every 
12H
(child <40 
kg ascertain 
appropriate 
formulation)
Amoxi component 
10-25 mg/kg/dose 
8H iv im oral
Oral (child <40 
kg) 20-40 mg/
kg/day every 
8H (amoxicillin 
component)
Amoxicillin/ 
Clavulanic acid 
dose calculated 
per calculated per 
mg/ kg/day
50-100 mg/kg/d 25-45 mg/kg/d 30-75 mg/kg/d 20-40 mg/kg/d
Drug
Drug Formulary 
for Children 
Micromedex Drug Doses Lexi-Comp
Ketanserin
0.5-5 mcg/kg/min 
Max 150 mg/day
Not available Not available Not available
Ketanserin dose 
calculated per 
mg/ kg/day 
0.72-7.2 mg/kg/d 
max 150mg/day
Not available Not available Not available
bosentan Not available Not available
Oral; 1 mg/kg/dose 
12H for 1-4 wk then 
2 mg/kg/dose 12H
Iv half oral dose
Oral <10 kg 15.6 mg 
daily to 15.6 twice 
daily
10-20 kg 31.25 mg 
daily to twice daily
>20-40 kg 31.25 mg 
twice daily to 62.5 
mg twice daily
>40 kg 62.5 mg 
twice daily to 125 mg 
twice daily
Bosentan dose 
calculated per 
mg/ kg/day
Not available Not available 2-4 mg/kg/d 1.6-4 mg/kg/d
iloprost Not available Not available Not available Not available
Iloprost dose 
calculated per 
mg/ kg/day
Not available Not available Not available Not available
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discussion
This study shows that the four selected drug formularies give dosing guidelines from 67.8% to 
86.4% of the 257 drugs prescribed in our ICU (Fig. 1). These guidelines diverge widely on various 
aspects. They reflect FDA status for the most and least frequently prescribed drugs. The coverage of 
drugs was associated with the number of prescriptions, with more information available for more 
frequently prescribed drugs and less variation between drug formularies with respect to the drug 
doses. An important limitation is, however, that not all studies that are used as basis for drug dosing 
guidelines are performed in the (sub)population of patients admitted to the ICU. For example, the 
dosing guidelines of the FDA on midazolam are based on a study 7 performed in pediatric patients 
undergoing computed tomography scans, a different population than the critically ill patients 
admitted to the ICU. In addition, even for frequently used drugs, there are few pediatric studies. 
For example, analgesics have been evaluated by no more than one or two RCTs, which often lack 
power. 17, 18 Although it has been recognized that further research is needed, pediatric drug research 
still faces financial, regulatory, practical, and scientific challenges. 19 In recent years, both American 
and European legislation has aimed to stimulate the study of medicines for use in children. Still, one 
cannot expect that the information gap will be closed soon. In this context, we believe that specific 
pediatric formularies, based on the latest evidence and expert opinions, are mandatory. They will 
enable physicians to provide the most effective and safe drug therapy in children.
figure 1 Availability of dosing guidelines of the 257 prescribed drugs in the intensive care unit, in the four used 
formularies
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They may also serve to protect physicians legally when prescribing urgently needed drugs to children. 
20 The formularies studied were developed for different user groups. The focus on the Drug Formulary 
for Children is office based pediatrics, whereas Drug Doses focuses on ICUs. This may perhaps 
explain the larger differences between these two as well as the higher total doses per 24 hrs in Drug 
Doses. Micromedex and Lexi-Comp were not specifically developed for pediatric use, although both 
now have a large pediatric component. The geographical origin of the formularies differs, resulting 
in different marketing and labelling strategies as well as different “culturally determined” prescribing 
preferences (e.g., rectal formulations are less common in North America than in Europe). Also, the 
formularies differ with regard to evidence supporting the dosing guidelines. The Drug Formulary for 
Children and Drug Doses do not provide literature references at all. A partial solution to this issue 
could be setting up a database of the literature references on which the dosing guidelines are based. 
It should be freely accessible, preferably online. The content would also allow physicians to create a 
personal formulary as advised by the World Health Organization in their Guide to Good Prescribing. 21
In addition to literature references, the rationale for the dosing guidelines should be given, as well 
as contact information to facilitate information sharing. Further needed research could then be 
anticipated according to evident knowledge gaps. It would also reduce the need for individual hospitals 
to perform time-consuming and costly literature search and to schedule Drug and Therapeutic 
committee meetings. Recently, the Dutch Knowledge Centre for Pediatric Pharmacotherapy launched 
a government-sponsored, free online pediatric formulary in the Netherlands, largely based on these
principles (www.kinderformularium.nl/search/index.php). Dosing guidelines are initially derived from 
the Drug Formulary for Children. In the near future, they will all be verified against existing evidence, 
adjusted if needed, and provided with the relevant literature references. In case of absence of evidence 
to support the guidelines, expert opinion is used to decide on dosing guidelines. Currently, general 
consensus is reached in face-to-face meetings with a panel of experts (e.g., pediatric subspecialists, 
pharmacists, clinical pharmacologists, and epidemiologists). Alternatively, Delphi surveys could aid 
this process of decision making. 22 Similarly, the British National Formulary for Children is a collective 
publication by the Royal College of Pediatrics and Child Health, British Medical Association, Neonatal 
and Pediatric Pharmacists Group, and the Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain. 20 As the 
British National Formulary for Children explicitly states that its main focus is not tertiary care, we did 
not include it in our analysis. Even when FDA or other government labelling is available based on 
sufficient pediatric data, age restrictions are not always mentioned. Thus, there is a risk that drugs 
are prescribed to children younger than the age group they are intended for. Pediatric data used to 
label drugs in children may not be applicable to the patient population that is to receive the drug, 
such as critically ill patients. Furthermore, physicians should realize that data on less commonly used 
drugs often have been derived from retrospective case series or open-label studies. Our study may 
be limited in that we only searched four formularies. Nevertheless, as our selection represents a wide 
variety of properties (e.g., pocket book vs. digital, international coverage, commercial vs. academic, 
referenced vs. “experience-based,” pediatric-specific vs. nonpediatric-specific), we believe that our 
findings may be generalized to other formularies. Another possible limitation is that we determined 
reliability of dosing guidelines for only the three most and three least prescribed drugs. Also, we 
did not perform a complete systematic review for these six drugs. We do believe, however, that this 
exploratory search provides a relevant overview of reliability of dosing guidelines in these formularies. 
To our knowledge, no systematic reviews or RCTs have been published that unequivocally determine 
optimal drug dosing for drugs used in pediatric intensive care covering all ages. Our search more or 
less reflects what a physician would do in limited time, at the same time juggling all other demands 
in a busy clinical practice.
conclusions
In conclusion, this study points at challenges in the availability and reliability of pediatric drug dosing 
guidelines in present drug formularies. Physicians should be aware of the limitations of the use of 
these formularies in daily practice. The lack of adequate and evidence based dosing recommendations 
for pediatric intensive care patients reflects the lack of drug studies in this population. Many others 
have made a plea, too, for studies in this population that might improve the current practice of off-
label and unlicensed prescription.
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safety of routine early mri in preterm infants
abstract
Objective: 
Preterm infants are at risk for brain injury and consequent neurodevelopmental impairment. Routine 
cerebral Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) at 30 weeks gestational age (GA) is performed as part 
of our standard clinical care to screen for possible brain injury. Our aim was to evaluate safety of 
these MRI procedures. 
Methods: 
We retrospectively collected data on patient safety and adverse events in 52 infants who underwent 
routine MRI scans at 30 weeks GA. MRI procedures were carried out according to a guideline covering 
all disciplines involved. This included time-out procedures and documentation of vital parameters 
and adverse events related to the procedure.
Results: 
Mean GA and weight at image acquisition were 30.1 weeks (29 4/7 - 30 4/7) and 1133 grams 
(659-1580), respectively. Vital parameters remained stable during the procedure. Minor adverse 
events were common. The MRI was terminated in 3 infants (5.8%) because of respiratory instability. 
Increased respiratory support within 24 hours after the MRI was necessary for 12 infants (23.1%) 
and was significantly correlated with GA, birth weight and the mode of respiratory support. 
Hypothermia (core temperature <36˚C) occurred in 9 infants (17.3%). Temperature drop was 
significantly correlated with weight at image acquisition.
Conclusions: 
Although scanning at 30 weeks gestational age is relatively safe for preterm infants, adverse events 
in our study were common and should not be underestimated. A dedicated guideline for MRI 
procedures in preterm infants, including documentation of patient data, time-out procedures and 
critical incident review is essential, and these guidelines should be re-evaluated systematically.
introduction
In preterm infants, early recognition of neonatal brain injury and assessment of risks of later 
impairment is a challenging goal of current neuroimaging studies. 1-3 Magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) provides clinicians and researchers objective, high-quality, in vivo information about brain 
anatomy, pathology and, due to recent advances, functional and physiological characteristics. 4-10 
Early cerebral MRI scans at 30-weeks postmenstrual age and at term-equivalent age are increasingly 
being incorporated into standard care for very low birth weight (VLBW) infants. This provides early 
biomarkers for studying preterm brain injury related to neurodevelopmental outcome. These early 
determinants may contribute to the design of pharmacological and behavioral interventions to 
improve future outcome. 6-7, 11-12
MRI is considered a safe imaging technique. No evidence exists of serious harm to human tissue, 
besides loud acoustic noise, tissue heating and peripheral nerve stimulation. 13-16 Performing early 
MRI scans in VLBW infants is challenging, as they frequently require respiratory support and are 
vulnerable to hemodynamic instability. Consequently, early MRI scans of VLBW infants should be 
performed in a safe and controlled environment with the use of a dedicated protocol. Studies on the 
methods that promote patient safety and health care quality are ongoing. Previous studies regarding 
safety of MRI in VLBW infants suggest that MRI procedures are safe. 17-19 However, population size 
and maturity range varied widely in these studies, and in some works, only adverse events during 
the scan were assessed. 17-18
Our aim was to study the safety of routine MRI scans in preterm infants at a postmenstrual age 
of 30 weeks. To accomplish this, we collected data of these infants regarding safety incidents and 
(avoidable) adverse events over a long time period: 24 hours before and 24 hours following the MRI 
scan.
methods
Description of the guideline: 
A tailored, center-specific guideline for MRI procedures in VLBW infants was developed in 
collaboration with representatives from the radiology and neonatology departments as well as a 
patient safety officer from the Erasmus Medical Center – Sophia’s Children Hospital. The guideline 
was based on the MR safety literature and our own experiences and was adjusted using the principles 
of the ‘plan-do-study-act’ quality improvement, 20 an iterative process, to improve outcomes (figure 
1, see appendix).
Study participants
As part of standard clinical care practices, MRI scans were performed on VLBW infants with 
a gestational age (GA) < 29 weeks. These scans were performed at a postmenstrual age of 30 
weeks (29 4/7 – 30 4/7 weeks). In all patients, the MRI procedure was carried out according to our 
multi-disciplinary guideline (see appendix). Data regarding patient safety, such as vital parameters, 
mode of respiratory support, number of episodes of bradycardia, apnea or oxygen desaturation 
and (avoidable) adverse events, were retrospectively collected from our electronic patient data 
management system. These data were sampled at fixed times: 24, 16 and 8 hours before the MRI 
scan, during the MRI procedure itself and 8, 16 and 24 hours after the MRI scan. The definitions of 
major and minor adverse events are listed in table 1.
table 1 Definitions of adverse events
Major adverse events Respiratory compromise resulting in intubation
 Circulatory compromise resulting in need for inotropic agents
 Cardiac resuscitation
 Death
  
Minor adverse events Respiratory instability during the procedure
 Respiratory compromise resulting in minor increased respiratory support
 Increased hemodynamic instability
 Increased hemodynamic instability resulting in sepsis work-up
 Hypothermia
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Image acquisition
All MRI scans were performed using a 1.5-T GE Echo Speed scanner (General Electronics Medical 
Systems, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.). The standard imaging protocol included the following: axial T1-w 
spin echo, axial T2-w dual spin echo, sagittal T1-w spin echo, axial 3DT1-SPGR and echo planar 
diffusion tensor imaging. Total acquisition time was approximately 39 minutes. 
Statistical analysis
Statistical analysis was performed using SPSS v17.0.2. A repeated measures ANOVA using Wilk’s 
Lambda test was conducted to test the stability of vital parameters during the MRI procedure. 
Correlations of adverse events with GA, birth weight, weight at image acquisition, gender, 
temperature drop, mode of respiratory support and total acquisition time were tested. Pearson’s 
correlation coefficients were used for continuous variables. A one-way ANOVA and Pearson’s chi-
squared test were used for categorical variables, as appropriate. A p-value of <.05 (two-sided) was 
considered statistically significant.
The study was approved by the medical ethical committee of the Erasmus Medical Centre Rotterdam, 
the Netherlands.
results
Infant characteristics
A total of 158 infants were eligible for inclusion in the study. Among these, 32 infants died, 36 
infants were transferred to other hospitals before the MRI scan could be performed and 38 infants 
were not hemodynamically stable enough for MRI scanning. Thus, 52 infants (30 boys) underwent 
a cerebral MRI scan. Patient characteristics are listed in table 2.
table 2 Patient characteristics
Hemodynamic (in)stability
Compared to 24 hours before the MRI scan, vital parameters (heart rate, breathing rate and oxygen 
saturation) remained stable during the 24 hours after the scan (figure 2). Repeated measures ANOVA 
using Wilk’s Lambda test was used to test this stability (data not shown). 
Increased hemodynamic instability, defined as an increase of >5 episodes of bradycardia (heart rate 
<100/min), apnea (>20 seconds) or oxygen desaturation (saturation <85%) within the first 24 hours 
after the MRI compared with the 24 hours before the scan, occurred in 14 infants (26.9%) (table 3).
table 3 Minor adverse events related to MRI procedure
Adverse events 
No adverse events occurred in 26 infants. However, in 26 infants (preventable) incidents and minor 
adverse events were encountered (table 3). The MRI scan was cancelled for 3 infants (5.8%) because 
of respiratory instability. In another infant, obstruction of the central venous catheter occurred after 
the scan, although its cause is unclear. Twelve infants (23.1%) needed increased respiratory support 
within 24 hours after the MRI; this was defined as increased inspiratory pressure, increased positive 
end expiratory pressure or increased frequency of ventilation. For one infant, this might have been 
due to being transported twice to the MR scanning room because of technical problems with the 
magnet. Hypothermia (core temperature <36˚C) occurred in 9 infants (17.3%). On average, the 
infants’ core temperature dropped 0.5 degrees after the MRI scan. Wilk’s Lambda test for repeated 
measures ANOVA showed that temperature significantly decreased after MRI scanning (figure 3).
A required increase in respiratory support after the MRI scan was significantly correlated with GA, 
birth weight and mode of respiratory support; infants that required increased respiratory support 
after the scan were born at a significantly lower GA, were born with a lower birth weight and/or 
more frequently received non-invasive ventilation during the scan (table 4). Temperature drop was 
significantly correlated with weight at image acquisition; infants with a lower weight showed an 
increased temperature drop after the scan (p< 0.03).  
Gestational age at birth, mean ± SD, wk 26.8 ± 1.4
Birth weight, mean ± SD, g 967 ± 247
Postmenstrual age at MR acquisition, mean ± SD, wk 30.1 ± 0.3
Weight at MR acquisition, mean ± SD, g 1133 ± 197
Male gender, n (%) 30 (57.7)
Mode of respiratory support during MRI, n (%)  
Nasal prongs 10 (19.2)
CPAP 27 (51.9)
Non-invasive ventilation 11 (21.2)
Mechanical ventilation 4 (7.7)
Increased hemodynamic instability 14 (26.9)
Cancellation of MRI because of respiratory instability 3 (5.8)
Obstruction of central venous catheter after MRI 1 (1.9)
Increased respiratory support necessary within 24 hours after MRI 12 (23.1)
Hypothermia (< 36.0˚) after MRI 9 (17.3)
Temperature drop after MRI, mean ± SD, degrees Celsius 0.5 ± 0.6
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table 4 Correlation of increased respiratory support with other variables
aPearson’s T-test, bPearson’s chi-squared test
NS: Not Significant
discussion
Our study stresses the importance of providing a controlled environment for early MRI procedures for 
preterm infants. Despite the presence of a multi-disciplinary guideline specifically designed for preterm 
infants, minor adverse events, such as hypothermia and the need for increased respiratory support after 
the scan, were encountered regularly (17.3% and 23.1%, respectively). Therefore, caution needs to be 
taken regarding the safety of VLBW infants during MRI procedures. Critical incident review and continuous 
re-evaluation of the guidelines are essential in this process. 
MRI is becoming increasingly important for accurately evaluating brain injuries and the consequent 
effects on neurodevelopment in preterm infants. 9, 11, 21-22 Compared with cranial ultrasonography, MRI 
has proven to be more sensitive for the detection of diffuse white matter injury (DWMI), 3, 23-24 and 
allows objective quantification of brain injury at a micro-structural level. 4, 25 MRI is considered a safe 
imaging technique, independent of ionizing radiation, and it enables high-resolution neuroimaging 
in a non-invasive manner. 26 The use of MRI scanning is limited in preterm infants because of their 
cardio-respiratory instability and predisposition to hypothermia. 17, 26-28 Performing an MRI scan 
in this vulnerable population requires a comprehensive guideline that includes all the essential 
elements: good preparation, optimal monitoring of vital parameters, open communication between 
the involved parties, individualized care and continuous efforts to improve the quality of care. 
Neonatal intensive care must obviously be maintained throughout the procedure, which requires the 
use of MR-compatible equipment that ensures optimal monitoring of vital parameters without causing 
injuries, such as burning, or image degradation as a result of radiofrequency interference with the static 
magnetic field. 
Because of the increased risk of respiratory and circulatory compromise, sedation is not often used in preterm 
infants. To reduce motion artifacts, other strategies to comfort the infant are used, such as those according 
to the principles of the Newborn Individualized Developmental Care and Assessment Program.  29-30
Safety incidents in (neonatal) health care are generally related to poor preparation, equipment failure 
and human error. 31-32 Studies on interventions to improve healthcare quality, such as staff training, 
implementation of a time-out-procedure (TOP) and the use of checklists and tailored guidelines, have 
shown that such preventable incidents can be reduced. 33-35 In addition, adverse events should always be 
reported in order for the guideline to be adjusted. 31 Comparable to operative procedures, a systematic 
pre-procedural briefing, such as a TOP, can be implemented for MR procedures as well. A pre-procedural 
TOP ensures that all involved caregivers agree that the correct procedure is being carried out properly for 
the correct patient.  
We have shown that adverse events related to MRI scans are common. This is in contrast to other studies, 
17-19 in which no significant adverse events were found. However, these studies primarily investigated 
serious adverse events that occurred during the scan itself, and the MRI scans had short acquisition times, 
17 or a lower field strength (1 T), 19 or the study population consisted of patients with a wide range of 
gestational ages. 17-18 In contrast, the results of the current study only include data on VLBW infants with 
a mean postmenstrual age of 30 weeks ± 4 days. In addition, total acquisition time was approximately 
39 minutes, and we collected data for the 48 hours surrounding the MRI procedure. Even though vital 
parameters remained stable during the MRI scan itself, increased hemodynamic instability occurred within 
the following 24 hours in some infants. 
The limitations of this study include its retrospective design and the lack of temperature measurement during 
the MRI scan. Because of the increased incidence of hypothermia, we propose using an optical temperature 
probe to measure temperature continuously during the scan. Another limitation could be selection bias, as our 
data consist only of infants considered hemodynamically stable enough for a MRI scan. This implies that the 
incidence of adverse events might increase if more critically ill preterm infants are scanned, emphasizing the 
importance of a comprehensive guideline with staff training to ensure the safe execution of MR procedures. 
Although minor adverse events were encountered more frequently after the MRI scan, it is not with 
certainty established that this in fact can be attributed to having undergone a MRI scan. However, due 
to the lack of evidence against causality and in the context of patient safety, we argue that each adverse 
event should be considered as a result of the procedure. Moreover, in order to avoid this possible bias, vital 
parameters, mode of respiratory support and the number of episodes of bradycardia, apnea or oxygen 
desaturation that occurred within 24 hours before the MRI scan were compared with the same details 
occurring within 24 hours following the MRI scan of each infant individually.
Finally, no serious adverse events occurred during the procedures, but the clinical significance of minor 
adverse events for future neurodevelopmental outcome remains unclear. Until empirical evidence shows 
that these events do not adversely affect neurodevelopment, we argue that adverse events should always 
be considered potentially harmful, and maximal efforts to prevent them must be undertaken. 
In conclusion, adverse events within 24 hours after routine MRI procedures in VLBW infants at 30 weeks 
gestational age are common. Our findings illustrate the importance of providing a safe environment for 
early MRI procedures in preterm infants. Considering the increased application of MR imaging as part of 
the standard clinical care for preterm infants, a multi-disciplinary-based approach with continuous re-
evaluation of the guidelines is necessary to ensure optimal safety for this population.
Parameter
Need for increased respiratory 
support
p
 No Yes  
Gestational age at birth, mean ± SD, wk 27.1 ± 1.3 25.8 ± 1.4 <0.01a
Birth weight, mean ± SD, g 1007 ± 244  831 ± 210 0.03a
Weight at MR acquisition, mean ± SD, g 1146 ± 210 1091 ± 148 NS
Temperature drop after MRI procedure, degrees Celsius 0.5 ± 0.6 0.5 ± 0.5 NS
Male gender, n 21 9 NS
Mode of respiratory support during MRI, n  <0.01b
Nasal prongs 10 0
CPAP 22 5
Non-invasive ventilation 4 7
Mechanical ventilation 4 0  
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appendix
description of the guideline: 
Preparation 
The medical team (attending neonatologist, pediatric radiologist and nursing staff) decides 
whether the infant is medically stable enough to undergo an MRI scan and whether the scan is 
indicated. 
A multidisciplinary approach with close communication is essential.
A checklist is used to prepare the infant and equipment for the procedure; this checklist ensures a 
minimal risk of adverse events related to incorrect execution of the procedure.
An MR-compatible incubator is used, which provides controlled temperature and humidity as well as 
MR-compatible pulse oximetry and ventilation. The MR-compatible incubator is checked as follows: 
the temperature is set correctly; nonmagnetic air and oxygen tanks are present with sufficient 
capacity; and equipment for ventilation support is available and working. 
A resuscitation bag with all necessary equipment for acute interventions is checked and available 
during the procedure. 
All devices attached to the infant and implants (e.g., ECG leads, pulse oximetry probe, temperature 
probe, intravascular catheters, ductus arteriosus clips and ventriculo-peritoneal shunts as well as 
metal-containing infant clothing and bracelets) are checked for MR compatibility (www.mrisafety.
com). MR-compatible ECG electrodes and pulse oximetry probe are attached to the infant to monitor 
heart rate and oxygen saturation during the scan. 
The infant is protected against noise with moldable earplugs and neonatal earmuffs. 
Infusion lines are sufficiently extended such that the infant can undergo an MRI scan while the 
infusion pumps remain outside the scanning room, or MR-compatible infusion pumps can be used.
The infant is placed in the MR incubator in a comfortable and secure way to encourage sleep and 
reduce movement. As sedation can cause respiratory and circulatory compromise, sedation is not 
desirable and often not needed. 
Transport
A time-out procedure is performed before leaving the NICU such that a quick re-check is conducted 
and all involved parties agree on the following: the correct infant has been properly prepared, the 
MR incubator is set correctly, the infant is stable and comfortable and the MR department is ready 
to scan the infant. 
Transport is accompanied by trained staff, and physiological stability is monitored during transport.
During the acquisition
Staff trained in neonatal life support remain present throughout the MRI scan.
A room near the MR suite with equipment, supplies and guidelines for neonatal resuscitation is 
checked and available during the MRI scan.
The technician at the MR suite performs a metal check on the infant, incubator, oxygen and air tanks 
and accompanying staff before entering the MR suite. Because of the potential hazards associated 
with the strong electromagnetic field, MR safety training for all accompanying staff is recommended.
Before the actual MR procedure starts, the presence of adequate respiratory support, hemodynamic 
stability and the infant’s comfort are verified. Hemodynamic stability is closely monitored from the 
console room. The MRI procedure should be interrupted if hemodynamic stability is compromised or 
if there is any doubt about it.
After the MRI scan 
After the acquisition, the infant’s hemodynamic stability and respiratory support are checked again 
before returning to the NICU. Upon arrival to the NICU, a handover of the procedure to medical and 
nursing staff takes place, and possible adverse events are noted. The MR-compatible incubator and 
accessories are cleaned, and the resuscitation bag is refilled if necessary. During the subsequent 24 
hours, the infant’s vital parameters and hemodynamic stability are monitored continuously.
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figure 1 Guideline for safe execution of MRI procedures in preterm infants (see also addendum).
figure 2 Trend of oxygen saturation (A), breathing rate (breathing rate was not measured during the MRI 
scan) (B) and heart rate (C) during the 48 hours surrounding the MRI scan. Note that these parameters 
remained stable. 
figure 3 Temperature dropped significantly after the MRI scan. A: trend of temperature during the 48 hours 
surrounding the MRI scan. B: Repeated measures ANOVA shows that temperature dropped significantly after the 
MRI scan. 
Logistic Ensure good communication
Use checklist
Check MR compatible incubator, 
accessories and resuscitation bag
Check devices for MR (jn)compatibility
Keep comfortable and minimize stress
Perform a Time-Out-Procedure to ensure
that preparation was carried out correctly
Transport should be accompanied by 
trained staff only
Monitor physiologic stability throughout
transport
Ensure that resuscitation room with
equipment is nearby the MR suite
MR Technician performs metal check on 
infant, incubator and staff
verify hemodynamic stability before
procedure starts
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and note adverse events
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Monitor vital parameters and hemodynamic 
stability for the following 24 hours
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integration of patient safety issues in mortality and 
morbidity conferences, does it maKe sense?
abstract
Objective: 
Mortality and Morbidity discussions in our institution were adapted to integrate patient safety issues. 
The focus was on recommendations to improve patient safety. The objective of the study was to 
describe the outcomes of these discussions over a 3 year period (2008 - 2010). 
Design:
a retrospective descriptive study.
Setting:
A level III 28-bed intensive care unit in a university children’s hospital. A patient safety management 
system has been in place since 2005. 
Patients:
The unit admits patients from birth to 18 years, and serves as the ICU for all specialties. During 3 
years, 85 patients were discussed in the conferences. 
Interventions:
Reports of the conferences over a 3 year period were analyzed. Recommendations for improvement 
were identified and categorized. 
Measurement:
We evaluated how many proposed recommendations had in fact been implemented. 
Main results:
Patient safety issues related to death or serious adverse events were analyzed in 85 of the 93 
conferences. Most of the 148 proposed recommendations concerned team (32.4 %) and individual 
provider performance (23.6%). Thirty one recommended interventions have been carried out so far. 
Conclusions:
These conferences should be considered a promising addition to patient safety programs. Low 
implementation rates of recommendations are a well known problem that needs to be addressed to 
improve the yield from safety focused M&M conferences. 
introduction
Various studies have made clear that safety of healthcare leaves much to be desired. 1-3 Medical 
errors and adverse events are not uncommon, and pediatric patients in particular are at a high risk. 
4-9 Both multinational and national initiatives have been launched to improve patient safety. 10-12 They 
are based on the notion that it is essential to create a culture in which staff feels safe to discuss any 
shortcomings without fear of “blaming and shaming” and to learn from errors. 3, 13, 14 
Mortality and morbidity (M&M) conferences were introduced in the 20th century in surgery and 
anesthesiology residency programs 15-18, and have since spread to other fields of medicine. 19-23 
Traditionally, the goals of the M&M conferences were educational 24, with a focus on peer review 
and open discussion of adverse clinical events. The Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education in the United States has included quality improvement and patient safety in the core 
competencies for residency programs 25 and has advocated M&M conferences for that purpose. 
In recent years, the conferences have come to include ways to discuss and implement preventive 
measures as well. 23, 26-30 So far, only 2 publications on patient safety focused M&M conferences are 
available in the pediatric literature, both not in an ICU setting. 27, 31 In 2007 we started to integrate 
safety aspects in the M&M conferences in our ICU. We describe the nature of these conferences, the 
resulting recommendations, the problems with implementation and the lessons learned to improve 
effectiveness of the conferences.
materials and methods
Setting and description
The ICU is a 28 bed tertiary care intensive care unit in an academic children’s hospital, with 1400 
admissions per year. It serves a referral region of 4 million and provides all types of intensive care, 
such as transplant surgery, Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation, cardiac surgery and care for 
newborns with major surgical anomalies. The ICU employs 15 certified intensivists with a background 
in pediatrics or anesthesiology; 4 fellows; 8 residents; and 120 FTE nursing staff. In 2005 a patient 
safety management system was introduced, with voluntary incident reporting, adverse event 
registration, scoring of protocol violations, and team resource management as its cornerstones. 
32-34 A nurse (AvdB) and a physician (CvdS) have completed the Patient Safety Officer Executive 
Development Program from the IHI 35 and together with a nurse-safety manager are responsible for 
patient safety. 
In 2007, weekly mortality, morbidity and safety (MMS) conferences were implemented, focusing on 
what went wrong and how errors could have been prevented. These are attended by ICU nurses, 
physicians and, if cases call for it, subspecialty physicians and nurses or other stakeholders. The 
MMS conferences are led by patient safety officers or senior clinical leaders when possible. Cases 
are usually presented by intensivists or fellows, and concern ICU deaths and serious adverse events. 
Others, too, may suggest topics, e.g. the ventilation practitioner (nurse specialist) presenting a 
case of difficult ventilation management. Furthermore, issues that are not directly patient related 
may be discussed, e.g. feedback from the incident reporting system, unnatural cause of death, or 
recognition of child abuse. Each conference is expected to be concluded with recommendations 
for improvement of care and prevention of the same or similar adverse events. The number and 
disciplines of attendees are recorded and minutes are taken.
Data collection
 For this study, recommendations were identified from the minutes and categorized according to 
the contributing factors framework for incidents as developed by Vincent et al. - In this framework, 
adverse events are the result of a chain of events and these events are influenced by working 
conditions and organizational context. The 7 “levels” of contributing factors are patient factors, 
task, provider, team factors, working environment factors, organizational and management factors 
and institutional factors. Patient’s factors can directly influence his condition and thus contribute to 
an event; in our study no recommendations pertaining to patients factors were established. Task 
factors are the availability and utility of protocols and test results. An example was the fact that 
a geneticist was not consulted in a patient with major congenital anomalies before she died; the 
protocol for diagnostic workup of these patients was outdated and not easily accessible. 
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Provider factors include the knowledge, skills and experience of each employee. An example would 
be the recommendation to consider rescue ECMO therapy in case of cardiac arrest and in-hospital 
resuscitation. The way an individual is influenced by other members of the team and the way they 
communicate, support and supervise each other are team factors. The recommendation to improve 
medical record keeping was classified as a team factor, as the issue was lack of communication 
of treatment plans etc and it was not aimed at a single provider but all members of medical staff 
(recommended 10 times). The working environment factors concern the physical environment and 
factors which affect staff ability to work effectively, such as defective equipment. Examples would 
be to mark ECMO cannulas as arterial and venous before insertion, or improve the redistribution of 
workload in case of deteriorating patients. The organisational factors include policies for continuing 
education, training and supervision and the availability of equipment and supplies. The request 
for better after-care for employees after stressful events or the suggestion to install rapid response 
teams were classified as organizational factors. The organisation is affected by the institutional 
context, including financial constraints, external regulatory bodies and the broader economic and 
political climate. Two recommendations were deemed institutional: earlier involvement of external 
expertise in conversations with parents and improve feedback on the outcome of cases of unnatural 
cause of death. The data are presented as numbers, medians and percentages. 
results
From January 2008 to January 2011 ninety-three MMS conferences were held. Seventy-seven 
(82.8%) conferences dealt with patient death; 8 (8.6%) with serious adverse events; 4 (4.3%) with 
general feedback from other patient safety activities; and 4 on other topics (e.g. unnatural cause of 
death, recognition of child abuse). Patient demographics are presented in Table 1. The minutes of 12 
conferences do not completely record the number and type of attendees. The other 81 conferences 
were attended by a median of 17 participants (range 6-28, SD 5), mostly nurses (median 10); 
intensivists or fellows (median 3) and residents (median 2). 
table 1 Demographics of patients presented during MMS conferences.
* N = 84, data on 1 case missing
Abbreviations: CPR; cardiopulmonary resuscitation, IQR; interquartile range 
An illustrative case is shown in Table 2. The case presented was a 15-year-old patient with neurotrauma 
who died within 24 hours after admission to the PICU. All trauma casualties are stabilized in the adult 
Emergency Room, where the adult trauma expert is the team leader and the pediatric intensivist is 
consulted when deemed necessary. After stabilization the patient is handed over to the pediatric 
intensivist and transported to the children’s hospital (a 15 minute walk). The normal policy is to 
first stabilize patients in the emergency department and then evaluate the neurologic status on the 
PCIU. The ED and PICU physicians did not decide treatment was likely to be futile considering the 
neurological status of the patient. However, the patient was not stabilized properly before being 
transported to the PICU. It is not likely this has changed the outcome for this patient, as the cerebral 
hemorrhaging and swelling was so severe that death was inevitable. 
sex n (%)
boys
girls
45 (53%)
39 (46%)
age at admission n (%)
Median
IQR
0-1 months
1-12 months
1 yr-12 yrs
≥ 12 yrs
1 yr
45 days – 6 yrs 
20 (23.8%)
28 (33.3%)
23 (27.4%)
13 (15.5%)
diagnoses n (%)
Cardiac disease
Neurological
Congenital anomaly
Post CPR
Respiratory 
Oncological
Infection
Trauma
Other
 
19 (22.6%)
14 (16.7%)
13 (15.5%)
9 (10.7%)
7 (8.3%)
6 (7.1%)
5 (6.0%)
4 (4.8%)
7 (8.3%)
length of stay (days)
Median
IQR
10
3-30 
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table 2 Example case:
Abbreviations:  ED: emergency department
  CT: computer tomography
  PICU: pediatric intensive care unit
  Hb: hemoglobin
In 85 conferences 148 recommendations were formulated (median 2; range 0-4). Fifteen conferences 
(17.6%) were concluded without recommendations; they dealt with unavoidable adverse outcomes 
or deaths where no errors in management could be identified, for instance inoperable congenital 
malformation or brain death after high energetic trauma.
The recommendations are categorized in Table 3. Only two (1.4%) related to institutional factors; 48 
(32.4%) related to team factors. Thirty-one recommendations (21%) have been implemented so far, 
for example the use of a list of available materials and equipment and the establishment of a support 
team for employees experiencing traumatic events. The team factors recommendations were taken 
up as topics for the team resource management and team simulation trainings. 
table 3 Recommendations categorized according to Vincent’s framework.
Abbreviations: 
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation   DNR do not resuscitate
ED emergency department   CT computer tomography
ECMO extra corporeal membrane oxygenation
discussion
Our patient safety focused M&M conferences in a pediatric ICU environment resulted in many 
recommendations – indicative of systems failures on the one side, and opportunities for improvement 
on the other side. However, only 21% of the recommendations have been taken up so far. A 
number of lessons can be learnt from this. First of all, in the conferences that were not chaired by 
the patient safety officers or senior leaders, recommendations were either not formulated or not 
specified enough to develop an intervention. Second, in a large number of conferences, nobody was 
appointed as responsible for the further development and implementation of the recommendations, 
thus the tasks were not taken up by anybody. Also, some of the recommendations were difficult 
to bring into practice, such as addressing “medical record keeping needs to be improved”. 
Especially addressing the organizational recommendations was difficult. These were often related to 
collaboration with other disciplines such as surgeons and cardiologists that were not involved with 
the safety improvement initiatives and thus more difficult to convince of the necessity of organizing 
multidisciplinary rounds etc. At the start of the conferences, the focus was on creating awareness 
of patient safety issues and the system’s approach towards errors and adverse outcomes. Thus, 
appointing responsibilities and assignments was not a priority in the beginning. Later, this proved to 
be very difficult as the attendees considered taking up the task of acting on the recommendations 
to be optional and not an obligation. 
Formats of M&M conferences, their goals, topics and impact on education have been reported 
extensively. 15, 17, 18, 36, 37 Lately, we have seen a shift from peer review of individual performance and 
review of “(educationally) interesting” cases to multidisciplinary open discussions of adverse events 
and system failures. 23, 26-30
chronological case description 
A 15 year old boy was hit by a car and severely wounded. On site he was successfully intubated and 
resuscitated. In the ED he was respiratory and circulatory stable but neurological examination revealed 
dilated non-responsive pupils. After CT scan of head and pelvic area he was transferred to PICU; transport 
from ED to the PICU via the CT took over 1 hour. No central lines were inserted, no lab checks were done 
in that period and transfusion units were not ordered. Upon arrival on the PICU, his Hb had dropped from 
6.3 to 2.4 mmol/L and he was hypotensive. CT scans showed massive intracranial hemorrhage and multiple 
bleeding fractures of the pelvis. Appropriate interventions to increase blood pressure, decrease intracranial 
pressure and stabilize the pelvis were carried out. In spite of these, brain death was declared shortly after. 
discussion points
- Transfer from the ED to the PICU took too much time, during which there was suboptimal 
monitoring of the vitals and no monitoring of laboratory values, amongst others due to long 
distance between units and staff shortage. 
- Communication and team structure was suboptimal because the adult trauma expert was the 
team leader and not the pediatric intensivist (as a rule, in all trauma cases trauma experts are 
teamleader). Stabilization of the fractured pelvis was not prioritized over head CT scan, and not 
discussed in the ED
- Transfusion units were not ordered in advance on the ED, because a quick transfer to the PICU 
was foreseen.
recommendations 
- Increase speed of transfer to PICU (organizational factor)
- Pediatric intensivist should speak up and discuss with team leader necessity of stabilization of 
fractured pelvis (provider factor)
- If large bones are fractured, transfusion units should be ordered immediately (task factor)
n (%) adopted category example of recommendation
2 (1.4) - Institutional context
Create guideline for feedback on unnatural deaths 
from forensic department/police.                                                            
22 (14.9) 1
Organizational and 
management factors
Improve psychological support for patient/parents/
employees; set up rapid response team.                                                            
16 (10.8) 6
Work environment 
factors
Improve visibility of lab results during CPR in ED; 
mark ECMO cannulas arterial/venous before 
insertion.                                                                                                               
48 (32.4) 18 Team factors
Improve communication and reporting on DNR 
policy.                                                 
35 (23.6) 3 Provider factors
Early CT scan in case of visible head injury; consider 
rescue ECMO for cardiac arrest.                                                              
25 (16.9) 3 Task factors
Have end-tidal CO2 measurement ready before 
intubation.                                                           
148 (100) 31 (21)
116 117
c
h
ap
ter 9 c
h
ap
te
r 
9
Integration of patient safety issues in Mortality and Morbidity conferences, does it make sense?PART 3
Two previous studies have reported on safety focused M&M conferences in a pediatric setting. One 
identified 33 improvement items resulting from19 conferences in a children’s hospital, of which 23 
had been implemented, such as a structured communication technique. 31 The other, in a pediatric 
psychiatry department, identified improvement opportunities in 80% of cases presented during 2 
years of monthly conferences, e.g. additional education and communication guidelines. 27 Our study, 
however, is the first of its kind focusing on patient safety in a pediatric intensive care setting.  
M&M conferences have also been implemented as a tool for the advancement of patient safety in 
other settings. Bechtold et al identified 121 system improvement recommendations in an internal 
medicine department in 11 months. 26 Szekendi et al. and Sultana and Baxter both describe that 
patient safety focused M&M rounds were successful in identifying potential system improvements. 
23, 28 Ksouri reported that M&M conferences on the adult ICU resulted in three major system 
improvements: a standardized procedure for sepsis in neutropenic patients, standardized prescription 
of mechanical ventilation, and definition of roles of nursing staff in cardiac or respiratory arrest. 29 
An important feature of the safety focused M&M meetings – and a likely key to their success – is 
application of the systems approach to adverse outcomes, as opposed to the approach in which 
individuals are blamed. A detailed discussion of the care process and the inadequacies therein, can 
direct attention towards factors such as management decisions or work environment that may have 
contributed to the adverse outcome. 28, 37 In our safety focused M&M conferences, no more than 
23.6% of the recommendations were aimed at individual performance (provider factors). Thus we 
have come a long way to achieving the systems approach. 
Another key element of successful M&M conferences is the multidisciplinary nature. 26, 27, 29, 38 
From the introduction of M&M conferences in our department, both nurses and physicians have 
contributed, allowing different viewpoints to be expressed and a broader range of improvements to 
be suggested. The conferences were scheduled in the afternoon so that both day and evening shifts 
nurses could attend.
Other studies have reported that lack of time and resources may hinder good preparation of these 
conferences. 20, 38 Without proper preparation, motivation of attendees to contribute to the discussion 
will decrease and pointing out opportunities for improvement will be more difficult. Therefore it may 
be necessary to select cases more purposefully, i.e. solely cases where something went wrong. 
An impediment was the lack of consistent leadership of the meetings, as the patient safety officers 
or senior clinical leaders were not always present. We believe this has hampered identifying 
contributing factors and successful implementation of recommendations. Furthermore, maximum 
yield of safety focused M&Ms can only be obtained when specific persons are assigned the task to 
implement the recommendations. 
The lessons we learned is that roles and responsibilities of participants, presenters, chairpersons, 
patient safety officers and senior management should be defined and formalized right from the 
start. In addition, all participants should agree on the contents of the conferences, the open way in 
which matters are discussed, and the nature of the recommendations to be made. Every conference 
could start with feedback on the recommendations from previous meetings, so that implementation 
can be augmented and quality and safety of care further improved. 
conclusion
Frequently held multidisciplinary mortality and morbidity conferences with a focus on patient safety 
have great potential, especially when attention is shifted away from individual failures and errors. 
They stimulate an open discussion of unsafe practices among care providers and provide leads for 
system-based safety interventions. Successful implementation largely depends on prior definition of 
roles and responsibilities of the participants, and on unwavering public support from clinical leaders 
and management.
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nursing protocol violations: detect, correct and 
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abstract
Introduction
The Critical Nursing Situation Index (CNSI) is a tool to detecting nursing protocol violations. 
Objectives: The objective of this study was to determine incidences and severities of different types 
of protocol violations and to check whether actions were taken to correct the protocol violations. 
Methods
Prospective observational study in the intensive care unit of the Erasmus MC-Sophia Children’s 
Hospital. 
A checklist adapted from a previously published version of the CNSI was applied in the period 
February 2009 to February 2010 by 14 nurses who had been trained to use the CNSI and whose 
interrater reliability was sufficient. The checklist addressed nine domains of nursing care; Basic 
Care, Circulation, Respiration, Digestive tract, Infection, Invasive catheters, Medication, ECMO, and 
Central nervous system.
Results
238 observations in 126 patients were carried out, in which 21512 items were checked. In 986 out 
of 8107 applicable items (12.2%) the protocol was violated. More than fifty percent (53.4%) of 
all protocol violations were corrected in the same shift. Nurses’ classification of the severity of the 
protocol violations was not reliable, with linearly weighted kappa varying from 0 to 0.33.
Conclusions 
The CNSI is a useful tool to monitor and to correct nursing protocol violations. 
Relevance to clinical practice: Timely identification of protocol violations enables to rectify them 
which will improve safety. Furthermore, this study made us aware that protocol violations may be 
justifiable in clinical practice. The reasons and durations of these should be well communicated 
among the nursing staff.
Introduction
The risk of errors and adverse events may be considerable in high-technology departments such as a 
pediatric intensive care unit (PICU). Several tools are available to monitor adverse events in the PICU 
setting but the role of the nurse in this area so far has been limited to voluntary incident reporting 
1-3. Adverse events registration has evolved with the use of trigger tools to identify adverse events 4-5 
but it is mainly physicians who apply trigger tools. It is thought that no instrument is ideal to identify 
all adverse events.
Of course it would be best to prevent errors in the first place. Important in this respect is continuity 
of care and adherence to evidence based nursing protocols. To check adherence to protocols, 
Binnekade et al. developed the Critical Nursing Situation Index (CNSI), a checklist to identify protocol 
violations. 6 De Neef et al. developed a modified version for use in a general PICU. 7 Binnekade et al. 
found an incidence of 13 protocol violations in 100 “items at risk” in an adult ICU. “Items at risk” 
are those CNSI items that are applicable; for instance items that concern mechanical ventilation will 
be items at risk for ventilated patients but not for spontaneously breathing patients. The incidence 
was statistically significantly higher when nursing time at bedside was shorter. The latter finding was 
not replicated by de Neef et al in a paediatric intensive care population. 7 In this study the incidence 
was 18 per 100 items at risk.  
The objective of our study was 1) to determine the incidences and severities of different types of 
protocol violations and to check whether actions were taken to correct the protocol violations; and 
2) to investigate how often nurses deviate from the protocol for justifiable reasons. 
methods
Patients and setting
All patients aged 0 to 18 years at the ICU of the Erasmus MC-Sophia Children’s Hospital are eligible 
for CNSI assessment of nursing care. The ICU is a level III unit with 28 beds and a step down unit 
of 6 beds with an average of 1400 admissions a year. The number of nurses is around 130. The 
Erasmus MC Medical Ethical Review Board waived informed consent because CNSI assessment is 
part of our Patient Safety Management System, which has been in place since 2005 and furthermore 
incorporates voluntary incident reporting, team resource training and adverse events registration. 
Study design
Prospective observational study.
CNSI instrument
In 2003 we tested the CNSI tools of Binnekade et al 6 and de Neef et al 7 both in 15 patients. Most 
items (69% and 83%, respectively) proved not suitable for our setting. 8 From October 2003 to 
August 2004, the 96 nursing protocols of our unit, that provide the basis of the CNSI, were each 
independently screened by two nurses, and if necessary, adapted and rewritten. Final approval was 
obtained from a paediatric intensivist. CNSI Items were added for neurotrauma patients and patients 
on Extra Corporeal Membrane Oxygenation (ECMO). A new update was prepared in 2009 (see 
Figure 1). Our CNSI now contains 181 items divided into 9 categories (Appendix 1). Each item of the 
CNSI represents an element of a nursing protocol.
There are three possible responses to the item statements: “True” which indicates that the protocol 
was violated; “False”, which indicates that care was by protocol, and “Not applicable”, which 
indicates that this item does not apply to this patient. A considerable number of CNSI items may not 
be applicable in for instance a patient without mechanical ventilation. 
Severity of protocol violations was established as follows. Seven nurses each independently scored 
the severity of 32 randomly selected protocol violations; i.e. hypothetically. Because the interrater 
reliability was low we continued with a second step. The nurses scored the same protocol violations 
again, but now after having been given information about patients in the current study for whom 
the protocol violations were noted, such as age, body weight and severity of illness. Severity was 
scored on a 1 to 5 scale: 1 Without adverse effects; 2 Possible minimal discomfort; no harm, no 
interventions necessary; 3 Moderate: Possible discomfort, temporary harm; 4 Serious: Possible 
serious discomfort; permanent harm; serious clinical interventions 5 Unknown: Possibility of future 
harm or interventions, but the potential is unknown by now.
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Procedure
Fourteen nurses were trained in CNSI assessment during two 3-hours sessions followed by bedside 
scoring. Each nurse made 10 assessments in alternating pairs with a colleague. Interrater reliability 
of all nurses was excellent (Cohen’s Kappa 0.93-0.99). These nurses were asked to apply the CNSI 
at least once a week to keep their skills and to collect sufficient data for this study. A patient would 
be randomly selected and the bedside nurse would be informed. After the assessment, the bedside 
nurse and the nurse who scored the CNSI would go through the list to discuss any protocol violation 
encountered. The nurse who scored also recorded if violations were discussed with the bedside 
nurse and corrected either immediately or later in the same shift; and if protocol violations were 
justifiable. 
The CNSI score form also includes date and time of admission; reason for admission; observation 
date and time; and IC or High Care patient. The total list of 181 items is divided into two sub lists 
to reduce assessment time. The odd numbered ones were placed on an ‘A’ list, the even numbered 
ones on the ‘B’ list. 
Data were collected from February 2009 to January 2010. CNSI assessments continued afterwards 
as standard of care with an average of 3-4 weekly CNSI sores. 
Statistical analysis
The incidence of ‘critical nursing situations’, which we shall further refer to as ‘protocol violations’ 
was the quotient of items scored as ‘true’ and the total number of applicable items and is expressed 
as the rate per 100 items at risk. Interrater reliability of the severity scores was calculated with the 
linearly weighted Cohen’s kappa. A kappa of 0.61 or higher was deemed acceptable. We calculated 
a mean (SD) severity score to compare the items.
results
In the study period 238 assessments were performed in 126 out of the 1081 patients (11.6%) 
admitted during that period. In 110 assessments the A form (92 items) was used; in 128 times the B 
form (89 items). Patients’ background characteristics are given in Table 1. Eighty percent were under 
the age of 4 years and their median length of stay was 19 days (IQR 9 to 40).  
table 1 Patient characteristics (N=126)
Of all 21512 items, 8107 (37.7%) were at risk for a protocol violation. Of these, 986 were scored as 
‘true’ (12.2%), resulting in an overall incidence of 12 protocol violations per 100 items at risk (Figure 
1). The incidence of protocol violations per subscale varied from 5 (Medication) to 26 (Digestive tract) 
as shown in Table 2. 
Actions taken upon protocol violations
Table 3 gives the response to the protocol violations. More than fifty percent (53.4%) of all protocol 
violations were directly or later corrected by the bedside nurse. This percentage varied between 
31.8% for ECMO related protocol violations to 64% for Digestive tract related violations. Protocol 
violations were justifiable in 22.3% of all, ranging from 10.9% for Digestive tract to 40.9% for 
ECMO related protocol violations (Table 3). The most frequent justifiable protocol violation was 
‘Incorrect vital functions alarm settings on the monitor’ (32 times). Alarm settings may be tailored to 
suit a specific patient. Refraining from weighing (item 3) or position not changed regularly (item 9) 
was noted respectively 11 and 10 times in case of instable patients.  
In almost one quarter (24.3%) of cases the violations were not discussed (e.g. because the assessment 
was performed in a next shift) or not recorded on the case record form.  
background characteristics
n (%) unless stated 
otherwise
Girls 
Boys
57 (45.2)
69 (54.8)
age group
Neonates
1 month -1 year
1 - 4 year
5 - 17 year
18 year and older
50 (39.7)
31 (24.6)
20 (15.9)
23 (18.2)
2 (1.6)
diagnosis
Cardiac disorders 29 (23.0)
Respiratory disorders 29 (23.0)
Gastrointestinal disorders 16 (12.7)
Neurological disorders 15 (11.8)
CDH 14 (11.0)
Sepsis/H1N1 9 (7.1)
Syndromes and other 14 (11.1)
prism-ii and pim-ii  in mean (sd)
PRISM II (n=119)
PIM-II  (n=119)
14.8 (8.5)
– 3.14 (1.59)
length of stay in median (iQr) days 19 (9 to 40)
type of patient
IC
HC
96 (76.2 %)
30 (23.8 %)
number of cnsi observations per patient in median 
(iQr)
1 ( 1 to 2)
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figure 1 table 2 Protocol violations, items at risk and incidence of protocol violations per 100 items at risk with the  
 highest CNSI item score in each subscale
table 3
subscale 
protocol 
violations
items at 
risk
incidence
item per subscale with the highest cnsi 
score
Basic care 180 1473 12
50.9% (29/57) item 21 No first responsible 
nurse selected for patient, although 
indicated
Circulation 140 1178 12
54.4% (68/125) item 24 Incorrect vital 
functions alarm settings on the monitor
Respiration 149 1742 9
51.1% (24/47) item 65 EtCO2 is not monitored 
in patient at Servo-I respirator
Digestive 
tract
128 495 26
51.4% (55/107) item 68 Insertion date of 
nasogastric- and/or duodenal tube is not 
noted in PDMS
Infection 113 742 15
39.1% (27/69) item 84 PVC nasogastric tube is 
not renewed every 10 days
Invasive 
catheters
181 1279 14
54.3% (50/92) item 106 Insertion date  of the 
central venous or arterial line not noted in 
PDMS
Medication 26 515 5
8.3% (9/109) item 114 Syringe with 
intravenous medication does not show label 
when in Perfusor pump
ECMO 45 560 8
33.3% (6/18) item 127 Membrane and coil 
kidney pressure device settings deviate from 
recommended setting
CNS 24 123 19
50% (5/10) item 183 Urine labstick test 
not performed twice daily in case of 
dexamethasone administration.
Total 986 8107 12
subscale protocol violations
corrected directly 
or later 
authorized 
violation
not discussed
or unknown
n n (%) n (%) n (%)
Basic care 180 83 (46.1%) 43 (23.8%) 54 (30%)
Circulation 141 63 (44.6%) 46 (32.6%) 32 (22.6%)
Respiration 149 85 (57%) 32 (21.4%) 32 (21.5%)
Digestive tract 128 82 (64%) 14 (10.9%) 32 (25%)
Infection 113 62 (54.9%) 21 (18.5%) 30 (26.5%)
Invasive catheters 182 114 (63.3%) 35 (19.4%) 33 (18.3%)
Medication 26 12 (46.1%) 7 (26.9%) 7 (26.9%)
ECMO 44 14 (31.8%) 18 (40.9%) 12 (27.2%)
CNS 24 12 (50%) 4 (16.6%) 8 (33.3%)
Total 986 527 (53.4%) 220 (22.3 %) 240 (24.3%)
Both not suitable for ICU
Erasmus MC Sophia Children
Hospital (2003)
CNSI scoring list adult ICU CNSI scoring list PICU21512 items
Development new CNSI special
for our unit (2004)
14 nurses trained for CNSI
assessment (2006). Introduction
on the ward.
Updating CNSI (2009)
corrected (53,4%)
240 not discussed or not
recorded (24,3%)
220 justifiable violations (23,3%)
986 protocol violations
(12,2%)
7121 items according
(87,8%)
8107 items at risk (37,7%) 13405 items not applicable (62,3%)
February 2009 to January 2010 
238 assessments in 126 patients: 
21512 scored items
Establishing severity
of protocol violations
in 32 randomly
selected items
128 129
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Severity of protocol violations
Seven nurses scored the severity of 32 randomly selected protocol violations. Their scores varied 
from 1 to 4; score 5 (unknown harm) was not assigned. The mean severity score across the 32 
items varied from 1.7 for item 89 ‘continuous enteral feeding system not renewed every 24 hours’ 
to 3.4 for item 121 ‘Marking stickers on intravenous infusion incorrect or unreadable’. The linearly 
weighted kappa was poor, ranging from 0 to 0.33. In the second step, after patient information had 
been provided, the mean severity scores for the 32 items with varied from 1.4 for item 65 ‘EtCO2 
is not monitored in patient at Servo I respirator’ to 3.8 for item 3 ‘Weight on resuscitation form not 
up-to-date’. The linearly weighted kappa now was poor to moderate, ranging from 0.12 to 0.46. 
For example, severity scores ranged from 1 to 4 for item 53 ‘Saturation limits of premature born not 
adapted to gestational age’ and from 2 to 4 for item 37 ‘Discrepancy between selected and actual 
ventilation settings’.
discussion
In this study the incidence of protocol violations was 12 per 100 items at risk. More than half of the 
protocol violations were effectively corrected either directly or at the end of the shift. Assessing the 
severity of the critical nursing situation proved unreliable. 
The incidence of protocol violations was comparable to that found in an adult ICU 6 and lower than 
the incidence of 18 per 100 critical incidents in the single pediatric study available in the literature. 
7 It is hard to draw conclusions, however, because the nature of the protocols and the numbers of 
CNSI items differed. Healthcare is a rapidly changing environment and protocols need to be regularly 
adjusted with these changes, it follows that the CNSI instrument requires updates as well. 
On a subscale level, the incidence of protocol violations in the Medication subscale was low in 
view of the high percentages of medication errors found with voluntary incident reporting. 2, 9 As 
a possible explanation, voluntary incident reporting obviously takes place after an incident has 
occurred, whereas CNSI assessment is performed at random moments, implying that theoretically a 
certain number of incidents are missed.  
Although the CNSI was originally designed to merely monitor the incidence rates of predefined 
observable protocol violations, we saw major value in the fact that more than half of incidents could 
be corrected. There is room for improvement considering that in a quarter of all incidents corrective 
actions were unknown. Interestingly, in almost one quarter of incidents the protocol deviations 
were justified. We feel that this reflects the essence of working according to protocol: being open 
for situations in which it would be better to deviate from protocol. A prerequisite is, however, that 
these justifiable violations are well communicated with co-workers and recorded in the patient data 
management system. 
Protocols ensure continuity of care and should be kept up-to-date and preferably be evidence-based, 
which means that the nursing profession should be stimulated to perform research. 
De Neef et al pointed out that the safety risk for the patient differs per CNSI item and we agree. 7 We 
were surprised, however, to find that agreement about the severity of protocol violations was so low. 
The low interrater reliability coefficients indicated large discrepancies between nurses. Our study was 
the first to try and classify the severity of the protocol violations. In future we should look at different 
approaches to establish the severity of protocol violations, for example in consensus meetings. 
When the CNSI was introduced in 2006, nurses felt they were checked upon and were nervous 
about the results. Over the years these feelings have changed and nurses more and more consider 
CNSI assessments as a useful way to correct possible flaws. Occasionally, they even ask for CNSI 
assessment for patients they take care of. We publish the results in newsletters and highlight 
protocols for which many violations were seen. Giving feedback about frequent protocol violations 
is very important. Our nursing staff includes 130 nurses, some part-timers, and not all nurses read 
these newsletters. We will therefore also monthly publish frequent protocol violations in strategically 
placed posters, and post them on the hospital’s Intranet.   
recommendations
Since many items often are not applicable we recommend using a short CNSI version or tailor-made 
versions for specific patient groups and units. Also, assessment within 24 hours after admission 
would allow timely corrections of flaws in protocol compliance. All units that want to develop a 
unit-specific CNSI should first evaluate the evidence base of existing protocols. 
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Appendix with all CNSI items
basic care
1
Bed environment not according to guideline (complete monitoring setting, set for manual 
ventilation, suction equipment, necessities for basic care). 
2 Resuscitation orders are missing or not up to date.
3 Weight on resuscitation form not up to date.
4 Nursing-or family report from previous shift is lacking.  
5 Hospital stay review not updated (at least 2 times a week) and/or events not registered in PDMS.
6
Bed safety fences not up (fences up if there is any possibility the child will sit or stand up 
independently).
7 Heated bed or incubator switched off.
8 Heat shield is not properly installed (minimal distance 60 cm).
9 Posture not in agreement with instructions (position changing every 4 hours).
10
Drain(s) and/or catheter(s) not fully secured in place (post-operative drains, Broviac and other venous 
catheters, supra pubis catheter, pyelum catheters).
11 Patients weight control not according to physician’s instructions.
12
Surgical wounds not observed and bandaged according to protocol (bandages to be changed 24-48 
hours after surgery. Observation surgical wounds must be recorded in PDMS every 2-3 hours, after 
48 hours every 6 hours).
13
Postoperative checks not according to protocol (Protocol: first hour after surgery every 15 min; 2 
hours every 30 min; 3 hours once an hour; every 2 hours).
14
Phototherapy conditions not according to protocol (eye protection, covered SpO2 adhesive sensor, 
40-60 cm. distance from child to lightsource).
15 No urinary catheter for patient with inguinal line.
16 Oral care not according to protocol.
17 Eye care not according to protocol.
18 No subcutaneous indwelling catheter present although indicated.
19 Neonatal hearing test not performed/scheduled after removing endotracheal tube.
20 Subcutaneous indwelling catheter not renewed according to protocol.
21 No first responsible nurse selected for patient, although indicated.
22 Comfort score not assessed or registered in PDMS according to protocol.
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circulation respiration
23 Sound alarms of one or more parameters switched off (unless agreed with physician). 
24 Incorrect vital functions alarm settings on the monitor.
25 Heart rate inadequately registered on the monitor. 
26
Peripheral circulation and color of patient not recorded in PDMS (I.C. patient every 2 hours;  if 
plaster cast present: first 6 hours every 60 minutes; 24 hours every 3 hours; 2 times daily).
27
NIBP not measured according to protocol (Protocol: when no IBP: NIBP control according to doctor’s 
orders when hypo- or hypertension, instable patient, cor vitium, use of medication which can affect 
the blood pressure).
28 Body temperature checked and registered less frequent than prescribed.
29 Transfusion form filled out incompletely.
30 Blood group not recorded in PDMS.
31
Fluid loss compensation recorded incorrectly (gastric fluid every 6 hours; drains every 2 hours; in case 
of electrolyte disturbance every hour).
32 Prescribed venous line is absent.
33 Urinary catheter is obstructed.
34 Traction on urinary-, supra pubic- or renal catheter.
35
No “low-resistance system” installed on the urinary catheter of children < 3 years (unless catheter 
removed < 24 hours).
36 Tube size and tube length not registered in PDMS.
37 Discrepancy between agreed upon and actual ventilation settings. 
38
Discrepancy between agreed upon and actual tube cuff pressure (Protocol: continuous pressure 
control). 
39 Endotracheal tube is fixed inadequately.
40 Humidifying system for respirator is empty.
41 Humidifier for respirator is switched off.
42 No closed suction system connected to endotracheal tube.
43 Respirator system not set up according to guidelines.
44 Color and consistency of sputum not recorded in PDMS.
45 Closed suction system not changed every 48 hours.
46 Suction system container filled for more than ¾.
47 Optiflow not set according to protocol.
48 Amount of NO in cylinder recorded incorrectly in PDMS.
49 Supply tubing and/or NO measuring point connected incorrectly. 
50 Saturation is inadequately registered on monitor.
51 No double suction tube connected between child on respirator and the suction container.
52 Patient on respirator has no gastric tube.
53
Saturation limits of preterm patient not adapted to gestational age (<32 weeks 88%-94%; >32 
weeks 92%-96%; neonates with NO-administration 94%-100%).
54 Drain system incorrect positioned relative to chest drain (fixed on chest, drains on the other side).
55 Thoracic drain settings not according to protocol or as agreed on.
56 Trachea cannula size not registered in PDMS.
57 Clamp missing when patient has chest drain.
58
Emergency tracheostomy set is missing or incomplete (contents: Spare cannula + 1 smaller cannula; 
mayo tube; fixation bandage). 
59 Changing date for trachea cannula not registered in PDMS.
60 FiO2 supply by nasal cannula or nasal catheter not as agreed upon.
61 Patient on NPT fails to reach PEEP limit.
62 Suction depth not or incorrect recorded in PDMS.
63 Renewal of expiration filter not recorded in PDMS. 
64 Pressure gauge at Jackson Reese or Waterset is lacking.
65 EtCO2 is not monitored in patient at Servo I respirator.
66 Cuff pressure of endotracheal tube is not checked every 4 hours.
67 Nebulizer is used incorrectly.
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digestive tract
infectious
invasive lines
medication
68 Introduction date of gastric tube is not noted in PDMS.
69 Discrepancy between actual and agreed upon amount and type of nutrition.
70 Trans-anastomosis nasal-gastric tube inadequately marked.
71 Nasal gastric tube and/or duodenum tube not secured according to protocol.
72 Gastric retention not measured as agreed upon. 
73 Hands of child with an trans-anastomosis nasal-gastric tube are not restrained.
74 Insertion site of gastric drain not managed according to protocol.
75 Gastric retention not as agreed upon.
76 Suction on replogle tube not as agreed upon.
77 Replogle tube not flushed every hour.
78 Replogle tube is not replaced every 24 hours or more frequently if necessary (obstruction).
79 Belly width not measured at the times agreed upon.
80 Rectal cannulas not applied at the times agreed upon.
81 Stoma care is inadequate.
83 Neonatal screening not performed or scheduled.
82 Times when infusion systems are renewed are not recorded in PDMS.
84 PVC nasal gastric tube is not renewed every 10 days.
85 Infusion system touches the floor.
86 Nasal cannula or -catheter for FiO2 supply visibly contaminated.
87 Blood or ESDEP not renewed every 6 hours.
88 No isolation prescriptions mounted if indicated.
89 Continuous enteral feeding system not renewed every 24 hours
90 One or more caps missing from venous access.
91 Medical- or nursing devices not renewed according to protocol.
92 Biopatch on insertion site central venous or arterial line is absent.
93 Bandage of central venous-, arterial- or peripheral line visibly contaminated.
94 Discrepancy between actual and agreed upon ml/h for continuous intravenous medication. 
95 Puncture site of peripheral line is fully covered and therefore not visible.
96 I.V. lock not flushed with NaCl 0.9% every 6 hours.
97 Peripheral administration of glucose > 10%.
98 T.P.N. not connected on lumen close to patient.
99 T.P.N. continued at body temperature > 38º.
100 No flush line on I.V. infusion system for administration of medication.
101
Ramp of 4 three way stopcocks absent in the presence of > 2 extra connectors on I.V. infusion 
system.
102 No caution mark on flush line on cardiovascular medication.
103 Caps on I.V. infusion system are absent.
104 Broviac catheter is not secured according to protocol.
105 I.V.3000 bandage of CVC, arterial catheter or peripheral infusion inadequately secured.
106 Date of introduction of the central venous or arterial line not noted in PDMS.
107 Pressure system(s) not calibrated.
108 No caution mark on arterial or central venous catheter.
109 A Grasebuy pump is connected next to an I.V. line for administration of cardiovascular medication.
110 I.V. system for administration of cardiovascular medication incorrectly set up. 
111 Cardiovascular agents are not connected on the proximal lumen of the venous catheter.
113 < 2 ml fluid per hour administered on one of the lumen of the C.V.C. 
115 C.V.P. measurement not connected to distal lumen of the central venous line.
112 Prescribed medication not administered or initialed by nurse on duty. 
114 Syringe with intravenous medication does not show label when in perfusor.
116 Furosemide and Sodium Nitroprusside are not protected against day light.
117 Prescribed medication not administered within one hour after agreed time.  
119 Medication for solitary intravenous infusion combined with other medication.
121 Marking stickers on intravenous infusion incorrect or unreadable.
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ecmo
central nervous system
118 ECMO system is not checked every 4 hours.
120 Tie-strips on connections are lacking.
122 Cables or gas pipes uncovered on the floor.
123 ECMO management policy checklist not complete.
124 Pigtails in use are not daily renewed.
125 ECMO cannulas are badly secured.
126 Pressure devices of membrane and coil kidney not changed every 4 days.
127 Membrane and coil kidney pressure device settings are not as agreed upon.
128 Disconnection of the ECMO system should be preceded by disinfection.
129 Raceway not repositioned once a week without informing intensivist.
130 There are no 2 syringes on blood sample point. (One 1 ml and one 2.5 ml.)
131 Pigtails that are not in use are not renewed every 3rd day. 
132 Post membrane blood gas assessment not according to protocol (6.00 - 14.00 - 22.00).
133 The person who disconnects the ECMO system does not wear gloves.
134 Pre- and post ductal saturation are measured incorrectly.
135 The daily blood culture at 6.00 p.m. is not performed.
136 ACT is not assessed every hour. 
137 Blood bag for emergencies missing or expired.
138 During platelets transfusion oxygen administration is not fully100%. 
139 Name of “back-up” nurse has not been registered in PDMS.
140 After platelet administration the pigtail used has not been renewed.
141 Venous bloodgas values have not been manually registered in PDMS.
142 After platelet transfusion the oxygen administration level has not been reset to original values.
143 Heparin administration not adjusted to ACT values.
144 Fontanel not performed and recorded in PDMS. (Only for neonatal ECMO)
145 An extra bolus of heparin not administered halfway through platelet transfusion.
146 Respirator treatment in emergencies isnot or incorrectly detailed. 
147 Pupillary reflex has not been checked and/or registered in PDMS.
148 Auscultation and chest excursions have not been noted in PDMS.  
149 Platelets not administered correctly.(Pediatric ECMO directly to patient, neonatal ECMO on heater)
150 Set bubble detector switched off.
151 Label detailing emergency respiration treatment is not present on respirator or is incorrect.
152 Biopatch on cannula insertion site is lacking.
153 Blood flow and blood temperature have not been checked after clamp from coil kidney.
154 Discrepancy between actually administered and prescribed ml/h of pre-dilution fluid.
155 Set bladder is switched off.
156 Venous blood gas assessment not according to protocol (6.00 - 14.00 - 22.00)
157 < 0.6 ml/h heparin 100 i.E./ml administered on the pressure device of coil kidney.
159 Discrepancy between actual withdrawn and registered ml/h fluid from coil kidney.
161 Nursing care of patient on ECMO not as prescribed.
158 Alarm settings of ICP, CPP and SvO2 are incorrect.
160 Calibration number of ICP express missing in PDMS and on ICP extension.
162 Bulbus jugular line not calibrated every shift.
163 Monitor modules plugged in, in wrong order.
164 Extension of bulbus jugular is found in bed.
165 SvO2, PtiO2 and/or brain temperature not manually registered in PDMS.
166 External ventricle drainage system positioned at wrong height. 
167 PDMS is not set at 15 minutes intervals.
168 Glasgow Coma Scale assessment not carried out as agreed upon. 
169 Orange “DO NOT FLUSH” label missing on bulbus jugular catheter.
170 Upon admission neurologic trauma patient is not immediately assigned a special bed.
171 Catheters and cables of measuring instruments have not been secured. 
172 Patient has not been given a “first-step mattress” after 48 hours.
173 Liquor production limit not indicated in PDMS. 
174 Insertion site of ICP not taken care of according to protocol.
175 Medical Research Council strength score not carried out according to protocol.
176 Patient with body temperature > 38º is not on cooling mattress.
177 Patient lies not flat in bed and/or head is not in midline.
178 VISS assessment not performed as agreed upon and/or not registered in PDMS.
179 Elbows and ankles not bandaged when patient is on standard bed.
181 Pupillary reflex has not been checked in patient in Sodium Pentobarbital coma.
183 Urine labstick test not performed twice daily in case of Dexamethason administration.
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lara’s story: part 4
Lara is back on the ICU! 
The surgeon told Thomas and Melissa the 
operation went well. The esophagus has 
been repaired, and they found that the 
esophagus and the trachea had been con-
nected by a so-called fistula. This explains 
that at intubation the air blown into the 
tube went through the fistula to the sto-
mach instead of to the lungs, and that’s 
why Lara deteriorated so quickly. Now that 
the fistula has gone, this will not happen 
again. Although very relieved that Lara 
is now doing better,  Thomas and Melissa 
still wonder how this could have hap-
pened. The next day they the head of the 
department tells them that Lara’s resusci-
tation and the circumstances leading up 
to it will be investigated. They are assured 
that the patient safety team on the unit 
will make recommendations to prevent 
this from happening again to other child-
ren in the ICU. 
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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the patient safety culture on a dutch pediatric surgical 
intensive care unit: an evaluation using the safety 
attitudes Questionnaire
abstract
Objective: 
Nowadays, the belief is widespread that a safety culture is crucial to achieving patient safety. Yet, 
there has been virtually no analysis of the safety culture in pediatric hospital settings so far. Our aim 
was to measure the safety climate on our unit, compare it with benchmarking data, and identify 
potential deficiencies.
Design: 
Prospective longitudinal survey study, at two points in time.
Setting: 
Pediatric surgical intensive care unit at a Dutch university hospital.
Subjects: 
All unit personnel.
Interventions: 
To measure safety climate, the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) was administered to physicians, 
nurses, nursing assistants, pharmacists, technicians, and ward clerks both in May 2006 and May 
2007. This questionnaire assesses caregiver attitudes through using the 6 following 
scales: 
teamwork climate, job satisfaction, perceptions of management, safety climate, working conditions, 
and stress recognition. Earlier research showed that the SAQ has good psychometric properties, and 
produced benchmarking data that can be used to evaluate strengths and weaknesses in a given 
clinical unit against peers.
Measurements and Main Results: 
The response rate for the SAQ was 85% (May 2006) and 74% (May 2007). There were mixed 
findings regarding the difference between physicians and nurses: on three scales (i.e., teamwork 
climate, safety climate, and stress recognition), physicians scored better than nurses at both points 
in time. On another two scales (i.e., perceptions of management and working conditions), nurses 
consistently had higher mean scale scores. Probably due to the small number of physicians, only 
some of these differences between physicians and nurses reached the level of statistical significance. 
Compared to benchmarking data, scores on perceptions of management were higher than expected 
(P < 0.01), whereas scores on stress recognition were low (P < 0.001). The scores on the other scales 
were somewhat above (job satisfaction), close to (teamwork climate, safety climate), or somewhat 
below (working conditions) what was expected based on benchmarking data, but no persistent 
significant differences were observed on these scales.
Conclusions: 
Although on most domains the safety culture in our unit was good when compared to benchmark 
data, there is still room for improvement. This requires us to continue working on interventions 
intended to improve the safety culture, including Crew Resource Management trainings, safety 
briefings, and senior executive walk rounds. More research is needed into the impact of creating a 
safety culture on patient outcomes.
the patient safety culture on a dutch pediatric surgical intensive care unit: 
an evaluation using the safety attitudes Questionnaire
Nowadays, improving patient safety is widely considered an important priority of our health care 
system. One factor crucial to achieving patient safety falls under the term “safety culture”. This term 
was first used in the aftermath of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986. 1 Later, it found its way to 
other high-hazard industries, such as aviation and chemical manufacturing, and eventually also to the 
health care sector. In 1999, the US Institute of Medicine recommended that healthcare organizations 
should work to enhance their safety culture. 2 Since then, it is increasingly believed that safety culture 
is a major determinant of patient safety. While an exact definition of a safety culture does not exist, 
it is generally described as including the following components: 1) acknowledgment of the high 
risk, error-prone nature of an organization’s activities, 2) blame-free environment where individuals 
are able to report errors or near misses without punishment, 3) expectation of collaboration across 
ranks to seek solutions to vulnerabilities, and 4) willingness on the part of the organization to direct 
resources to address safety concerns. 3 Without the right safety culture, initiatives to improve patient 
safety, such as blame-free incident reporting and root cause analysis, are far less likely to succeed. 
It can be assumed that health care organizations have ample room for improvement. For example, 
a pervasive culture of blame that impedes acknowledgment of error and barriers to communication 
against the authority gradient are traditionally regarded as obstacles to a safety culture within health 
care. 3
The field of pediatric health care is showing increasing interest in safety culture. 4, 5 Yet, there 
has been virtually no analysis of the safety culture in pediatric hospital settings so far, despite the 
development and psychometric assessment in recent years of instruments to measure safety culture. 
6, 7 There are a few notable exceptions. Grant and co-workers documented poor recognition of the 
adverse effects of stress and fatigue, but high levels of job satisfaction among staff members of a 
children’s hospital. 8 This result is in line with a study among pediatric trainee physicians by Parry 
and colleagues, who further found that trainee physicians are not fully comfortable with their ability 
to act interdependently (i.e., to care for patients in situations where they interact with another 
group of providers). 9 In a study of the safety culture in pediatric cardiac surgery teams, Bognár 
et al. concluded that many team members considered it difficult to raise safety concerns and felt 
that teams lack the power to prevent safety events. 10 Khoshbin and co-workers found that the 
introduction of operating room briefings was associated with an improvement in patient safety 
attitudes among nursing staff. 11 Finally, Snijders et al., who analyzed the safety culture in neonatal 
ICUs, showed that a nonpunitive approach to error, hospital management support for patient safety, 
and overall perceptions of safety predicted incident reporting behavior. 12
This study sought to add to the scarce evidence on the safety culture in pediatric intensive care 
settings. Our three-fold aim was to measure the safety climate on our pediatric surgical intensive 
care unit (PSICU), to compare it with benchmarking data, and to identify potential deficiencies.
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materials and methods
Setting
The study was carried out in the PSICU of the Sophia Children’s Hospital (Erasmus MC), a level III 
hospital serving a referral area of 4 million inhabitants with 44,000 births each year. At the time 
of this study, our PSICU had a capacity of 14 beds and admitted 550 patients each year, with ages 
ranging from newborn to 18 years (>65% below the age of 3). The PSICU serves as the ICU for 
all surgical specialties, with the exception of open-heart surgery patients. Consequently, it treats 
children with a wide variety of congenital anomalies and acquired diseases, among others traumatic 
brain injury, renal transplants, craniofacial surgery, and scoliosis. It also provides extracorporeal 
membrane oxygenation (ECMO).
A comprehensive unit-based patient safety management system has been established on our PSICU 
beginning in 2003 to improve the safety culture, and patient safety. 13, 14 Among its main components 
are: incident reporting, critical nursing situation index (CNSI), complication registration, and crew 
resource management (CRM) training. These components may be briefly described as follows. First, 
medical and nursing staff are asked to report any incidents, including near-incidents, during each 
shift. This goes together with applying a risk assessment matrix and with systematic in-depth analysis 
of underlying causes. 15-17 Second, the CNSI represents a tool to assess adherence to standards and 
protocols in ICU nursing care. 18 Third, complication registration involves medical staff registering all 
unintended and undesirable medical events or conditions during the daily rounds. 19 Fourth, CRM 
training concentrates on subjects such as human errors, stress management, communication, group 
dynamics, leadership, decision making, and risk management. Practically, CRM programs typically 
include educating staff about the limitations of human performance, videotaping of actual mishaps, 
simulation trainings, and debriefing sessions. 20-22
Data collection
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) was used to measure safety climate, a term that generally 
refers to the measurable components of safety culture. It assesses caregiver attitudes by using the 
following 6 scales: teamwork climate, job satisfaction, perceptions of management, safety climate, 
working conditions, and stress recognition (Table 1). 23 The SAQ-ICU version used in this study 
comprised 64 items, each of which is answered using a five-point Likert scale: Disagree Strongly (a 
score of 0), Disagree Slightly (25), Neutral (50), Agree Slightly (75), and Agree Strongly (100). Each 
scale score was calculated as the mean score of its component items, and thus was calibrated from 
0 to 100. Negatively worded items were reverse scored, so that higher scores indicated better safety 
climate.
table 1 Safety Attitudes Questionnaire scales and example items
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table borrowed from Sexton et al. 23
An additional section of the SAQ is a scale to evaluate the quality of collaboration and communication 
between employee groups. This section of the survey uses a five-point Likert scale with response 
choices of Very Low, Low, Adequate, High, and Very High. Finally, an open-ended section asks 
responders to write their top three recommendations for improving patient safety. These responses 
were categorized by theme. Basic demographic information included age, sex, job status, years of 
experience, and time with the organization. Each participant was asked if he or she had ever followed 
a CRM training, either in our hospital or elsewhere. Finally, we asked each participant how many 
events he or she had reported in the past month.
The SAQ has been shown to have good psychometric properties. 23 Sexton et al. administered the 
SAQ ICU version to 8,646 health care providers at 179 ICUs in three countries (United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and United States of America). 23 This resulted in benchmarking data that clinical units can use 
to understand their strengths and weaknesses against peers and to identify appropriate interventions.
Developed in the USA, the original language of the SAQ is English. With the help of the tool’s original 
developers, its linguistic validation into Dutch was undertaken. To ensure conceptual equivalence 
and respondent acceptance, the translation process followed well-established methods, comprising 
the following six steps: forward translation, reconciliation, backward translation, harmonization, pre-
testing and cognitive interviewing, and finalization. For a full description of the translation process, 
please see supplemental Table 1, available on the PCCM website.
Design
This was a prospective longitudinal survey study. To track possible changes in safety culture over time, 
the SAQ was administered at two points in time (in May 2006 and May 2007). 
scale example items
teamwork climate: perceived quality of 
collaboration between personnel
– Disagreements are appropriately resolved (i.e., not who 
is right, but what is best for the patient)
– Our doctors and nurses work together as a well 
coordinated team
job satisfaction: positivity about the work 
experience
– I like my job
– This ICU is a good place to work
perceptions of management: approval of 
managerial action
– Management supports my daily efforts in this ICU
– Management is doing a good job
safety climate: perceptions of a strong and 
proactive organizational commitment to safety
– I would feel perfectly safe being treated here
– ICU personnel frequently disregard rules or guidelines
working conditions: perceived quality of 
the work environment and logistical support 
(staffing, equipment etc.)
– Our levels of staffing are sufficient to handle the 
number of patients
– The equipment in this ICU is adequate
stress recognition: acknowledgement of 
how performance is influenced by stressors
– I am less effective at work when fatigued
– When my workload becomes excessive, my 
performance is impaired
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Apart from the ongoing activities as part of our patient safety management system, such as incident 
reporting, complication registration, and CRM training, there were no specific events on our unit 
between these two dates that likely could have affected the safety culture. These surveys were 
the starting point of our current standard practice to administer the SAQ once every one or two 
years. This standard practice was developed because we feel that regular measurements at set time 
intervals provide essential information in this respect, considering that safety culture may fluctuate 
over time and considering that human behavior is a fundamental issue in the implementation of 
safety measures.
Eligible were both full- and part-time staff members working on our ICU for at least one month, 
including employees not based in the unit, but with a significant work commitment to it. This implies 
that all physicians, nurses, nursing assistants, pharmacists, technicians, and ward clerks were invited to 
participate. The questionnaires were handed over during CRM meetings. Staff members not present 
at the meetings received the questionnaires in their mailboxes. Completed questionnaires could be 
left in a closed box at the ward. Hospital staff were not identified on the data collection instrument.
Statistical analyses
We collapsed nurse and physician subcategories into all nurses and all physicians and compared scale 
scores between these two professions (Mann-Whitney U test). The comparisons between professions 
mainly focused on nurses and physicians, and not on the group ‘other’, because the last-mentioned 
group was heterogeneous. To analyze possible changes over time, the scores at the two points in 
time were compared. Although the samples were correlated, we had to use Student’s t-test for 
independent samples, because the observations could not be matched due to the anonymity of the 
questionnaires. This statistical test was also used to evaluate differences between our sample and 
the benchmark group. 23 The relationship between the number of reported events and the perceived 
safety culture was examined using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. The Chi-square test with 
Yates’ correction for continuity was used to test for differences in the ratings of collaboration and 
communication between nurses and physicians. Trying to explain particularly low or high scores 
(at both points in time) on a given scale, we performed linear regression analyses. Results were 
considered statistically significant if they were below the 0.05 level of probability.
results
Table 2 lists basic information on the response rate and the responders. The response rate was 85% 
(May 2006) and 74% (May 2007), yielding an overall response rate of 79%. At both measurement 
dates, responders were approximately 40 years of age on average, and were predominantly 
female (a little less than 90%). In May 2006, responders included nurses (71%), physicians (13%), 
and a group ‘other’ (16%). One year later, this distribution was 84%, 7%, and 9%, respectively. 
This distribution of age, sex, and profession is a good reflection of the total staff employed in our 
unit, with a slight underrepresentation of physicians. Consider that in May 2006, of the total staff 
(i.e., all 89 staff members who were asked to complete the SAQ) 71% (n = 63) were nurses and 
20% (n = 18) were physicians. In May 2007, these numbers were 76% (n = 73) and 15% (n = 
14), respectively. The levels of the physicians and nurses, as well as the composition of the group 
‘other’, are broken down in Table 2. At the time of the first survey, 74% of the responders had 
ever followed a CRM training. At the 2007 survey, this proportion had increased up to 80%. 
table 2 Information on the response rate and the responders
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
may 2006 may 2007
response rate
No. of surveys distributed 89 96
No. of surveys returned 76 71
Response rate 85% (76/89) 74% (71/96)
responders
Sex (% male) 12% 11%
Mean age (interquartile range) 39.4 (10) 40.8 (10)
Profession (%)
  - physician 10 (13%) 5 (7%)
pediatrician/intensivist 3 3
ICU fellow pediatrician 1 1
ICU fellow anesthesiologist 1 1
resident 5 -
  - nurse 54 (71%) 56 (84%)
coordinating nurse 4 4
unit head nurse 1 1
IC senior nurse 29 37
IC nurse 9 4
student IC nurse 2 2
nurse practitioner 1 1
pediatric/high-care nurse 8 7
  - other 12 (16%) 6 (9%)
nursing assistant/care assistant 5 2
ward clerk 3 4
other 4a -
Job status (%)
full-time 25 (33%) 20 (28%)
part-timeb 48 (64%) 51 (72%)
other (on an agency or ‘flexible’ contract basis) 2 (3%) -
Mean no. of years of experience in discipline (SD) 12.4 (9.4) 12.2 (8.6)
Mean no. of years worked in this ICU (SD) 8.5 (7.9) 9.0 (7.6)
Ever followed a CRM training (%) 56 (74%) 56 (80%)
No. of events reported in the past month (%)
none 14 (18%) 15 (21%)
1 to 2 20 (26%) 23 (33%)
3 to 5 24 (32%) 21 (30%)
6 to 10 10 (13%) 8 (11%)
more than 10 8 (11%) 3 (4%)
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation.
a This group includes one medical technician. In the remaining three cases, the subcategory was 
not specified by the responder. 
b Part-time staff are defined as those staff that work anything less than full-time.
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We calculated mean scale scores for both measurement dates, with a distinction between three 
professions (physicians, nurses, and other) (Table 3). On three scales (i.e., teamwork climate, safety 
climate, and stress recognition), physicians scored better than nurses at both points in time. Regarding 
teamwork climate for example, at the first measurement date 80% (n = 8) of the physicians (slightly) 
agreed with the statement “Disagreements in this ICU are resolved appropriately (i.e., not who is right, 
but what is best for the patient)”, versus 44% (n = 24) of the nurses. At the second measurement 
date, these proportions were 60% (n = 3) in physicians and 50% (n = 28) in nurses. On another two 
scales (i.e., perceptions of management and working conditions), nurses consistently had higher 
mean scale scores. For example, at the first measurement date 25% (n = 13) of the nurses (slightly) 
agreed with the statement “Hospital administration supports my daily efforts”, as compared to 10% 
(n = 1) of the physicians (at the second measurement date: 16% (n = 9) and 0% (n = 0), respectively). 
Statistical testing revealed that, at the first measurement date, physicians had higher levels of stress 
recognition than nurses (P = 0.003). At the second measurement date, the difference in perceptions 
of management – in favor of the nurses – reached the level of statistical significance (P = 0.04), 
though especially at this point in time the number of physicians included in the comparison was small 
 
table 3 Main results of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (by profession)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Higher scores indicate better safety climate.
We were interested to know whether there were statistically significant associations between the 
number of patient safety events reported and the scale scores. There appeared to be a weak negative 
correlation between job satisfaction and the number of events reported in the past month, both at 
the first (rho = -0.28; P = 0.02) and the second measurement date (rho = -0.26; P = 0.03). Overall, 
the mean score on job satisfaction decreased from May 2006 to May 2007 (70.9 v 65.6; P = 0.02) 
(Table 3). 
The mean score on safety climate appeared to improve from May 2006 to May 2007, whereas the 
scores on working conditions and stress recognition seemed to show a decrease from 2006 levels. 
However, the differences on all these three domains were not statistically significant.
Table 4 presents the results of the SAQ compared to the benchmark. At both points in time, scores 
on the perceptions of management scale appeared to be higher than would be expected from 
benchmarking data (P < 0.01), whereas scores on stress recognition were relatively low (P < 0.001). 
The mean scores on the other scales were somewhat above (job satisfaction), close to (teamwork 
climate, safety climate), or somewhat below (working conditions) benchmarking scores, but no 
persistent significant differences were observed on these scales.
table 4 Results of the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire compared to benchmarking data 
Higher scores indicate better safety climate.
* Statistically significantly different from the benchmarking scores at P < 0.05.
** Statistically significantly different from the benchmarking scores at P < 0.01.
*** Statistically significantly different from the benchmarking scores at P < 0.001.
a Benchmarking scores of the SAQ ICU version (n = 8,646) as published by Sexton et al. 23
In an attempt to explain the scores on stress recognition and perceptions of management, we 
performed linear regression analyses, with the following independent variables: sex, age, profession, 
job status, number of years worked in this ICU, and ever followed a CRM training (data not fully 
shown). Regarding stress recognition, at the first measurement date the fact whether the responder 
had ever followed a CRM training was the only variable that made a significant contribution to the 
regression (P = 0.006). Surprisingly, those who had ever followed a CRM training (n = 55; score = 
51.3) had poorer levels of stress recognition than those who did not (n = 17; score = 65.8). At the 
second measurement date, only the number of years that the responder had worked in this ICU 
significantly contributed to explaining stress recognition (P = 0.03): as the number of years worked in 
this ICU increased, the level of stress recognition decreased (as also reflected by a negative Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient of -0.29). Regression analysis revealed that, with the available data, it was not 
possible to explain the relatively high scores on perceptions of management at both measurement 
occasions: none of the independent variables were found to make a significant contribution to 
predicting perceptions of management.
At the first measurement date, 8% of the nurses and 60% of the physicians rated the quality of 
collaboration and communication with physicians as high or very high (P < 0.001). 
may 2006
mean scale scores (sd)
Physicians 
(n = 10)
Nurses 
(n = 54)
Other 
(n = 12)
Total 
(n = 76)
Teamwork climate 72.9 (11.7) 68.6 (12.1) 68.3 (8.1) 69.1 (11.5)
Job satisfaction 68.5 (11.6) 70.4 (13.2) 76.5 (13.6) 70.9 (13.1)
Perceptions of management 48.8 (16.1) 56.1 (10.8) 57.5 (18.1) 55.3 (12.9)
Safety climate 68.3 (14.1) 66.9 (11.5) 63.5 (10.4) 66.7 (11.6)
Working conditions 49.4 (13.6) 56.9 (11.6) 54.2 (7.0) 55.6 (11.6)
Stress recognition 71.3 (16.7) 51.2 (16.7) 56.3 (17.2) 54.7 (17.9)
may 2007
mean scale scores (sd)
Physicians 
(n = 5)
Nurses 
(n = 56)
Other 
(n = 6)
Total 
(n = 71)
Teamwork climate 77.5 (9.6) 68.0 (12.7) 74.3 (5.5) 69.0 (12.1)
Job satisfaction 72.0 (10.4) 63.8 (13.9) 79.2 (5.8) 65.6 (13.9)
Perceptions of management 43.8 (9.9) 55.7 (13.3) 60.4 (7.6) 55.4 (12.7)
Safety climate 73.6 (13.7) 68.8 (14.7) 73.6 (14.4) 69.4 (14.2)
Working conditions 47.5 (10.5) 54.8 (12.0) 58.8 (8.4) 54.4 (11.8)
Stress recognition 60.0 (18.0) 51.3 (16.7) 56.3 (17.2) 52.2 (16.4)
Benchmarking scoresa PSICU Sophia Children’s Hospital
Mean scale scores (SD) May 2006 May 2007
Teamwork climate 70.7 (18.6) 69.1 (11.5) 69.0 (12.1)
Job satisfaction 63.4 (21.6) 70.9 (13.1)** 65.6 (13.9)
Perceptions of management 48.0 (20.3) 55.3 (12.9)** 55.4 (12.7)**
Safety climate 67.7 (17.0) 66.7 (11.6) 69.4 (14.2)
Working conditions 58.6 (20.4) 55.6 (11.6) 54.4 (11.8)
Stress recognition 65.9 (20.2) 54.7 (17.9)*** 52.2 (16.4)***
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The quality of the collaboration and communication with nurses was rated as high or very high by 
50% of the nurses and 50% of the physicians (P = 1.00). These differences in the evaluation of the 
collaboration with physicians were also found when the SAQ was administered for the second time 
(although it should be taken into account that the number of physicians surveyed was small at that 
time, which is why no statistical testing was done for these results): 7% of the nurses and 20% of 
the physicians rated the quality of collaboration with physicians as high or very high, whereas the 
quality of the collaboration with nurses was rated as high or very high by 30% of the nurses and 
25% of the physicians.
Regarding the questionnaires handed out in May 2006, 67% (51 of 76) of responders together wrote 
127 patient safety recommendations. One year later, 54% (38 of 71) of responders wrote 80 patient 
safety recommendations. Considering all 207 recommendations, the top four recommendations 
fell within the themes of: “Improve communication (e.g., between nurses and physicians)” (15%); 
“Improve the training and supervision of interns” (15%); “Report, analyze, and take action on 
incidents, complications, and deaths (including debriefings)” (10%); and “Provide trainings (e.g., 
CRM trainings) and/or continuing medical education” (9%). There were only small differences 
between May 2006 and May 2007 in the recommendations most frequently mentioned (data not 
shown).
discussion
This article has focused attention on the safety culture on our PSICU, as measured by personnel 
attitudes across six different scales. The results reveal that the scale scores were, by and large, in 
line with benchmarking scores. Yet, another finding, which was consistent over time, was that 
the perceptions of management were higher than would be expected from benchmarking data, 
whereas scores on stress recognition were relatively low.
In this study, we choose to use the SAQ, which provides a snapshot of a clinical unit’s safety climate. 
The SAQ is among the most rigorously tested instruments to measure safety climate. 6 For example, 
Sexton and co-workers have administered the SAQ to >200 clinical units across three countries. 23 
Another strong point of our study was the good response rate (79%). Other studies using the SAQ 
had response rates of 58 to 77%. 8, 9, 23-34 It should be acknowledged that the SAQ was created 
primarily with adult practitioners in mind, whereas we applied it to pediatric physicians and nurses. 
Given the different approaches to patient care used in adult and pediatric ICUs, it is important that 
efforts to apply the SAQ to pediatric settings are continued and that the evidence base on safety 
culture in pediatrics is broadened. This study was meant to be a step in that direction.
Even though the benchmarking data were collected in ICUs (that is, adult ICUs) from other countries 
than our own – ICUs that may differ from our unit in characteristics such as nurse-to-physician 
ratio and full-time/part-time ratio – we draw the following conclusions from the comparison with 
benchmarking data. The staff members surveyed displayed relatively poor recognition of the effects 
of stress and fatigue on performance. This feeling of invulnerability is part of several professional 
cultures. It has been found in the aviation industry, and seems even more prevalent in health care 
settings. 35 
Our findings that medical staff do not fully appreciate the effects of stress and fatigue echo the 
findings of other studies in tertiary care pediatric centers 8, 9, as well as studies in, for example, 
anesthetists 36 and members of air medical teams. 37 The perception that people make good 
decisions no matter what stress they are under is not true however: stress, high workload, and sleep 
deprivation do decrease performance and raise medical error occurrence. 38-41
Although above benchmark scores, the perceptions of management found in this study were fairly 
low. Perceptions of management are high when management favors open communication, supports 
team work, allocates appropriate resources, rewards reporting, and visibly acts to remedy problems. 
42 One way to improve the staff’s perceptions of management, and thereby the safety culture, is by 
senior executive walk rounds, which are intended to demonstrate senior leadership commitment to 
patient safety. Building on the examples set by several other hospitals 5, 43-45, we implemented senior 
executive walk rounds in our unit in the year 2007. Importantly, patient safety walk rounds indeed 
seem to fulfill their promise to improve the safety culture. 43-45
The comparisons of the patient safety attitudes between physicians and nurses need to be 
interpreted with some caution, because the number of physicians was small (reflecting the staff 
composition typically seen in a PSICU in the Netherlands). Nevertheless, the following conclusions 
may be presented. There were mixed findings regarding the differences in patient safety attitudes 
between physicians and nurses. A number of previous studies provided insight in these differences, 
with equivocal results. In the study of Pronovost et al. 46, who used a derivation of the full SAQ, 
physicians gave lower scores than nurses for most items. On the contrary, in other studies nurses 
generally had the lowest scores. 27, 47 Using the SAQ or its predecessor, six previous studies all found 
that nurses had lower scores on teamwork climate than physicians. 8, 27, 32-34, 47 This is consistent 
with our findings. Moreover, in this study, when asked to rate the quality of collaboration and 
communication, relatively few nurses rated collaboration and communication with physicians as 
high or very high, while many more physicians rated collaboration and communication with nurses 
as high or very high. This finding mirrors the similar results found by others. 28, 31, 34, 35 Next to 
this, the patient safety recommendation most frequently given in the open-ended section of the 
SAQ was to improve communication, particularly between nurses and physicians. It is important to 
remedy this situation, for several reasons. First, breakdowns in communication and collaboration are 
a cause of incidents. This was demonstrated by data from the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Healthcare Organizations: problems in communication were a root cause in approximately 65% 
of the 2,966 sentinel events reported to the Joint Commission from 1995 to 2004. 48 Second, as 
Thomas et al. mention, poor teamwork may be a significant source of nurses’ dissatisfaction with 
their profession that has led to a critical nursing shortage. 34 Third, empirical research suggested 
several other benefits of good teamwork, such as less sickness absence among physicians 49 better 
quality of care as assessed by nurses 50, and lower patient mortality rates or ICU readmission rates. 51, 
52 All this highlights the need to invest in initiatives that have the potential to improve the teamwork 
climate, such as team training in the form of CRM and the use of daily goals sheets. 53, 54
This study analyzed safety culture by measuring the attitudes of staff members - a practical and 
efficient method of collecting safety climate data. However, attitudes and real behavior are not the 
same thing. 
150 151
c
h
ap
ter 11 c
h
ap
te
r 
11
The Patient Safety Culture on a Dutch Pediatric Surgical Intensive Care Unit: 
An Evaluation Using the Safety Attitudes Questionnairre
PART 4
It would be worth employing a triangulation methodology, combining staff attitudes surveys with 
alternative methods to study safety culture, such as peer observations, group discussions, analysis 
of an organization’s incident history, and audits of the safety management system. 55 So far, this has 
largely been ignored in studies on safety culture. There is still much to learn about how data obtained 
from different methods are related and how to combine these data to get the most complete view 
of safety culture.
Creating a safety culture is a widely heralded goal, but an important question is whether this has 
an effect on the bottom line — that is, patient outcomes. The value of creating a safety culture is 
difficult to link to better patient outcomes. There is however some evidence that safety culture, as 
measured by the SAQ, can be improved in health care and that survey scores are related to patient 
safety outcomes. In a study of Pronovost et al., a comprehensive unit-based safety program led to 
an improved safety climate, and at the same time to a reduction in nursing turnover, in medication 
errors, and in length of stay. 56 A study by McCulloch and colleagues showed that CRM training 
resulted in an improvement in safety climate and in team performance, as well as in a decline in both 
technical and procedural errors. 57 Plainly, further research using more rigorous designs is needed 
into the relationship between safety culture and variables such as staff turnover, staff sickness rates, 
incident rates, length of stay, and patient outcomes such as mortality and morbidity.
conclusions
Safety culture is increasingly recognized as one of the primary conditions for patient safety. Assessing 
the status quo is a critical first step to improving safety culture. This study showed that on most 
domains the safety culture in our PSICU was good when compared to benchmark data. It is hard 
to quantify exactly to what degree this was a result of the interventions we introduced to improve 
the safety culture, including CRM trainings. Despite their face validity, the effectiveness of such 
interventions and causal relationships are difficult to prove. Nevertheless, we will continue working 
on interventions to improve the safety culture, among which are CRM trainings, safety briefings, 
and senior executive walk rounds. To monitor progress, this will go together with administration of 
the SAQ at regular intervals, along with other methods that can be used in attempts to assess the 
effectiveness of patient safety initiatives, such as analyzing reported incidents and studying adverse 
events by means of a PICU-focused trigger tool. 58-60
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supplemental digital content
supplemental table 5 The six-steps methodology used to translate the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire into 
Dutch
Step Explanation
1) Forward translation Two translators, who were native speakers of the target language and fluent in 
the source language, undertook two independent forward translations (that is, 
translations from the original language into the target language).
2) Reconciliation Based on these two translations, a reconciled third version of the instrument 
was developed by a translation team composed of different experts.
3) Backward translation As a quality-control check, two independent translators who were native 
speakers of the source language and fluent in the target language and who 
had no knowledge of the questionnaire then did a backward translation of the 
reconciled version (that is, translated the tool back into the original language).
4) Harmonization The backward translation and the original were compared and any discrepancies 
(i.e., instances where the underlying concepts of the original version were 
subverted) were discussed. The process of forward and backward translation 
was iterated as many times as needed until a satisfactory version was reached.
5) Pre-testing and 
cognitive interviewing
The instrument was pre-tested on individuals (not involved in the translation 
process) representative of those who were administered the questionnaire. 
Pre-test respondents were administered the instrument and debriefed using 
personal interviews. For example, this debriefing asked respondents what they 
thought the items were asking and whether there were any words they did not 
understand.
6) Finalization Based on all the steps described above, a final version of the instrument in the 
target language was produced.
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General discussion and summarylara’s story: part 5
Lara is home! 
After those first hectic days on the ICU 
she quickly improved and now she is even 
drinking her bottles. And it appears that 
the resuscitation procedure did not bring 
any harm, so Melissa and Thomas are 
confident about her future….
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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general discussion
towards a nation-wide patient safety program
The last decade has seen a wealth of studies about preventable mortality and morbidity in hospitals. 
1-8 On average one in 12 patients suffered a serious adverse event due to their medical treatment. 
The conclusions attracted intense public attention, and made healthcare managers and providers 
aware that patient safety should be an indispensable part of healthcare management. Several 
patient safety campaigns were launched in countries such as the USA, Australia and the UK. 9-11 The 
Dutch Ministry of Health decreed that all hospitals and healthcare facilities should have a patient 
safety management system in place by January 1, 2008. In 2007 the Dutch Technical Agreement on 
patient safety management was published, which delineates the requirements for hospital patient 
safety management. A Dutch government-supported collaboration of Dutch hospitals, physicians 
and nurses resulted in the launch of the Dutch Patient Safety Program (“VMSZorg”, www.vmszorg.
nl) in 2008. Simultaneously three centers for expertise on patient safety were founded – in Utrecht, 
Zwolle and Rotterdam – and a professorial chair of patient safety was established in Rotterdam in 
2010. So far these initiatives have resulted in 3 PhD theses on patient safety. 12-15 
Anticipating these developments, the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands established a Patient 
Safety Committee in 2005. Guided by this Committee an adverse event registration system for 
pediatric practice was developed and made available to Dutch pediatricians on the website of the 
Paediatric Association of the Netherlands. At the same time the Neosafe® project was launched, a 
nation-wide initiative for voluntary incident reporting in neonatal intensive care units. 16 The Patient 
Safety Committee next organized patient safety courses and developed an e-learning module on 
patient safety specifically for pediatricians (www.medschool.nl/patientveiligheid). Furthermore, in 
august 2011 the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands has distributed guidelines on six major 
pediatric patient safety issues, such as prevention of central line associated infections and early 
recognition of deterioration, among all Dutch pediatricians.  
Younger children have been overlooked to some extent in patient safety research. As an illustration, 
the Dutch study on preventable adverse events 8 excluded patients under 1 year of age. Interventions 
to improve patient safety are usually designed for the adult setting and cannot just be copied to 
pediatrics for lack of evidence in this setting. For example, a combination of measures to prevent 
central line associated infections in adults, which was proven very effective by Pronovost et al 17, was 
found not effective in the PICU setting. 18 
why patient safety in pediatric intensive care?
Tailored interventions for hospitalized children need to be developed and tested. Patients in intensive 
care units, as in operating rooms and emergency departments, are at a higher risk of incidents and 
adverse events than are medium care patients or outpatients. They are more critically ill and undergo 
more high-tech interventions. Safety management systems for intensive care settings should be 
developed with these factors kept in mind. 
The PICU in the Erasmus MC -Sophia Children’s Hospital has developed and implemented such a 
patient safety management system (PSMS). It potentially serves as a role model for the other seven 
PICUs in academic hospitals in the Netherlands. In this thesis we reported on the patient safety 
activities employed in the past 6 years, the results of evaluations, and consequences for future 
patient safety management.
the patient safety management system: safety first
In 2004, we started a patient safety project under the name ‘Safety First’ (fig 1). The first components 
to be implemented were adverse event registration (2005), Safety First reports (blame-free incident 
reporting) (2004), Critical Nursing Situation Index (CNSI) (2005), and Team Resource Management 
(TRM) (2005). Since 2006 other elements have been added: retrospective incident analysis (PRISMA) 
(2006), prospective risk analysis (HFMEA) (2007), Safety Walk Rounds (2007), safety focused 
Mortality and Morbidity conferences (2007), and Simulation training (2007). 
figure 1 Elements of the Safety First patient safety management system
Abbreviations:
AEs  adverse events  SSTT Sophia Simulation team training  
CIA  critical incident analysis TRM Team Resource Management 
CNSI  Critical Nursing Situation Index
HFMEA  Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
PRISMA   Prevention and Recovery Information System for Monitoring and Alalysis
A number of elements of the Safety First project have been studied and the findings are reported in 
this thesis. To asses the effectiveness of the Safety First project, we aimed at determining the rates 
of preventable mortality before and after the introduction of the project. We concluded, however, 
that mortality is not a useful outcome measure for a number of reasons, of which the low mortality 
rate in pediatric ICUs is the main one. So effectiveness of the safety management system in reducing 
preventable mortality has not yet been proven. Comparable data from other pediatric ICUs in the 
Netherlands are not available. Studies of preventable mortality in children are few. 19 
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Studies on adverse events reported that some adverse events had contributed to death, but the 
incidence was very low. 20 Sharing of data on outcome and preventable events is indispensable for 
reliable benchmarking with similar ICU units. The Vermont Oxford Network (www.vtoxford.org) is 
an example of how sharing data can lead to the spread of best practices. 
The incidences and nature of adverse events in both general pediatrics and pediatric intensive care 
were studied by means of physician registration. In addition we applied the trigger tool methodology 
to detect adverse events in the PICU. The Paediatric Association of the Netherlands has facilitated 
registration of adverse events for all pediatric units, but so far no studies have been reported. A 
number of studies have looked at adverse events in hospitalized children in other countries, using 
different methodologies. The most promising method appears to be the trigger tool, both for general 
pediatrics 21 and the intensive care settings. 20, 22-23 However, in our study 30% of adverse events were 
not detected with the trigger tool, so a combined approach is necessary. We recommend further 
development of triggers to increase the yield from electronic searches. Until that is accomplished, 
physician registration of adverse events needs to be facilitated and stimulated by developing easy-
to-use registration systems and by providing regular detailed feedback. 
The usefulness of critical incident analysis in detecting causal and contributing factors is described in 
this thesis. The methodology was adapted from critical incident analysis in high risk industries such 
as aviation, nuclear and chemical industry. Van de Schaaf et al adapted risk analysis to the medical 
setting and this has been applied in the Neosafe study by Snijders et al. 16, 24 No other study of 
incident analysis in pediatrics in the Netherlands is available. A number of studies described results 
of incident analysis in pediatric ICUs, most using a voluntary web-based incident reporting system. 
25-28 The incidents were reported anonymously and could not be investigated as thoroughly as in 
our critical incident analysis. All different methods of incident analysis succeeded in identifying the 
contribution to the incident of factors beside the patient and the care provider, but we believe critical 
incident analysis results in the highest numbers of contributing factors. Because it is time-consuming 
however, it should be applied to cases where the patient suffered serious harm. 
Our safety focused Mortality and Morbidity (M&M) conferences resulted in a large number of 
recommendations for improvement. No studies have been reported for similar initiatives in the 
Netherlands. A number of international publications describe integration of patient safety aspects 
in M&M conferences, of which two in a pediatric setting. 29-30 The experiences were similar to our 
experiences, even though they were in quite different settings (one pediatric hospital and 1 pediatric 
psychiatry ward). As in our safety focused M&M rounds, theirs had resulted in recommendations for 
system improvements, and we believe they are an important component of a PSMS.
The Critical Nursing Situation Index 31 has been applied in our unit for 5 years and in one other 
PICU and in two adult ICUs in the Netherlands. The first advantage of using this instrument was 
the assessment of all nursing protocols: are they actually evidence-based? How up-to-date are our 
protocols? The next step, reevaluating existing protocols and creating new ones, was also beneficial 
for nursing care. Lately we have seen a shift in use of this checklist, from monitoring to intervention, 
as protocol violations can be corrected immediately upon discovery. However, we would argue to 
keep the monitoring function as well, to identify which protocols are not or poorly followed. 
We reported on the results of two consecutive Safety Attitude Questionnaire surveys. This 
questionnaire is a validated instrument for assessment of safety climate. 32 The safety climate in 
the surgical PICU was comparable to benchmark data from ICUs in the USA, UK and New Zealand. 
Except the Neosafe project, no comparable studies in Dutch pediatrics have been reported. 33 There 
is one other study on safety culture in 19 Dutch hospitals. 34 It used the Hospital Survey on Patient 
Safety Culture and concluded that this questionnaire represented the group culture rather than 
individual attitudes. A large number of studies have assessed safety climate both in nationwide 
surveys or in local surveys of a single unit, but few of them have focused on pediatrics. 35-38 The 
main findings in these studies are that a positive safety culture positively impacts on teamwork and 
perception of safety, so monitoring it is a valuable instrument for safety management. Another 
conclusion is that relations between safety culture, teamwork, and patient outcomes are worth 
investigating. 39
An instrument we have introduced in 2007 to improve the leadership aspect of patient safety is 
Safety Walk Rounds. 40 This implies that the executives and senior management join the patient 
safety officers on visits to the wards and discuss safety issues with staff and parents. An additional 
benefit is that staff will realize that the management is concerned with safety issues. Responsibilities 
for any improvement actions are assigned and feedback is given at the next round. Monthly Safety 
Walk Rounds across all wards in the children’s hospital start October 2011. 
Team Resource Management training (TRM) is another intervention with a potential positive impact 
on safety culture. 41-44 All employees in the PICU and NICU of our hospital have taken this training 
course and are required to attend follow-up training once every 2 years. The focus is on interaction 
between participants: what goes well and what could be improved on the unit and how will that be 
achieved? (figure 2). 
The TRM courses were supplemented with simulation team training sessions in which TRM skills and 
knowledge are tested. Ten physicians and nurses have learned how to set up simulation training by 
attending a course in the Center for Advanced Pediatric & Perinatal Education at Stanford University, 
Los Angeles, USA. 45-46 A designated patient area has been made available for training sessions in 
our own unit, which all physicians and nurses are required to attend two days per year. TRM and 
simulation training have thus become part of our continuous education program. Next to studies on 
the effects of these trainings on teamwork we plan to set up a regional training center. 
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figure 2 Topics of Team Resource Management training, adapted from the Center for Man and Aviation. 
suggestions for improvement
A number of suggestions on improving the PSMS can be identified.
- As Monroe and colleagues 47 demonstrated, preventable adverse events contributing to death 
mainly occur before admission to the PICU itself. Promising preventive interventions are setting up 
the Pediatric Early Warning System 48-51 and rapid response teams (RRT) of intensive care consultants 
and nurses who can be consulted when a patient is deteriorating. The introduction of RRTs has 
decreased in-hospital arrests and lowered in-hospital mortality in a number of pediatric studies. 49, 
52-57   
- For monitoring of adverse events it would be best to avoid relying on registration of adverse events 
by care providers only, as underreporting remains an issue difficult to resolve. We would argue to 
apply the trigger tool to the electronic databases every month in combination with the voluntary 
incident reporting. Also new triggers need to be developed to specifically target the adverse events 
that are hard to detect with the current triggers. 
- A redesign of the incident reporting system is needed so that management is notified almost 
immediately after serious incidents occur. For every recommendation stemming from incident analysis 
or M&M conferences someone needs to be appointed as being responsible for further development 
and implementation of the recommended action. More employees should be trained in incident 
analysis so that more incidents can be investigated, more information on system factors is gained, 
and more system-wide preventive measures can be developed. Another important improvement 
would be feedback on the recommendations: what has been done and has it worked? Not just to 
the involved parties but also to management and other units in the hospital.
- Improvement of medication safety can be achieved by adaptation of the computerized physician 
order entry (CPOE) systems. It would involve adding, for example, dose monitoring, reminders 
of dangerous drug-drug interactions, and suggestions for better choices of drugs. The use of 
standardized solutions for IV pumps combined with barcode scanning and smart pump technology 
would be a next step. These techniques check if the right drug is given to the right patient at 
the right time and at the right pump rate. Bar code scanning should be applied to single dose 
administration as well. 58-59 Collaboration of front line staff with pharmacists, ICT specialists and 
human factor engineers is critical to achieve foolproof medication safety. 
- Focusing the Critical Nursing Situation Index on specific protocols, such as ECMO or ventilatory 
support, assessing each patient within 48 hours after admission, and providing prompt feedback to 
the nursing team will promote protocol adherence. 
- The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire as well could be put to better use. For instance the divergent 
responses from doctors and nurses to statements such as “decision making is a team effort in our 
unit”, with nurses less inclined to agree, is a clear indication that decision making needs to be 
addressed. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire could be used as a monitoring tool for employee 
satisfaction and management perception, administering it more frequently and studying the results 
in greater detail.
- Teamwork could be improved by applying the TRM principles in daily practice. The use of briefings 
and debriefings, daily goals sheets and the use of time out procedures (before interventions such as 
intubation or placement of central venous line) will lead to better communication and feedback and 
better teamwork. These tools are not just applicable to intensive care settings, but other settings as 
well. 
cost-effectiveness
A number of studies concluded that the costs of adverse events are high, due to longer stay, extra 
medication and extra procedures related to the adverse events. A Dutch study found an average 
amount of €4555. 60 Interestingly, regarding the 10 children in that study, the extra costs involved 
in adverse events were estimated at approximately €600. Except for a few studies on specific 
targeted interventions (infection control or fall prevention) evidence for cost effectiveness of patient 
safety is very limited, and no studies have yet looked into the cost-effectiveness of a patient safety 
management system; further research into this is slowly getting under way.
Group
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management
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education
With the growing awareness that poorly designed systems may cause adverse events, the awareness 
of current inadequacies in medical and nursing education has spread. 61 Systems theory, safety 
science and improvement science are usually not incorporated in educational programs. Only by 
teaching patient safety can we prepare future doctors and nurses for the task of improving the 
systems of healthcare delivery developed by their predecessors. We also should realize that standard 
medical research is not suitable to study improvement strategies. 62 It is imperative we understand 
how to develop and introduce better practices in the absence of randomized trials. Therefore 
academic leaders need to embrace patient safety and safety research, so that patient safety becomes 
a genuine academic discipline. 
conclusion
The Safety First project as developed in our ICU can serve as a framework for patient safety 
management in both general and university pediatric healthcare. It meets the requirements for a 
patient safety management system as established in the Dutch Technical Agreement. Multidisciplinary 
teams on unit level are needed to develop and implement good patient safety measures. Such teams 
must include physicians to facilitate data acquisition and interpretation, improvement development, 
and promoting safety awareness among colleagues. Support from management and leaders is 
indispensable for success, the more so as safety programs involve considerable costs. The safety 
teams need to be educated not only in the many aspects of patient safety, but also in implementation. 
We would recommend the Patient Safety Officer Executive Development Program from the Institute 
for Healthcare Improvement in Boston, USA. 63 As detailed in the first requirement for safety 
management in the Dutch Technical Agreement and required by the Ministry of Health in the Dutch 
Patient Safety Program, support from the Boards of Directors is crucial to all patient safety programs. 
The various institutions should share all patient safety related data to facilitate benchmarking and to 
identify best practices, which requires the use of the same measurement instruments. The Paediatric 
Association of the Netherlands is the most suitable organization to facilitate setting up national 
databases on incidents and adverse events and disseminating best practices proven to improve 
patient safety topics. Another important duty for the Paediatric Association of the Netherlands lies 
in providing education on patient safety, as is being done presently. Finally, up-to-date guidelines and 
protocols are important means to improve quality of care.
Patient safety should be integrated in everyday healthcare. The Patient Safety Management System 
in our intensive care unit has made a promising start. If the principles of safety are embraced more 
widely, the likelihood of improving safety will increase, as every care provider is aware of his/her 
accountability for the care he/she provides. Against the background of “To Err is Human” 64 it seems 
justified to say that promoting patient safety is not just the task and responsibility of patient safety 
officers, quality managers or Boards of Directors, but of everybody involved in healthcare.
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summary
The rationale for the patient safety management system in our pediatric and intensive care units is 
explained from the increasing attention to patient safety, both in the public and medical domain, 
since the ground breaking report “To Err is Human” by the Institute of Medicine in the US. For Dutch 
hospitals, the number of yearly preventable deaths in 2004 was estimated at 1735, but excluding 
children less than 1 year of age. Information on preventable deaths in pediatrics is still lacking for 
the Netherlands.
The Dutch regulatory bodies required hospitals and healthcare facilities to have a functional patient 
safety management system (PSMS) in place by January 1, 2008. In our pediatric surgical ICU a PSMS 
was already in place prior to this date and in 2008 we introduced it in the general pediatric ICU. 
Voluntary incident reporting was introduced in 2004, scoring of nursing protocol violations and 
team resource management training in 2005 and adverse event registration in 2006. Subsequently 
other elements were introduced: retrospective incident analysis, prospective risk analysis, safety walk 
rounds, safety focused mortality and morbidity conferences, and simulation training. 
part i: the why and how of the safety first project
In a study in 2004 we found that 4.5% of patients had been admitted more than 25 days, which 
in half of them was related to adverse events. Chapter 2 focuses on details of these so-called long-
stay patients (admitted longer than 28 consecutive days) collected over three years (2003-2005). 
They comprised 4.4% of all admitted patients and accounted for 63% of total admission days. As a 
striking finding in these patients, mortality was 5 times higher than that in the others.
Chapter 3 deals with potentially preventable mortality; i.e. hospital deaths in which a potentially 
preventable adverse event has contributed to the death. Preventable mortality has been an 
important focal point in the media and in many patient safety campaigns. Thirty-one of 255 deaths 
in our ICU (12%) in three time periods (2001-2002, 2005-2006, 2009) were identified as potentially 
preventable, a median of 5 deaths per year. After the implementation of the PSMS the number of 
preventable deaths did not decrease. 
part ii: finding the right outcome to study patient safety 
Studies in the United States have applied retrospective reviews of administrative databases, and found 
adverse event rates of 1 to 3.4% for hospitalized children. In chapter 4 we present a prospective 
study on 11 general pediatric units across the Netherlands in which local pediatricians registered 
adverse events over a 3 month period. The adverse event rate was 0.016 per patient, which is higher 
than reported in previous studies. Most adverse events occurred in neonates and infants. Diagnostic 
failures (e.g. loss of blood sample, failed lumbar puncture) were most frequent but did not cause 
serious physical harm. However, they increased length of hospital stay with a median of 1 day. 
In Chapter 5 we studied the adverse events in the pediatric surgical ICU in 2006 and 2007. 
Numerous methods to detect and monitor adverse events have been advocated, but there is no 
gold standard. The Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston, USA, has developed the trigger 
tool methodology. The trigger tool uses “clues” found in a sample of medical records for a targeted 
search for adverse events. So far, this has resulted in higher detection rates than obtained with 
incident reporting, physician reporting, or chart review. We applied a modified version of the trigger 
tool to the electronic databases of 2006 and 2007. In the same period the physicians registered 
adverse events during the daily rounds. The two methods combined yielded an adverse events 
rate of 0.66 per patient. One or more adverse events occurred in 23% of patients; these patients 
were significantly younger than the other patients and their length of stay was longer. Comparison 
of the two methods showed that the trigger tool identified 70% of the adverse events; the 
physician registration 35%. There was only a 4.7% overlap of the two methods (4.7%). Catheter 
complications, accidental extubations and medication errors were sometimes not detected with the 
trigger tool. We concluded that the modified PICU trigger tool is a good method to detect adverse 
events, but should be used in combination with other methods, to assure the least possible number 
of adverse events is missed. 
part iii: finding the right interventions to improve patient safety
Since the medical community realized that errors in health care are common, costly and sometimes 
detrimental for patients, they turned to other high risk industries to learn how to deal with 
this. One of the main principles of safety management is learning from errors. To analyze errors 
it is essential to look beyond the individual committing an error and closely examine all factors 
contributing to the incident. This provides a window on the system in which individuals work that 
also allows for more effective improvements. Chapter 6 describes the results of 17 incidents that 
were thoroughly investigated with the SIRE (Systematic Incident Reconstruction and Evaluation) 
approach. The incidents varied from near-strangulation, with no permanent harm to the patient, 
to a medication error contributing to death. The resulting causal and contributing factors were 
classified in contextual categories (e.g. work environment factors, provider factors, patient factors), 
as were the recommendations stemming from the incident analyses. On average, we could identify 
5 factors per incident and formulate 5 recommendations. The contributing factors were mostly 
team factors (such as communication, loss of information) and task factors (no protocol available). 
The most frequent recommendations were about task factors (improve protocol) and team factors 
(improve communication). 
Chapter 7 focuses on medication safety. In both adult and pediatric studies the most frequent 
reported incidents are medication errors. The PICU is no exception to this rule, as medication errors 
continue to account for one third of all incidents. We investigated the available dosing information 
for 6 drugs that were most (n=3) and least (n=3) frequently prescribed. For none of them consistent 
guidelines were available, which might have contributed to the occurrence of medication errors in 
our PICU. 
MRI scanning of preterm infants requiring respiratory support is associated with a high risk of 
adverse events. In Chapter 8 we retrospectively collected data on adverse events occurring during 
and after MRI scanning of 52 infants at 30 weeks gestational age. Adverse events such as increased 
respiratory instability or hypothermia occurred in half of these infants. Analysis of the adverse events 
led to the introduction of time out procedures for MRI scanning and systematic incident review for 
future prevention of adverse events. 
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Chapter 9 describes experiences gained from our so-called Patient Safety focused Mortality 
and Morbidity conferences over 3 years (2008-2010). Focusing on patient safety implied that 
participants addressed what went wrong and considered opportunities for improvement. Most of 
the recommendations related to team work (e.g. improve communication) and individual staff (e.g. 
check medication prescription). However, only 31 of 148 recommendations had been acted upon. 
Safety focused M&M conferences can be a valuable addition to a PSMS, provided that individual 
staff is made responsible to implement the recommendations. 
Next to voluntary incident reporting, scoring of nursing protocol violations was implemented. In 
chapter 10 the Critical Nursing Situation Index was applied 238 times; the mean percentage of 
protocol violations was 12.2% (SD 7.4%). More than fifty percent (53.4%) of all protocol violations 
could be timely corrected. Severity of the protocol violations could not be assessed in a reliable 
manner; the assessors’ interrater reliability was poor and it was not possible to reach consensus.
part iv: culture, leadership and teamwork
A PSMS will only be effective if a number of basic requirements are met. An important feature is 
establishing a culture in which discussing errors is welcomed, in contrast with a culture of “blaming 
and shaming”. Chapter 11 evaluates the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, administered to all 
employees of the pediatric surgical ICU in 2006 and in 2007, and inquiring after safety aspects such 
as teamwork and stress recognition. The response rates were 85% and 74% respectively. From a 
comparison to benchmark data we concluded that the safety culture was good enough. There is 
room for improvement, however, but so far it is unknown how to achieve this and how this would 
improve patient care and health outcomes. 
discussion
The general discussion in chapter 12 regards the findings in a broader view. The main conclusions are: 
- preventable mortality cannot serve as an indicator for quality and safety of care in a single pediatric 
(intensive care) unit;
- measuring (preventable) harm to patients will remain difficult;
- more of the recommendations stemming from incident analysis, Mortality and Morbidity 
conferences, and Safety Walk Rounds should be implemented and their effectiveness should be 
monitored;
- reliable measurement tools for the effect of team training need to be developed and tested;
 A number of recommendations are presented on how to proceed with patient safety in the ICU, in 
the children’s hospital and in pediatrics in general:
 - the use of the Pediatric Early Warning Score and so-called Rapid Response Teams for the timely 
detection and treatment of deteriorating patients outside of the ICU;
- the application of the trigger tool in electronic databases every month, complemented with 
voluntary incident reporting; new triggers need to be developed to detect as many adverse events 
as possible; 
- the incident reporting system needs to be redesigned so that management is rapidly informed after 
the occurrence of serious incidents;
- more personnel needs to be trained in critical incident analysis; 
- more feedback is required on the implementation of recommendations and their effectiveness; 
- the use of computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systems can improve medication safety; 
standard iv solutions, barcode scanning and smart pump technology can further increase safety; 
for this, intense collaboration between paediatricians, pharmacists, IT specialists and human factors 
engineers is indispensable; 
- the CNSI can be put to more effective use by developing scoring lists for specific patient categories 
and then using them within 48 hours after admission for each patient; 
- the Safety Attitudes Questionnaire can be used more effectively by studying the divergent responses 
from different disciplines such as doctors and nurses in more detail; the Questionnaire can also be 
applied to monitor employee satisfaction;
- teamwork can be improved by using instruments from the TRM training such as briefings and 
debriefings, daily goals sheets and time out procedures;
- determining cost-effectiveness of patient safety interventions is difficult, more research into this 
topic is required; 
- patient safety needs to become an integral part of the education of both doctors and nurses. 
appendices
In chapter 15 the multidisciplinary approach to patient safety management as implemented in the 
pediatric surgical ICU is described for Dutch physicians. It explains the different elements of the 
PSMS and the preliminary results: on average 125 incidents were reported per month, one in every 
5 patients suffered an adverse event and on average 5 nursing protocols per patient were violated.
Chapter 16 deals with our experiences with simulation team training. From 272 evaluation forms 
of 10 training days it became clear that 89% of the participants felt they had things under control 
during the sessions and 79% expected to feel more in control during actual work events in the 
future. 
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samenvatting
De rationale voor de ontwikkeling en invoering van het patiëntveiligheidsmanagementsysteem 
(PVMS) op onze afdeling Intensive Care voor Kinderen (IC Kinderen) hangt samen met de 
toenemende aandacht voor patiëntveiligheid, zowel in de publieke opinie als in de medische wereld, 
sinds de publicatie van het baanbrekende rapport “To Err is Human” van het Institute of Medicine 
in de Verenigde Staten. Voor de Nederlandse ziekenhuizen is de jaarlijks vermijdbare sterfte geschat 
op 1735, maar hierbij werden dossiers van kinderen onder 1 jaar niet onderzocht. Gegevens over 
vermijdbare sterfte in de kindergeneeskunde ontbreken nog in Nederland. 
De Nederlandse overheid heeft bepaald dat alle ziekenhuizen en zorginstellingen per 1 januari 
2008 een functionerend PVMS dienen te hebben. Op de kinderchirurgische IC was het PVMS al 
voor deze datum ingevoerd en in 2008 werd het geïntroduceerd op de IC Kinderen. Vrijwillige 
incidentmelding was geïntroduceerd in 2004, scoren van verpleegkundige protocolschendingen en 
team resource management training in 2005, en complicatieregistratie in 2006. Vervolgens werden 
andere elementen toegevoegd: retrospectieve incidentanalyse, prospectieve risicoanalyse, safety 
walk rounds, mortaliteit-, morbiditeit- en veiligheidbesprekingen en simulatietraining. 
deel 1: het waarom en hoe van het safety first project
Uit een studie in 2004 bleek dat 4.5% van de patiënten meer dan 25 dagen opgenomen was 
geweest, en dat dit bij de helft daarvan gerelateerd was aan complicaties. Vervolgens hebben we 
over de jaren 2003 tot en met 2005 gekeken wat de kenmerken waren van deze zogenaamde 
long-stay patiënten (langer dan 28 opeenvolgende dagen opgenomen). Ze vormden 4.4% van alle 
opgenomen patiënten en waren goed voor 63% van het totaal aantal opnamedagen (Hoofdstuk 
2). Een opvallende bevinding was dat in deze patiënten de sterfte 5 keer hoger was vergeleken met 
de andere patiënten.
Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over de potentieel vermijdbare sterfte; oftewel overlijden in het ziekenhuis waarbij 
een mogelijk vermijdbare complicatie bijgedragen heeft tot het overlijden. Dit is een belangrijk 
aandachtspunt in zowel de media als in vele patiëntveiligheidsprojecten. We kwamen tot de 
conclusie dat bij 31 van de 255 overleden kinderen op onze IC in 2001-2002, 2005-2006, en 2009 
mogelijk te voorkomen complicaties hadden bijgedragen tot het overlijden. Het gemiddelde aantal 
van 5 per jaar nam niet af na de invoering van het PVMS in 2005. 
deel 2: op zoek naar de goede uitkomstmaat voor het meten van patiëntveiligheid. 
Onderzoekers in de Verenigde Staten kwamen na het achteraf bestuderen van administratieve 
gegevens tot de conclusie dat bij 1 tot 3,4 % van de kinderen opgenomen in een ziekenhuis 
een complicatie was ontstaan. In hoofdstuk 4 presenteren we de resultaten van ons prospectief 
onderzoek gedurende 3 maanden naar complicaties in 11 algemene kinderafdelingen verspreid over 
Nederland. Het percentage complicaties was 1,6%, hoger dan in eerdere onderzoeken. De meeste 
complicaties kwamen voor bij pasgeborenen en baby’s. Procedurefouten kwamen het meest voor, 
zoals het kwijt raken van bloedmonsters of het niet lukken van een ruggenprik, en die veroorzaakten 
weinig lichamelijke schade. Maar ze maakten wel een langer ziekenhuisverblijf (gemiddeld 1 dag) 
noodzakelijk. 
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft ons onderzoek naar complicaties op de kinderchirurgische IC in 2006 en 
2007. Er zijn verschillende methodes om complicaties te ontdekken en bij te houden, maar een 
gouden standaard is er niet. Het Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston, USA, heeft de 
trigger tool methodologie ontwikkeld. De trigger tool maakt gebruik van bepaalde aanwijzingen 
in het medisch dossier voor een gerichte zoektocht naar complicaties. Tot nu toe worden hiermee 
meer complicaties opgespoord dan methodes zoals incidenten melden, registratie door artsen, of 
gewoon dossieronderzoek. We hebben een aangepaste versie van de trigger tool gebruikt met de 
elektronische gegevens van 2006 en 2007. In diezelfde periode werden de complicaties ook door 
de artsen bijgehouden tijdens de dagelijkse visiterondes. Kijkend naar alle opgenomen patiënten 
in deze 2 jaar leverden de twee methodes samen 0,66 complicaties per patiënt op. Een of meer 
complicaties kwamen voor bij 235 van de 1223 patiënten; deze kinderen waren jonger dan de 
kinderen zonder complicaties en lagen langer op de IC. Bij vergelijken van de methodes bleek dat 
de trigger tool 70% van de complicaties had gevonden en de registratie door artsen 35%. Er was 
4,7% overlap van die 2 methodes. Problemen met intraveneuze lijnen, met beademingsbuizen en 
medicatiefouten werden met de trigger tool veel gemist. Onze conclusie was dat de aangepaste 
versie van de trigger tool een goede mogelijkheid biedt om complicaties op te sporen, maar dat die 
het beste gecombineerd kan worden met nog andere methodes om zo weinig mogelijk complicaties 
te missen. 
deel 3: op zoek naar de goede interventies om de veiligheid te verbeteren.
Sinds de gezondheidszorg doordrongen is van het feit dat fouten in de zorg veel voorkomen, kosten 
met zich meebrengen en soms ernstige gevolgen hebben voor de patiënt, is gekeken naar hoe andere 
bedrijfstakken hiermee omgaan. Eén van de beginselen van veiligheidsmanagement is het leren van 
fouten. Het is van groot belang om niet alleen te kijken naar de individuele medewerker die een fout 
heeft gemaakt, maar naar alle factoren die hebben bijdragen. Hiermee krijg je zicht op het systeem 
waarbinnen mensen werken en kunnen effectievere verbeteringen bedacht worden. Hoofdstuk 6 
beschrijft wat we vonden bij het grondig uitzoeken van 17 incidenten met de SIRE benadering 
(Systematische Incident Reconstructie en Evaluatie). De incidenten varieerden van bijna-wurging 
door een maagsonde zonder uiteindelijke schade voor de patiënt, tot een medicatiefout die bijdroeg 
aan het overlijden. De mogelijk veroorzakende en bijdragende factoren werden in categorieën 
ingedeeld (bijvoorbeeld betrekking hebbende op de werkomgeving, een individuele zorgverlener, 
of de patiënt zelf), en ook de aanbevelingen uit de analyses werden op die manier ingedeeld. 
Gemiddeld konden we 5 factoren per incident identificeren en 5 aanbevelingen benoemen. De 
meeste bijdragende factoren hadden betrekking op samenwerking in het team (zoals onvoldoende 
communicatie, verloren gaan van informatie) en protocol of procedure gerelateerde factoren (geen 
protocol aanwezig). De meeste aanbevelingen gingen inderdaad over deze zaken: verbeteren van 
communicatie, en ontwikkelen/verbeteren van protocollen. 
Hoofdstuk 7 richt zich op medicatieveiligheid. Zowel bij volwassenen als bij kinderen zijn 
medicatiefouten de meest voorkomende incidenten. De IC Kinderen is geen uitzondering op die 
regel, want medicatiefouten vormen nog steeds één derde van alle incidenten. We hebben gekeken 
naar de informatie over de dosering van de drie medicijnen die het meest, en de drie die het minst 
werden voorgeschreven. Voor geen van de zes waren consequente richtlijnen te vinden, wat kan 
hebben bijgedragen aan het optreden van medicatiefouten op de IC Kinderen. 
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Het maken van MRI-scans bij te vroeg geboren kinderen die beademd worden kent een hoog risico 
op complicaties. In hoofdstuk 8 hebben we informatie verzameld over incidenten en complicaties 
tijdens en na het maken van een MRI-scan bij 52 kinderen van 30 weken zwangerschapsduur. Bij de 
helft waren complicaties opgetreden, zoals toegenomen ademhalingsproblemen of onderkoeling. 
Naar aanleiding van een analyse van de complicaties hebben we time out procedures ingevoerd 
vóór de MRI-scan en worden eventuele incidenten systematisch beoordeeld zodat ze in de toekomst 
voorkomen kunnen worden. . 
Hoofdstuk 9 beschrijft de ervaringen opgedaan met de zogenaamde Mortaliteit, Morbiditeit en 
Veiligheid besprekingen. De laatste drie jaar waren die speciaal gericht op patiëntveiligheid, wat 
betekent dat de deelnemers bespraken wat er niet goed was gegaan en hoe dat verbeterd kon 
worden. De meeste aanbevelingen betroffen teamwerk (bijvoorbeeld verbeteren communicatie) en 
individuele zorgverleners (bijvoorbeeld beter checken van medicatievoorschrift). Er waren echter 
maar 31 van de 148 aanbevelingen uitgevoerd. Deze besprekingen kunnen een waardevolle 
aanvulling zijn op een PVMS, maar dan moeten er wel verantwoordelijken aangewezen worden 
voor het uitvoeren van de aanbevelingen.
Behalve het vrijwillig melden van incidenten werd ook een systeem ingevoerd om het niet volgens 
verpleegkundig protocol werken te registreren: de Critical Nursing Situation Index. In hoofdstuk 10 
wordt beschreven dat uit 238 observaties bleek dat gemiddeld 12.2% (SD 7.4%) van de voorschriften 
waren geschonden. In meer dan de helft van de gevallen kon dit op tijd recht gezet worden. Een 
aantal verpleegkundigen was gevraagd in te schatten hoe ernstig de protocolschendingen waren. 
De inschattingen liepen echter ver uiteen; de inter-beoordelaar betrouwbaarheid was laag en het 
lukte niet om consensus te bereiken.
deel 4: cultuur, leiderschap en teamwerk
Een PVMS kan alleen goed werken als aan een aantal basisvoorwaarden is voldaan. Een belangrijke 
voorwaarde is het creëren van een cultuur waarin het bespreken van fouten verwelkomd wordt, 
in tegenstelling tot een cultuur van “blaming and shaming”. Hoofdstuk 11 evalueert de Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire, afgenomen bij alle medewerkers van kinderchirurgische IC in 2006 en 
2007, die veiligheidsonderwerpen als teamwork en stressherkenning in kaart brengt. De deelname 
was 85% en 74% respectievelijk. Na vergelijking met benchmarkgegevens konden we besluiten dat 
de veiligheidscultuur goed genoeg was. Er is echter wel ruimte voor verbetering, maar het is moeilijk 
te zeggen hoe dit te bereiken en of dit inderdaad tot betere patiëntveiligheid leidt.
discussie
De discussie in hoofdstuk 12 plaatst de bevindingen in een breder perspectief. De belangrijkste 
conclusies zijn: 
- vermijdbare sterfte kan niet als kwaliteits- of veiligheidsindicator gebruikt worden voor een 
kindergeneeskundige (IC) afdeling;
- het inzicht krijgen in de gevallen van mogelijk vermijdbare schade aan patiënten zal moeilijk blijven;
- meer van de aanbevelingen die voortkomen uit de incidentanalyses, de mortaliteit en morbiditeit 
besprekingen en safety walk rounds moeten ingevoerd worden en daarna worden getest op hun 
effectiviteit;
- betrouwbare meetinstrumenten voor de effecten van teamtraining moeten ontwikkeld en getest 
worden.
De volgende aanbevelingen worden gepresenteerd over hoe verder te gaan met patiëntveiligheid op 
de IC, in het kinderziekenhuis en in de kindergeneeskunde algemeen:
- het gebruik van de Pediatric Early Warning Score en zogenaamde Rapid Response Teams om op tijd 
achteruitgang bij patiënten te ontdekken en te kunnen behandelen;
- het gebruik van de trigger tool in de elektronische database op maandelijkse basis, aangevuld 
met vrijwillige incidentmeldingen, waarbij nieuwe triggers ontwikkeld dienen te worden om zoveel 
mogelijk complicaties te vinden; 
- het incidentmeldingen systeem moet zo aangepast worden dat het management na ernstige 
incidenten snel op de hoogte wordt gebracht;
- meer medewerkers moeten geschoold worden in incident analyse;
- er moet meer feedback gegeven worden over wat met de aanbevelingen is gedaan en of ze 
effectief zijn;
- door het gebruik van zgn computerized physician order entry (CPOE) systemen kan de 
medicatieveiligheid worden verbeterd. Ook kunnen standaard oplossingen voor intraveneuze 
medicijnen, barcode scanning en zgn smart pump technologie hierbij helpen. Intensieve 
samenwerking tussen de kinderartsen, de apothekers, ICT deskundigen en industrieel ontwerp 
specialisten is hierbij onmisbaar;
- de CNSI kan effectiever gebruikt worden door het gericht op bepaalde soorten patiënten te maken 
en dan binnen 48 uur na opname elke patiënt te scoren;
- de Safety Attitudes Questionnaire kan ook beter gebruikt worden door in meer detail de 
uiteenlopende antwoorden van bv artsen en verpleegkundigen met elkaar te vergelijken. De Safety 
Attitudes Questionnaire kan ook gebruikt worden om medewerker tevredenheid bij te houden;
- teamwerk kan verbeterd worden door gebruik te maken van instrumenten uit de TRM training 
zoals briefings en debriefings, daily goals sheets en time out procedures;
- kosten-effectiviteit van patiëntveiligheid interventies is moeilijk te bepalen, dit moet verder 
onderzocht worden;
- patiëntveiligheid dient opgenomen te worden in het onderwijs van zowel artsen als verpleegkundigen. 
bijlagen
In hoofdstuk 15 wordt de multidisciplinaire aanpak van patiëntveiligheid, zoals op de kinderchirurgische 
IC ingevoerd, voor Nederlandse artsen uitgelegd. De verschillende onderdelen van het PVMS komen 
aan bod en de eerste resultaten worden beschreven: per maand worden gemiddeld 125 incidenten 
gemeld, 1 op de 5 patiënten krijgt een complicatie, en er worden gemiddeld 5 verpleegkundige 
protocollen per patiënt geschonden. 
Hoofdstuk 16 meldt onze ervaringen met simulatie-teamtraining. Uit 272 evaluatieformulieren bleek 
dat 89% van de deelnemers zich zeker voelde tijdens het uitvoeren van de scenario’s en 79% 
verwachtte in de toekomst zich in echte werksituaties ook zekerder te voelen. 
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lara’s story: part 6
Conclusion
When Lara was about to be discharged 
from the hospital the safety officers told 
Thomas and Melissa about the results of 
the investigation they did. The work 
protocols for children with esophageal 
atresia were updated and all staff had 
been especially instructed on things that 
could go wrong. Also the rules and guide-
lines for acutely worsening patients were 
put up on the screensavers and posters 
all over the unit. Thomas and Melissa 
feel that what had happened to their 
daughter had been taken seriously and tell 
the safety officers they hope the next baby 
with esophageal atresia will benefit from 
all these improvements. 
Our first child > Lara was born > Something went wrong 
> Lara is back on the ICU > Lara is home > Conclusion
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multidisciplinaire aanpaK van patiëntveiligheid op de Kinder-ic
abstract
Doel: Verbetering van de patiëntveiligheid en daarmee van de kwaliteit van zorg op een 
kinderchirurgische niveau 3 Intensive Care in een universitair centrum met ongeveer 550 opnames 
per jaar.
Opzet: Beschrijvend onderzoek.
Methode: Verschillende meetmethoden voor het melden van incidenten, registratie van 
complicaties, evaluatie van protocollen en protocollair werken, en gestructureerde trainingen 
werden geïntroduceerd. Er werden 3 verschillende analysemethoden van incidenten gebruikt.
Resultaten: Er werden gemiddeld 125 incidenten per maand gemeld; ongeveer 25% van de patiënten 
liep 1 of meer complicaties op; per patiënt werden gemiddeld 5 verpleegkundige protocollen niet 
nageleefd.
Conclusie: Het blijkt goed mogelijk een effectief veiligheidsmanagementsysteem te introduceren op 
een klinische afdeling, overeenkomstig de door het Nederlands Normalisatie-Instituut opgestelde 
norm, mits er een veilige en open afdelingscultuur wordt gecreëerd. Onderrapportage van incidenten 
en complicaties is desalniettemin nog een probleem. De cultuurverandering is een langzaam 
verlopend proces en de implementatie van gerichte verbeteringen heeft nog niet aantoonbaar 
geleid tot betere zorg, voornamelijk door de korte tijd dat het project loopt.
introductie
Volgens onderzoek zouden er in Nederland per jaar zo’n 1700 mensen overlijden door fouten in 
ziekenhuizen. 1 Overheid, ziekenhuizen, verpleegkundigen en specialisten zien patiëntveiligheid als 
één van de belangrijke punten van verbetering van de zorg. Dat heeft de afgelopen jaren geresulteerd 
in projecten zoals ‘Sneller beter’, waarbij gestreefd wordt naar grotere transparantie, doelmatigheid
en kwaliteit in de curatieve zorg ( www.snellerbeter.nl ), maar ook in de verplichting om per 1 januari 
2008 een werkend veiligheidsmanagementsysteem te hebben. Het Nederlands Normalisatie-Instituut 
heeft samen met 36 andere partijen de minimumeisen voor een dergelijk systeem vastgelegd in 
de Nederlandse Technische Afspraak (NTA 8009:2007). 2 De ontwikkeling van deze norm verloopt 
volgens een groeimodel, waarbij in 2011 een nieuwe versie als Nederlandse norm zal verschijnen.
In oktober 2003 werd op de kinderchirurgische Intensive Care van het Erasmus MC-Sophia 
Kinderziekenhuis te Rotterdam een project gestart, genaamd ‘Safety first’,met als doel de 
patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren. Het uitgangspunt was dat dit project uiteindelijk zou moeten
leiden tot minder incidenten en complicaties, en daardoor tot een lagere mortaliteit en morbiditeit, en 
een kortere opnameduur. Een belangrijke voorwaarde voor het verbeteren van de patiëntveiligheid is 
dat medewerkers zich bewust worden van de risico’s en gevaren van hun handelen in de dagelijkse
praktijk. Deze bewustwording moet samengaan met een cultuurverandering: in plaats van reactief 
om te gaan met voorgevallen incidenten en de daaropvolgende schuldvraag (‘blaming and shaming’) 
moet men incidenten en complicaties gaan melden zonder angst voor repercussies (‘blame-free’), 
en risico’s proactief analyseren. Een stimulerende rol is hierbij weggelegd voor de leiders van de 
afdeling. 
In dit artikel bespreken wij de verschillende onderdelen van het door ons opgezette 
veiligheidsmanagementsysteem ‘Safety first’, zoals risico-inventarisatie, risicoanalyse en teamtraining. 
Ook worden de samenhang tussen de verschillende onderdelen en de ontwikkelingen in de tijd 
weergegeven, naast de resultaten over de periode 2005-2007.
gegevens en methoden
Het project ‘Safety first’ vond plaats op de kinderchirurgische Intensive Care, een multidisciplinaire 
IC van niveau 3 met ongeveer 550 opnames per jaar. De opgenomen patiënten zijn vooral kinderen 
met ernstige aangeboren afwijkingen, kinderen met neuro- of multitrauma, kinderen die een 
craniofaciale of orthopedische operatie hebben ondergaan en kinderen die behandeld worden met 
extracorporele membraanoxygenatie. 3 Er werken ongeveer 120 verpleegkundigen, 5 intensivisten, 
4 fellows en 7 arts-assistenten. Sinds januari 2008 zijn deze afdeling en de Intensive Care Pediatrie 
samengevoegd tot de Intensive Care Kinderen. In ons project gebruikten wij een aantal methoden 
om de patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren, zoals het melden en bespreken van incidenten, protocollair 
werken en trainingen om het personeel bewust te maken van patiëntveiligheidsaspecten (figuur).
samenwerking en training
Optimale samenwerking in teamverband is van groot belang voor de kwaliteit en de veiligheid van 
de geleverde zorg. Omdat analyse van ongevallen en incidenten in de luchtvaart heeft aangetoond 
dat in 70% van de gevallen ontoereikende communicatie en samenwerking een rol speelden, 4 
startten wij met ‘Team resource management’ (TRM)-training, een van de luchtvaart afgeleide 
veiligheidstraining op het gebied van samenwerking voor personeel in de gezondheidszorg. Zowel 
de medische als de verpleegkundige staf volgde een tweedaagse training onder andere gericht op 
menselijk gedrag en fouten, effecten van stress op handelen en perceptie, en op communicatie 
tussen teamleden. 
PATIENTVEILIGHEIDS MANAGEMENT SYSTEEM
interventies uitvoeren
METEN EN ACTIES TRAINEN
Retrospectief
SIRE
PRISMA
Prospectief
HFMEA
Scoren van
(bijna)
incidenten
Scoren van
afwijkingen
van protocol
Scoren van
complicaties
Registreren
onveilige
situaties
Bespreken
complicaties
overlijden ect
MMV
(2007)
CNSI
(2005)
Complicatie
registratie
(2005)
Safety Walk
Rounds
(2007)
Crew Rescource
Management
(2006)
Simulatie
team training
(2007)
Risicoanalyse
ernst en kans
op herhaling
Incidenten 
meiden
(2004)
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Inmiddels volgen ook alle nieuwe medewerkers deze training en wordt een herhalingstraining 
voorbereid. In 2007 werd een programma van simulatietrainingen opgezet dat met name gericht was 
op het samenwerken in teamverband. Na instructie in het Center for Advanced Pediatric and Perinatal 
Education aan de Stanford University in Californië voerde het team regelmatig praktijkscenario’s uit 
die werden gefilmd. Na het bekijken van iedere opname vond een nabespreking plaats, waarbij
de TRM-principes aan de orde kwamen. Om de betrokkenheid van het hoger management en van
de medewerkers bij de patiëntveiligheid te bevorderen, werden veiligheidsvisiterondes (‘safety 
walk rounds’) georganiseerd. Deze hielden in dat vertegenwoordigers van het ziekenhuis- en 
afdelingsmanagement (zowel het medisch als het verpleegkundig management) samen met de 
veiligheidsfunctionarissen van de kinder-IC de afdeling halfjaarlijks bezochten. Tijdens dit bezoek 
konden de deelnemers en de medewerkers, evenals de ouders van de kinderen op de afdeling, 
incidenten en situaties benoemen die zij als risicovol ervoeren. 
incidenten, complicaties en protocollair werken
Het ‘Vrijwillig incidentmeldingssysteem’ (of ‘Veilig incidentmeldingssysteem’) is een alom gebruikt 
instrument om potentiële risico’s op te sporen en gericht interventies te ontwikkelen om fouten en 
incidenten te voorkomen. De bereidheid om fouten te melden, wordt negatief beïnvloed door angst 
voor represailles, het ontbreken van feedback over ondernomen acties en door de hoeveelheid tijd 
die met een melding gemoeid is. 5,6 Voor het melden van (bijna-)incidenten werd een eigen formulier 
ontwikkeld, in overleg met een klankbordgroep bestaande uit vertegenwoordigers van verschillende 
disciplines werkzaam op de ic-afdeling, zoals van de apotheek en het laboratorium. Het hoe en 
waarom van het melden van incidenten werd in voorlichtingsbijeenkomsten aan alle medewerkers 
uitgelegd. De definitie van ‘incident’ is: ‘onbedoelde gebeurtenis in het zorgproces die tot schade 
voor de patiënt heeft geleid dan wel had kunnen leiden’, maar de medewerkers werd gevraagd 
‘alles te melden wat niet ging zoals de bedoeling was’. Er werd een brainstormgroep van een tiental 
verpleegkundigen in het leven geroepen om een breed draagvlak voor het melden te creëren. 
Terugkoppeling aan de medewerkers vond plaats via het maandelijkse ‘Safety First journaal’,
waarin de 5 meest voorkomende meldingen van de afgelopen maand worden beschreven, maar ook 
door het doorvoeren van verbeteringen door middel van interventies. Twee leden van de ‘Safety First’-
projectgroep (een verpleegkundige Kwaliteit en een stafarts) beoordeelden wekelijks de meldingen. 
Dit gebeurde aan de hand van een risicomatrix om zodoende zowel de potentiële als de feitelijke 
ernst van het (bijna-)incident te beoordelen en de kans op herhaling ervan in te schatten. De uitkomst 
van deze beoordeling bepaalde vervolgens of nadere analyse van het incident zou plaatsvinden. 
De ‘Critical nursing situation’-index (CNSI) werd geïntroduceerd als indicator voor het al dan niet 
protocollair werken door verpleegkundigen. Een ‘critical nursing situation’ is een observeerbare 
situatie die afwijkt van geprotocolleerde zorg en die kan leiden tot een incident of complicatie. 
7 Inzicht in het aantal en het soort situaties waarbij er niet volgens protocol gewerkt wordt, kan 
richting geven aan verbeteringen, zoals het aanpassen van protocollen of het geven van scholing. 
In de zomer van 2004 werden alle verpleegkundige protocollen geactualiseerd en bekwaamden 
10 verpleegkundigen (vrijwilligers) zich in het scoren van de index. Om de betrouwbaarheid van de 
waarnemingen vast te stellen, werd de overeenstemming tussen de beoordelaars gemeten. 
Deze was voldoende (kappa = 0,69), waarna in 2005 het gebruik van de CNSI werd ingevoerd. 
De scoorders verrichtten eenmaal per dienst een CNSI bij een willekeurig gekozen patiënt. 
Complicatieregistratie dient, behalve als kwaliteitsindicator voor ziekenhuizen op gezag van de 
Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg, ook voor risico-inventarisatie. De definitie van ‘complicatie’ 
zoals deze door de Orde van Medisch Specialisten en de Inspectie gehanteerd wordt, luidt: ‘Een 
onbedoelde en ongewenste gebeurtenis of toestand, tijdens of volgend op medisch-specialistisch 
handelen, die voor de patiënt zodanig nadelig is dat aanpassing van het medisch (be)handelen 
noodzakelijk is, dan wel dat er sprake is van onherstelbare schade.’ Na deelname aan 2 pilotstudies 
naar de bruikbaarheid van de complicatieregistratie 8 werd daadwerkelijk gestart met registreren. De 
complicaties werden geclassificeerd in verschillende assen met bijbehorende codering, zoals eerder 
door Marang-van de Mheen in dit Tijdschrift beschreven. 9 Sinds 1 januari 2007 werden tweewekelijks 
zogenaamde mortaliteit-, morbiditeit- en veiligheidsbesprekingen gehouden in multidisciplinair 
verband. Naar aanleiding van overlijdensgevallen, complicaties of andere ernstige (bijna-)incidenten 
die zich voordeden, werden beheers- en verbetermaatregelen voorgesteld. Voorbeelden hiervan zijn 
richtlijnen die werden opgesteld voor de preventie van trombose, voor sedatiebeleid en voor het 
fixeren van maagsondes, diepe veneuze lijnen en endotracheale tubes op uniforme wijze.
Analyses
(Bijna-)incidenten die matig of ernstig letsel hadden kunnen veroorzaken, werden geanalyseerd met 
behulp van de ‘Prevention and recovery information system for monitoring and analysis’(PRISMA)-
methode. Hierbij wordt een oorzakenboom opgesteld, zodat men tot de basisoorzaken komt. Deze 
zijn in te delen in menselijke, technologische en organisatorische factoren. 10 Bij een ernstig incident 
werd een ‘Systematische incident reconstructie en evaluatie’(SIRE)-analyse verricht. 11 Bij deze 
methode wordt niet alleen naar oorzaken gezocht, maar vooral ook naar mogelijke maatregelen die 
het incident hadden kunnen voorkomen; drempels die in het systeem ingebouwd moeten worden ter 
preventie van incidenten. De aanbevelingen die voortkwamen uit deze analyses werden maandelijks 
besproken met de medische en de verpleegkundige staf. Prospectieve analyses van de risico’s – dus 
niet analyses naar aanleiding van bijvoorbeeld een incidentmelding – werden uitgevoerd met behulp 
van de ‘Healthcare failure mode effect analysis’ (HFMEA;www.va.gov/NCPS/SafetyTopics.html ). 
Hierbij wordt preventief gezocht naar mogelijke oorzaken van het falen van processen. Vervolgens
wordt bepaald waar drempels opgeworpen kunnen worden die de kans op fouten verkleinen, en 
daarop worden gerichte interventies ontwikkeld.
resultaten
Informatie uit bovenstaande bronnen werd gebruikt om gerichte interventies te ontwikkelen en 
uit te voeren. Door continu alle binnenkomende informatie te verwerken, konden aanpassingen 
gedaan worden, zowel in het beleid voor de patiëntenzorg als in het veiligheidsbeleid.
Training
De onderwerpen van de TRM-training werden door een multidisciplinaire werkgroep in de praktijk 
gebracht op de afdeling en verschenen als screensavers op de computerterminals op de afdeling. 
Waar nodig werden maatregelen ter verbetering geïntroduceerd. 
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Voorbeelden hiervan zijn: het elkaar aanspreken op onvoldoende handhygiëne, het verminderen van 
geluidsoverlast en het nabespreken van ernstige incidenten of acute situaties met de betrokkenen.
Incidenten, complicaties en protocollair werken. Van 1 januari 2005 - 31 december 2007 werden 
4512 (bijna-)incidenten gerapporteerd, een gemiddelde van 125 per maand. De 5 frequentste 
meldingen staan in tabel 1 beschreven. Meldingen met betrekking tot medicatie kwamen het 
meest voor (31% van alle meldingen), zoals de toediening van een verkeerde dosis of een onjuiste 
infuusstand.
tabel 1 De 5 meest voorkomende incidenten in de periode 2005-2007
* onder “fysieke omgeving” werd een scala aan incidentmeldingen verstaan, bijvoorbeeld het ontbreken van 
verpleegartikelen bij de bedplaats, het niet omhoog staan van de bedhekken, of het in bed aan treffen van 
infuusdopjes. 
PDMS: patient data management system
In het eerste volledige jaar dat de CNSI gebruikt werd (2006), werd de CNSI bij 247 patiënten 
bepaald. Er werd 1232 keer niet volgens een verpleegkundig protocol gewerkt, wat neerkomt op 
een gemiddelde van 5 maal per patiënt per dag. De 5 handelingen die het vaakst niet volgens 
protocol verricht werden, waren: plaatsing of verschoning van centrale lijnen of infuussystemen, 
plaatsing of verschoning van maag- of duodenumsondes, mondverzorging, het invullen van het 
transfusieformulier, en het instellen van de beademing of het maken van afspraken hierover. 
Van 1 december 2005 - 28 februari 2006 werden 120 complicaties geregistreerd bij 46 van de 
181 opgenomen patiënten. Dit houdt in dat een kwart van de opgenomen patiënten 1 of meer 
complicaties opliep; anders gezegd ging het om 8 complicaties per 100 verpleegdagen. De 5 meest 
vóórkomende complicaties waren: medicatiefouten, hypoxie (voornamelijk bij accidentele extubatie), 
sepsis (vooral bij aanwezigheid van een centrale lijn), problemen met een centraal-veneuze of 
arteriële lijn en atelectase. Uit tabel 2 wordt duidelijk dat er verband bestaat tussen de resultaten 
van deze 3 onderdelen van het veiligheidsmanagementsysteem. Zo is te zien dat zorgprocessen 
waarbij medicatie, beademing, intraveneuze en intraarteriële lijnen, beademingstubes of katheters, 
en apparatuur een rol spelen, een hoog veiligheidsrisico hebben.
tabel 2 de top 5 van meest vóórkomende meldingen per onderdeel van het veiligheidsmanagementsysteem
* onder “fysieke omgeving” werd een scala aan incidentmeldingen verstaan, bijvoorbeeld het ontbreken van 
verpleegartikelen bij de bedplaats, het niet omhoog staan van de bedhekken, of het in bed aan treffen van 
infuusdopjes. 
PDMS: patient data management systeem
Analyses
In 2005 en 2006 werden 157 PRISMA-analyses verricht, waarbij 464 basisoorzaken benoemd 
konden worden. In tabel 3 is de onderverdeling van de basisoorzaken in de verschillende 
categorieën weergegeven. Menselijke factoren speelden een belangrijke rol bij de meeste 
incidenten, maar ook werden veel technische en organisatorische basisoorzaken gevonden. Sinds 
de zomer van 2006 werden 8 SIRE-analyses verricht, die gemiddeld 14 manuren in beslag namen. 
De aanbevelingen hieruit betroffen technische aspecten, zoals het aanpassen van het elektronisch 
medicatievoorschrijfsysteem, en menselijke factoren, zoals afspraken over supervisie. In 2006 werd 
een prospectieve HFMEA-analyse verricht van de orale toediening van clonidine. Deze analyse 
kostte 30 manuren. Hierna konden 8 verschillende aanbevelingen gedaan worden om 13 risicovolle 
processtappen te verbeteren.
Succes- en faalfactoren
Meerdere factoren droegen bij tot het slagen van de verschillende onderdelen van het 
veiligheidsmanagementsysteem, zoals een klimaat van openheid en veiligheid, het geven van 
feedback, een breed draagvlak voor de implementatie, teamtraining, steun van het (hoger) 
management en het aanhoudend onder de aandacht brengen van de patiëntveiligheid. Andere 
factoren hadden een vertragende werking op de ontwikkeling van het systeem, zoals vooral de 
traagheid van de cultuurverandering en onderrapportage.
beschouwing
Het project ‘Safety First’ ging van start als een systeem voor het vrijwillig melden van incidenten. 
Door dit te integreren met het evalueren van protocollair werken, de door ons gevalideerde 
complicatieregistratie en met de bewustwording van groepsprocessen door TRM-training, is het 
uitgegroeid tot een volledig patiëntveiligheidsmanagementsysteem overeenkomstig de norm zoals 
die is geformuleerd in de Nederlandse Technische Afspraak 8009:2007. 
aard incident
n (%)
2005
(n=1600)
2006
(n=1796)
2007
(n=1116)
2005-2007
(n=4512)
medicatiefout 512 32% 557 31% 340 30% 1409 31%
fout PDMS 339 21% 338 19% 198 18% 875 19%
probleem lijnen, katheters, tubes 195 12% 279 16% 155 14% 629 14%
probleem apparatuur 192 12% 169 9% 112 10% 473 10%
fysieke omgeving* 144 9% 115 6% 55 5% 314 7%
top 5 complicatieregistratie incidentmeldingen
afwijkingen van protocol 
(cnsi)
1 medicatiefout medicatiefout
aanleggen of hantering van 
lijnen
2 hypoxie fout PDMS
inbrengen of verzorgen van 
sondes
3 sepsis
probleem met lijnen, 
katheters, tubes
mondverzorging
4
probleem met veneuze of 
arteriële lijn
probleem met apparatuur invullen transfusieformulier
5 atelectase fysieke omgeving
afspraken over, of instellingen 
beademing
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Het vrijwillig melden van (bijna-) incidenten is goed ontvangen en blijkt inmiddels verankerd te zijn 
in de cultuur van de afdeling. De meldingen worden daadwerkelijk gebruikt om verbeteringen te 
bewerkstelligen, maar het aantal meldingen blijft constant. We vermoeden dat er overrapportage is 
van onschuldige incidenten en onderrapportage van ernstige incidenten. Capuzzo et al. beschreven 
al dat er een verschil bestaat tussen het aantal en het soort incidenten dat door medewerkers 
gemeld wordt en het aantal en het soort incidenten dat door onafhankelijke waarnemers worden 
gesignaleerd. 12 Er is gelukkig een toename van het aantal meldingen door artsen, waarschijnlijk 
door de aanhoudende aandacht voor patiëntveiligheid en door het voorbeeldgedrag van stafleden. 
Analyse van gerapporteerde incidenten (PRISMA- danwel SIRE-analyse) blijkt een tijdrovende, maar 
zeer waardevolle bezigheid. Het verdient de voorkeur een PRISMA-analyse kort na de melding te 
verrichten, zodat de betrokkenen zich nog zoveel mogelijk details kunnen herinneren. Zij en hun 
collega’s zien dat er actie wordt ondernomen en dat de bedoeling nadrukkelijk is om te leren van de 
voorgevallen incidenten. Ook bij het registreren van complicaties is er onderrapportage. In de praktijk 
blijkt het aantal gemelde complicaties nauw samen te hangen met de aandacht die de superviserende 
intensivist of fellow aan het melden besteedt. Er blijkt een neiging om alleen de ernstigste complicaties 
te melden, alsmede die waarbij er een fout in het zorgproces is opgetreden. Daarnaast werd door 
artsen ‘registratiemoeheid’ als reden voor niet registreren genoemd. Het niet melden van incidenten 
en complicaties hangt samen met het ontbreken van feedback en van een ‘veilige’ cultuur, en met 
angst voor repercussies. Een eenvoudig en toegankelijk meldinstrument en doeltreffende educatie 
over de zin van het melden van incidenten en complicaties maakt de meldingsbereidheid groter. 1,13 
Zoals te verwachten, blijkt het doorvoeren van technische en organisatorische verbeteringen minder 
moeilijk dan het aanpakken van menselijke factoren. Onze overtuiging is dat juist hier teamtraining 
een belangrijke rol kan spelen, omdat daarin aspecten zoals communicatie, groepsdynamiek en 
stressmanagement aan de orde komen. Ook een systeem voor het melden van (bijna-)incidenten 
kan een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan cultuurverandering. Hierbij hoort uiteraard een analyse 
naar oorzakelijke factoren. In een functionerend veiligheidsmanagementsysteem hoort een 
meetinstrument voor de uitkomst van de zorg, zoals complicatieregistratie of een andere prestatie-
indicator, zodat gecontroleerd kan worden of de verbeteringen ook werkelijk effectief zijn. Gezien 
de relatief korte looptijd van het ‘Safety First’-project, konden we echter nog niet aantonen of het 
veiligheidsmanagementsysteem leidt tot een betere kwaliteit van zorg.
conclusie
Het blijkt goed mogelijk een veiligheidsmanagementsysteem te implementeren en de professionele 
verantwoordelijkheid hiervoor te dragen. 14 De basiselementen van de Nederlandse Technische 
Afspraak 8009:2007 blijken goed kwantificeerbaar, zodat ook gerichte maatregelen en de resultaten 
hiervan in maat en getal kunnen worden uitgedrukt. Cultuurverandering, dat wil zeggen een klimaat
van openheid en veiligheid creëren, is een belangrijke voorwaarde voor het slagen van de 
implementatie. Hierbij dient de klinische staf, samen met het hogere management – tot aan de 
raad van bestuur –, een voorbeeldfunctie te vervullen in het omgaan met incidenten, fouten en 
complicaties.
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simulatietraining op een Kinder-ic: leren van de luchtvaart
eén van de belangrijkste aspecten van een veiligheidscultuur, is teams te leren samenwerken.
in de luchtvaart is hiervoor de crew resource management (crm) training ontwikkeld.
op de ic Kinderen van het erasmus mc-sophia is deze training in grote lijnen overgenomen. 
de principes die men leert, worden daarna in een simulatiesetting praktisch getraind door 
middel van teamscenario’s.
Een van de voorvechters van patiëntveiligheid, Lucian Leape, beschrijft dat een veiligheidscultuur 
ontstaat door zes belangrijke veranderingen:
- Bewustwording dat menselijke fouten gemaakt worden omdat het systeem het toelaat.
- Menselijke fouten niet bestraffen maar ervan leren.
- Fouten zichtbaar maken, zodat men kan zorgen dat deze niet weer gebeuren en dat anderen ervan 
kunnen leren.
- De patiënt centraal stellen, niet de hulpverlener.
- Teams creëren die geleerd hebben hoe men met elkaar samenwerkt.
- En ten slotte: alle niveaus verantwoordelijk maken voor veiligheid.
Effectief teamwerk is echter een essentiële voorwaarde om dit te bereiken, en daarvoor is Crew 
Resource Management (CRM) zeer geschikt. Tevens is het al bewezen dat volwassenen beter leren 
van ervaring en oefening dan van leerboeken of hoorcolleges. CRM komt voort uit de luchtvaart, 
waar slechte communicatie de oorzaak bleek van zeventig procent van de ongevallen. CRM training 
richt zich op het verbeteren van de communicatie en het teamwerk. In ziekenhuizen wordt ook 
nauw samengewerkt in teams, bijvoorbeeld op afdelingen Spoedeisende hulp en Intensive Care. 
De risico’s hier zijn vergelijkbaar met die in de luchtvaart. Een manier om de CRM basisprincipes 
praktisch te trainen, is simulatietraining met gebruikmaking van een pop of een computermodel 
. Als de setting zeer realistisch is spreekt men van ‘high fidelity’ simulatietraining. Deze vorm is 
kostbaarder dan de ‘low fidelity’ variant. Een simulatietraining kan in een speciaal simulatiecentrum 
(bijvoorbeeld Veldhoven en Groningen) uitgevoerd worden. Een nadeel hiervan is dat dit het team 
veel reistijd kost en de setting anders is dan in de praktijk. De laatste jaren is er een trend om de 
simulatietraining dicht bij de afdeling uit te voeren. Dat is goedkoper en praktischer. Daarnaast 
benadert dit de echte setting zoveel mogelijk.
functioneren als team
Sinds 2005 past de IC Kinderen van het Erasmus MC-Sophia een vorm van CRM toe voor de 
verpleegkundigen en artsen. De CRM training en simulatietraining zijn onderdelen van het Patiënt 
Veiligheid Management Systeem op de IC Kinderen. De tweedaagse CRM training behandelt een 
zevental onderwerpen:
1. Informatiemanagement: de focus ligt op het creëren van situational awareness van het team. 
Situational awareness houdt in dat alle betrokkenen een bepaalde situatie op dezelfde manier bekijken 
en interpreteren. Voor het optimaal functioneren als team is het dus belangrijk kennis te hebben van 
informatieverwerking.
2. Communicatie: wat kan er misgaan in de communicatie en wat is effectieve communicatie in 
teamverband?
3. Stressmanagement: gaat in op de (positieve en negatieve) invloeden van stress op het functioneren 
en hoe hiermee om te gaan.
4. Groepsprocessen: met nadruk op groepscohesie en groepsdenken, evenals de gevaren van 
groepsdenken en hoe dit te voorkomen.
5. Effectief leiderschap en volgerschap: Wat heb je nodig om een effectieve leider te zijn en wat 
zorgt ervoor dat er goed volgerschap is?
6. Besluitvorming: gaat in op het nemen van besluiten onder stress en het belang van het vasthouden 
aan genomen besluiten.
7. Risicomanagement: betreft het monitoren van de risico’s waarmee de afdeling te maken heeft.
Deze onderwerpen worden vervolgens in teamverband getraind binnen een simulatiesetting aan de 
hand van zogenaamde teamscenario’s.
methoden
Setting
De IC Kinderen bestaat uit vier units met in totaal 28 bedden. Gemiddeld worden per jaar 
ongeveer 1300 kinderen tussen de nul en achttien jaar opgenomen, inclusief pasgeborenen met 
ernstige aangeboren afwijkingen. Er werken elf kinderartsen/intensivisten, vijf fellows, veertien 
arts-assistenten, 120 verpleegkundigen en twintig zorgassistenten. Speciale aandachtsgebieden 
zijn: neonatale chirurgie, extracorporele membraanoxygenatie (ECMO), cardiologische patiënten, 
patiënten met noodzaak tot neuromonitoring, en algemene IC patiënten.
Patiëntveiligheidsmanagementsysteem 
Het melden van incidenten was een van de eerste onderdelen van ons patiëntveiligheids-
managementsysteem.Vanaf 2003 zijn maandelijks ongeveer 150 (bijna-) incidenten gemeld. Deze 
worden vervolgens geanalyseerd met als doel zowel ad hoc als structurele verbeteringen in te 
kunnen zetten. Daarna zijn er een aantal onderdelen toegevoegd om de risico’s van de afdeling nog 
beter in kaart te brengen (zie figuur 1).
Simulatietraining
Een groep van zeven verpleegkundigen en drie artsen heeft in 2007 een train-the-trainer-
cursus gevolgd bij het Center of Advanced Pediatric Education aan de Stanford University in 
Los Angeles (www.cape.lpch.org). Hier hebben zij geleerd om teamscenario’s te schrijven voor 
kindergeneeskundige intensive care casuïstiek. Het streven was om iedereen op de IC Kinderen twee 
keer per jaar een eendaagse simulatietraining te laten volgen. Aan een simulatietrainingsdag nemen 
negen tot twaalf medewerkers deel, verdeeld in drie groepen, elk onder leiding van twee trainers. In 
elke groep zijn minimaal drie verpleegkundigen ingedeeld; indien een scenario de aanwezigheid van 
een dokter vereist, kan men deze oproepen. Tevens wordt op een simulatietrainingsdag onderwijs 
gegeven in twee andere onderwerpen; de groepen rouleren gedurende de dag en zo volgt elke 
groep.
ook de simulatietraining. Deze andere onderwerpen staan los van de simulatietrainingen. Tijdens 
de twee uur durende simulatietraining worden drie teamscenario’s gespeeld. Als introductie wordt 
uitgelegd wat er wel en niet kan in de trainingsruimte, hoe de simulatiepoppen werken, en wat
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de regels en afspraken over het scenario zijn. De huidskleur (grauw, bleek of rood) of de 
lichaamstemperatuur van de pop zijn niet te simuleren en daar moet men desgewenst naar vragen. 
Vervolgens ontvangt de verpleegkundige die geacht wordt voor ‘de patiënt’ te zorgen een briefing 
over de gesimuleerde patiënt. De rest van het team wacht dan in een andere ruimte. Het scenario 
begint met de verpleegkundige die ‘de dienst’ start zoals gebruikelijk op de werkvloer. Afspraken 
controleren over beademing of infusen, controle van materiaal rondom de patiënt, etc. Intussen 
simuleren de trainers een incident, bijvoorbeeld huilen vanwege pijn, een snelle hartactie of een 
lager wordende bloeddruk bij shock na een bloeding. De verpleegkundige kan een arts bellen (die 
op afdeling werkzaam is, maar wel naar de training toe kan komen) of een andere verpleegkundige 
vragen mee te helpen en te denken. Een bepaald scenario wordt gestopt na vijftien à twintig 
minuten, als de van tevoren bepaalde leerpunten (vaardigheden, kennis en teamwerk) zijn gehaald. 
Elk scenario wordt gefilmd en teruggekeken. Dit maakt het gemakkelijk de leerpunten te bespreken 
tijdens de afsluitende debriefing. Hierin evalueren de deelnemers onder begeleiding van de trainers 
wat er goed of fout ging, welke inzichten men heeft gekregen en wat men de volgende keer anders 
zou doen.
Evaluatie en analyse
Om de training te kunnen beoordelen en te verbeteren, is een vragenlijst ontwikkeld. Afgezien van 
achtergrondgegevens zoals beroepsgroep, leeftijdscategorie en aantal jaren ervaring, worden acht 
vragen gesteld over de inhoud van het scenario. Voorts wordt gevraagd te reageren op acht
stellingen over de simulatietraining, op een 5-punts Likert schaal van ‘geheel mee eens’ tot ‘geheel 
niet mee eens’. Daarnaast wordt een rapportcijfer gevraagd over de kwaliteit van de communicatie 
tijdens de simulatietraining. Gegevens die normaal verdeeld zijn, worden weergegeven als 
gemiddelde en standaarddeviatie, niet normaal verdeelde variabelen als mediaan en interkwartiel 
range. Verschillen in frequenties tussen artsen en verpleegkundigen werden getoetst met de Chi-
kwadraat toets.
resultaten
Er zijn 272 enquêtes ingevuld over tien scenariodagen in de periode november 2008 tot en met mei 
2009. Bijna driekwart (72,4 procent) werd door verpleegkundigen ingevuld en ruim een kwart (27,6 
procent) door artsen. Binnen de verpleegkundige groep was 29 procent High Care verpleegkundige
en 71 procent IC verpleegkundige. Bijna de helft van de artsen was man tegenover tien procent van 
de verpleegkundigen. 29 procent van de artsen was dertig jaar of jonger tegenover negen procent 
van de verpleegkundigen. Het merendeel van de verpleegkundigen (83 procent) was tussen de 
31 en 50 jaar, het merendeel van de artsen (93.5procent) tussen de 20 en 40 jaar. De gemiddelde 
ervaring in
de gezondheidszorg van de verpleegkundigen was twintig jaar (SD 8) en van de artsen zeven jaar 
(SD 4). In totaal werden elf verschillende scenario’s gespeeld, met onder andere de onderwerpen 
ventrikel fibrilleren, gastroschisis, necrotiserende enterocolitis, stomp buiktrauma, near drowning en 
supraventriculaire tachycardie.
De respondenten moesten aangeven of ze:
1. de informatie over de training van tevoren per email voldoende vonden;
2. of ze voldoende tijd hadden om de scenarioruimte te bekijken;
3. of de briefing over de patiënt voldoende was.
Het bleek dat 63 procent van de artsen een of meer van deze aspecten onvoldoende vond tegenover 
vijftien procent van de verpleegkundigen. Dit verschil was statistisch significant (Chi-kwadraat toets, 
p< 0.001). Dit verschil is te verklaren omdat de artsen niet tijdens de briefing aanwezig waren, 
maar tijdens het scenario konden worden opgeroepen. Het merendeel van de respondenten vond 
de scenariosetting overeenkomen met de praktijk (85 procent). Respondenten werd gevraagd een 
rapportcijfer te geven voor de communicatie tijdens de scenariotraining. 43 respondenten vulden 
deze vraag niet in. Dertien van de overige 229 respondenten (7,4 procent), vonden de communicatie 
onvoldoende. Figuur 1 laat zien dat het rapportcijfer niet significant verschillend is voor de 
verschillende leeftijdsgroepen (p=0,50).
figuur 1
Tijdens het spelen van het scenario voelde 98 procent van de respondenten zich veilig, en 83 procent 
van de respondenten voelde zich niet geremd. Op de stelling ‘Ik voelde me zeker in mijn handelen’ 
tijdens het scenario reageerde 55 procent van de respondenten positief, 28 procent neutraal, 
en 17 procent negatief. Zes respondenten (2 procent) voelden zich niet veilig, maar geremd en 
onzeker. Bij twee was dit het geval in het scenario over gastroschisis, bij twee in het scenario over 
stomp buiktrauma, bij een ritmestoornis en bij een in het necrotiserende enterocolitisscenario. 
Deze zes respondenten waren op vier verschillende dagen aanwezig en vier van hen hadden 
hun achtergrondgegevens niet ingevuld. 94 procent van de respondenten vond dat er tijdens de 
debriefing voldoende aandacht was voor de punten die goed gingen, vier procent regeerde neutraal 
op de betreffende stelling, en twee procent van de respondenten was het oneens. 93 van de 
respondenten was het niet eens met de stelling: Ik kon tijdens de debriefing NIET alles zeggen wat 
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ik zou willen. Slechts drie procent van de respondenten was het eens met deze stelling. De overigen 
reageerden neutraal. Slechts twee procent van de respondenten was het eens met de stelling: Ik 
vond het moeilijk om feedback te geven, negen procent reageerde neutraal, en 89 procent vond 
het niet moeilijk om feedback te geven. Ook werd gevraagd of de simulatietraining effect had op 
de kwaliteit van zorg door 1) het oefenen in communicatie; 2) het opdoen van nieuwe kennis; en 
3) door meer zekerheid in de praktijk als men in de situatie van het scenario zou terechtkomen. 
Dit werd beaamd door respectievelijk 85 procent, 84 procent en 79 procent van de respondenten. 
Tabel 1 geeft een overzicht van de percentages artsen en verpleegkundigen die het helemaal eens of 
eens waren met de stellingen. Dit betreft ongeveer tachtig procent van de respondenten, aangezien 
47 respondenten geen beroep hebben ingevuld en in een enkel geval items niet werden ingevuld. 
De tabel onderschrijft dat artsen minder goed voorbereid waren op de scenariotraining.
tabel 1 Samenvatting van de resultaten uitgesplitst voor artsen en verpleegkundigen
1percentages van resp. artsen en verpleegkundigen die het met de stelling helemaal eens of eens waren. 
discussie
Uit de vragenlijst blijkt dat het merendeel van de respondenten zich veilig genoeg voelt om door 
middel van teamscenario training ervaring op te doen in onder andere teamvaardigheden. Deze 
bevindingen zijn vergelijkbaar met die van buitenlandse studies. Het lijkt erop dat meer High
Care verpleegkundigen zich zeker voelen in deze scenariosetting dan Intensive Care  verpleegkundigen. 
Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat de High Care verpleegkundige altijd eerst nog om hulp kan 
vragen bij de IC-verpleegkundigen. Het is lastig om het effect van teamscenario training te meten. 
Een review uit 2008 beschreef slechts één gerandomiseerde studie waarin artsen zonder en met 
simulatie training om chirurgische ingrepen te oefenen werden vergeleken. 
De deelnemers die simulatietraining hadden gekregen functioneerden inderdaad beter. Het is echter 
de vraag of simulatietraining ook voor andere, niet-chirurgische vaardigheden de meest effectieve 
training is. In een editorial uit 2009 noemt Ventre ook de grote verschillen tussen simulatietrainingen 
op het gebied van feedback geven, mogelijkheden tot herhaaldelijk oefenen en integratie in het 
gehele curriculum. Omdat simulatietraining meer en meer wordt toegepast, is het belangrijk om de 
effectiviteit te meten volgens een gestandaardiseerde methode. Twee procent van de deelnemers 
voelde zich niet veilig tijdens de training. Bij de artsen trad dit voornamelijk op indien men opgeroepen 
was om mee te draaien in het teamscenario en ze niet wisten dat het gefilmd en nabesproken werd. 
Voor de artsen was het daarnaast soms lastig dat ze onvoorbereid de simulatietraining ingingen. 
Zij kregen tevoren namelijk geen informatie over deze dag. 
Dit punt is verbeterd. ’s Morgens tijdens de overdracht worden de simulatiepatiënten ook overgedragen 
zodat een ieder weet dat het mogelijk is hiervoor gebeld te worden. Verpleegkundigen die aangaven 
moeite te hebben met deze vorm van trainen, werden gecoacht door een maatschappelijk werker 
of psycholoog. Op deze manier kunnen we achterhalen waarom men zich niet veilig voelde en 
wat daaraan gedaan zou kunnen worden. Een beperking van onze studie is dat er gekeken is naar 
ervaringen van deelnemers, maar effecten op dagelijkse zorg zijn vooralsnog moeilijk of niet te 
meten.
conclusie
Simulatietraining is een goede manier om teams te leren samenwerken, te oefenen in communicatie 
en kennis te delen. Daarbij is het filmen van de teamscenario’s een onmisbaar onderwijsmiddel. 
Men leert ervan door de situatie met eigen ogen terug te zien. 
Met dank aan de leden van het Sophia Simulatie Training Team voor hun enorme inzet.
Artsen1 VP1
% %
Genoeg tijd om scenarioruimte te verkennen 45 95
De informatie over de training via de email was voldoende 24 77
De briefing van de patiënt was voldoende 76 91
De scenariosetting kwam overeen met de praktijk 93 84
Ik voelde me geremd tijdens het scenario omdat ik het gevoel had bekeken of 
beoordeeld te worden
16 17
Ik kon tijdens de debriefing NIET alles zeggen wat ik zou willen 5 2
tijdens de debriefing was er voldoende aandacht voor de punten die goed gingen 92 93
Ik vond het moeilijk om feedback te geven - 3
Dit scenario heeft invloed op kwaliteit van zorg omdat:
Ik kon oefenen in communicatie  86 85
Nieuwe kennis heb opgedaan 80 86
Zekerder ben wanneer ik in de praktijk in deze situatie terechtkom 91 81
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abd/surgabdominal/surgical
AE adverse event
AER Adverse event registration
AHRQ Agency for Healthcare Research   
 and Quality
BD brain death
card cardiac/circulatory
CDH Congenital diaphragmatic hernia
CIA Critical incident analysis
CNSI Critical Nursing Situation Index
CPAP continuous positive airway pressure
CPOE Computerized physician order entry
CPR cardiopulmonary resuscitation
CRM Crew Resource Management
CT computer tomography
DNR do not resuscitate
ECLS Extracorporeal life support
ECMO Extracorporealmembrane oxygenation
ED emergency department
ET endotracheal tube
FDA Food and Drug Administration
FONA faults or near accidents
GA gestational age
Hb Hemoglobin
HC high care
HFMEA Healthcare Failure Mode and Effect   
 Analysis
ICU intensive care unit
ICUSRS Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting   
 System
IHI Institute for Healthcare Improvement
IOM Institute of Medicine
IQR interquartile range
IV Intravenous
LST life sustaining treatment
M&M Mortality and Morbidity
MAS meconium aspiration syndrome
MCA major congenital anomalies
MMS Mortality, morbidity and safety
MRI magnetic resonance imaging
N/A not available
neur Neurological
NICU neonatal intensive care unit
PDMS Patient Data Management System
PICU pediatric intensive care unit
PRISM Pediatric Risk of Mortality
PRISMA Prevention and Recovery Information 
 System for Monitoring and Analysis
PSICU pediatric surgical intensive care unit
PSMS Patient Safety Management System
PVMS Patient Veiligheid Management Systeem
RCTs randomized controlled trials
RES failed resuscitation
resp respiratory insufficiency
resusc Resuscitation
Rx Therapy
SAQ safety Attitudes Questionnaire
SD standard deviation
SSTT Sophia Simulation Team Training
SWR Safety Walk Rounds
TRM Team Resource Management
TT Trigger tool
VAS Visual Analogue Scale
VLBW very low birthweight 
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danKwoord
Het is er! Het boekje met daarin de uitkomsten van jaren hard werken aan patiëntveiligheid en het 
resultaat van maanden keihard werken om het allemaal op te schrijven. Dit was nooit gelukt zonder 
de hulp van een heleboel mensen, waarvan ik er een aantal in het bijzonder wil bedanken.
Mijn promotor, Prof. dr. D. Tibboel. 
Beste Dick, ik had nooit gedacht dat er ook maar iemand bestond die mij aan het promotie-onderzoek 
zou krijgen, maar jou is het gelukt. Ik weet nog goed dat je na het overleggen over een ECMO-
kandidaat op de neonatologie vroeg of ik al besloten had wat mijn keuze zou worden: “Cynthia, 
met die patiëntveiligheid zit het zo: je bent gewoon de juiste vrouw op de juiste plek op de juiste tijd 
hiervoor!” En je had gelijk. Patiëntveiligheid is helemaal “mijn ding”. Dank voor de kans die je me 
hiermee geboden hebt, voor je steun bij de ontwikkeling ervan, en vooral ook voor je vertrouwen. 
En niet te vergeten dank voor het hoge tempo waarin we de laatste fase afgerond hebben! 
Mijn copromotor, dr. M. van Dijk.
Beste Monique, zonder jou was dit echt niet geworden wat het nu is, en zeker niet zo snel! Dank 
voor je onmisbare hulp met mijn digitale nachtmerries SPSS, Endnote, Word enzovoort. Maar vooral 
ook voor het meedenken over wat we nou eigenlijk gedaan hebben de laatste jaren en wat daar nou 
eigenlijk uit gekomen is, en wat we daar nou eigenlijk van vinden….
De leden van de kleine promotiecommissie: Prof. dr. J. Klein, Prof. dr. W.P.F. Fetter, 
Prof. dr. J.B. van Goudoever.
Heren, hartelijk dank voor het snelle beoordelen van het manuscript en het zitting nemen in de 
kleine commissie. Beste Hans, wie had dat ooit gedacht? Volgens mij wij allebei niet…
De overige leden van de grote promotiecommissie: Prof. dr. A.J. van der Heijden, Prof. dr. R.M.H. 
Wijnen, dr. I. Leistikow. Hartelijk dank voor uw bereidheid zitting te nemen in de commissie. 
Mijn maatje en mede Patient Safety Officer Ada van den Bos-Boon. 
Lieve Ada, wat een klus hebben we op ons genomen! En hoe hebben we ons daarin ontwikkeld! 
Het is super om met je samen te werken en ik kijk ontzettend uit naar wat we nog allemaal gaan 
aanpakken en verbeteren. “Patients, there’s no need to feel down… We’ve found safety! It’s the 
new kid in town! There are methods – waiting just to be found…That will make your care less 
lethal……”
Jan Dekker en Marjan de Jong, als meest recente mede-veiligheidsmensen toegetreden tot ons 
“team” heb ik nu al gemerkt dat jullie onmisbaar zijn! Dank voor al jullie hulp!
Saskia Gischler en Robert Jan Houmes: de eerste stafleden die zich ook met patiëntveiligheid zijn 
gaan bezig houden; super zoveel als ik van jullie geleerd heb en hoe we daar nu mee verder gaan. 
Ben er trots op met jullie samen te werken!
Name PhD student: Cynthia van der Starre
Erasmus MC Department: IC Kinderen
Research School:
PhD period: 2006-2011
Promotor(s): Prof. dr. D. Tibboel
Supervisor: dr. M. van Dijk
1. phd training
Year
Workload
(Hours/ECTS)
specific courses (e.g. research school, medical training)
- Patient Safety Officer-executive development 
program, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, Boston, USA
2009 56 hours
presentations
- Kennis Beter Delen, Nieuwegein
- Veiligheid in veelkleurigheid, Utrecht
- Nederlandse Intensivisten dagen, Ede
- 2e kwaliteitsforum CBO, Nieuwegein
- Venticare, Utrecht
- Een vak apart IV, Rotterdam
- Leiderschap en professionaliteit, Rotterdam
- Van ziekenhuis naar zorg, NIAZ conferentie, Utrecht
- Jaarcongres NVK, Veldhoven 
- Neonatologie aan de Maas, Tegelen
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008
2008
2009
2009
2010
2010
12 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
12 ECTS
(inter)national conferences
- Patient Safety 2006 conference, Birmingham
- European Academy of Paediatrics Congress, Barcelona
- Jaarcongres NVK, Veldhoven
- Symposium Patiëntveiligheid IGZ, Rotterdam
- Zuigelingen met kanker en bloedziekten, Rotterdam
- Pediatrische Farmacotherapie, Rotterdam
- Hot topics in neonatology, Washington
- Neonatologendag, Zwolle
- Quality and Safety in Healthcare, Paris
- 2008 PAS Annual Meeting, Honolulu
- Risky Business conference, London
- 25th International ISQUA conference, Kopenhagen
- 2010 PAS Annual Meeting, Vancouver
- Extreme prematuur, Rotterdam
- 27th International ISQUA Conference, Parijs
- Grote mensen huilen niet, Utrecht
- Patiëveiligheid, hoe doen we dat? Rotterdam
- International Forum Quality and Safety Healthcare, Amsterdam
2006
2006
2006
2007
2007
2007
2007
2008
2008
2008
2008
2008
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2011
12 hrs
32 hrs
8 hrs
8 hrs
5 ECTS
5 ECTS
24 hrs
5 ECTS
18 ECTS
20 ECTS
8 hrs
18 ECTS
20 ECTS
8 hrs
18 ECTS
8 hrs
8 hrs
20 hrs
2. teaching
Year
Workload (Hours/
ECTS)
lecturing
- PAOK Patiëntveiligheid, Rotterdam
- Masterclass Patiëntveiligheid NVK, 5 x, Zeist
- Team Resource Management basistraining, 10 x, Rotterdam
- Team Resource Management vervolgtraining, 10 x, Rotterdam 
- Grand Round Patient Safety, Rotterdam
- VMS conferentie Veilige zorg voor zieke kinderen, Utrecht
- Medicatieveiligheid PAO Farmacie, Utrecht
2006
2009-2011
2008-2011
2009-2010
2009
2011
2011
10 hrs
44 hrs
180 hrs
90 hrs
8 hrs
10 hrs
8 hrs
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Inge van ’t Wout: in mijn optiek het beste unithoofd dat er rond loopt, en zeker niet alleen omdat 
je patiëntveiligheid hoog in je prioriteiten hebt staan! Dank voor je luisterend oor, vele adviezen, 
shoppen in Boston….
Corinne Buysse, Janet Bogert, Helma den Boer, Olga Stoffels, Ramona Sebes, Angelique 
Hoogenboom, Irma Radder: zonder al het werk dat ons Safety Action Team verricht heeft, was het 
nooit gelukt om dit boekje te kunnen schrijven. Jullie hebben me even moeten missen, maar we 
gaan weer in volle vaart verder.
Iedereen die ooit in de CRM werkgroep en/of de brainstorm-groep en/of de klankbordgroep en/of 
het SSTT team en/of de CNSI ploeg heeft gezeten of nog zit: ben trots op wat er inmiddels staat aan 
patiëntveiligheid en dat komt mede door jullie!
De overige staf van de IC Kinderen: Matthijs, Linda, Ulrike, Sara, Koen, Jan, Saskia, Natasja, 
Annemieke, Sascha, Muriël, Suzan, Berber, Enno (zullen we ooit ophouden over SF te kletsen, hoop 
van niet…), Kim (wij kunnen niet eens ophouden met kletsen…): zonder jullie als collega’s was dit 
nooit op deze manier gelukt, bedankt!
Irwin Reiss: nu van de IC Neonatologie, maar toen ik hieraan begon nog van de IC Kinderen; dank 
voor je steun en vertrouwen en wijze adviezen, echt waar! En succes natuurlijk …
De staf van de IC Neonatologie: Monique, René, Ronny, Marijn, Renate, Nynke, 
Sandra, Jeroen, Femke, Ellen, Willemijn, Jeanine: onmisbaar zoals jullie vooral in de laatste fase 
telkens weer bereid waren te helpen en mij vrij te plannen voor die laatste loodjes, super!
Liesbeth: de fijnste kamergenote die ik kon wensen! Dankjewel voor het meehelpen met de focus 
en concentratie die zo hard nodig waren. Succes met de cyclaam…
Marlou en Annemarie: heel goed dat jullie me af en toe achter m’n bureau vandaan sleurden om 
een Doppio te scoren, heel veel succes met jullie boekjes, je hebt gezien hoe het niet moet als je het 
verstandig wil doen… 
Het moge inmiddels wel duidelijk zijn dat al dit werken aan patiëntveiligheid dus niet iets is dat je in 
je eentje doet. Zonder de inzet van de verpleegkundige teams, de ventilation practitioners, de nurse 
practitioners, de secretaresses, de zorgassistenten en de afdelingsassistenten van de beide IC’s waar 
ik werk, waren we nooit zover gekomen. Dames, en de enkele heren, het blijft ontzettend fijn met 
jullie samen te werken, zowel aan het bed als aan de patiëntveiligheid! Henrike, mijn allereerste 
sparring partner bij het analyseren van de eerste incidenten, we zijn een heel eind op weg, nu de 
rest nog!
Ko Hagoort: wat een eindspurt! Door jouw kritische vragen, verbeteringen en commentaren zijn de 
artikelen stukken duidelijker en beter geworden. Op naar de volgende ….
Marten Poleij: dank voor je hulp met het opzetten van de databases en met het opstarten van onze 
onderzoeken.
Annemarie Illsley, Chantal Strik, Karen Suvaal en Judith Visser: wat moet ik zonder jullie hulp bij deze 
toestanden? 
 
Mijn collega’s van het Sophia Patiëntveiligheidsoverleg, in het bijzonder Diane van Felius: dank voor 
het meedenken, meewerken, mee voorbereiden en meedoen met alle patiëntveiligheid activiteiten, 
samen maken we het Sophia een stuk veiliger!
Jeanette en Monique: bedankt voor het mij in eigenlijk heel korte tijd een stuk gezonder en sportiever 
krijgen en houden! (voor zover ik dat toelaat dan….)
Daniella, George en André: lieve vrienden, jullie steun en vriendschap waren onmisbaar, niet alleen 
nu maar alle jaren dat we elkaar al kennen, zowel binnen het Sophia als vooral ook (en gelukkig) 
daarbuiten. 
Lieve Nikk: telkens weer verrast het me hoeveel we voor elkaar betekenen. Ik kan me niet voorstellen 
hoe het nu met me zou zijn zonder de vele dingen die we samen al beleefd hebben. Zoals ik al 
eerder heb gezegd: jij hebt mijn blik op de wereld verruimd: Namaste! 
Lieve Oma: je oudste kleinkind heeft weer een grote stap gedaan, zoals ik er als klein kind al zovelen 
aan jouw hand heb gedaan. Ben superblij dat je erbij bent vandaag!
Lieve Liesbeth: mede door jouw onvoorwaardelijke liefde en steun ben ik zo ver gekomen als ik nu 
ben en ik prijs me zeer gelukkig met jou als collega, buurvrouw en tante maar bovenal ben je de 
beste vriendin die ik me kan wensen. Mijn bewondering voor jou is enorm en ik hoop dat we samen 
nog vele reisavonturen en wandeltochten enzo zullen maken. 
Lieve Ma: eigenlijk heb ik geen woorden voor jou, want er zijn er toch niet genoeg!
Ik ben zo ongelooflijk trots op jou en op mij en op dat we deze klus ook weer geklaard hebben. 
We blijven samen de wereld ingaan met open blik, (en natuurlijk met de juiste witbalans, de beste 
sluitertijd, de ideale diafragma-instelling, de goede scherpte-diepte, de juiste ISO-waarde en de 
beste camera’s), en we blijven genieten van al die dingen die we delen. Ik hou van je. xxx C. 
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stellingen
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift “Patient safety in pediatrics: a developing discipline”.
Vermijdbare sterfte is niet geschikt als uitkomstmaat voor kwaliteit en veiligheid van zorg voor patiënten op een 
kinder intensive care. 
(dit proefschrift)
Er is geen “gouden standaard” voor het opsporen van complicaties; daarom moet de beste combinatie van 
methodes gebruikt worden om zoveel mogelijk schade aan patienten op te sporen: de trigger tool methode 
gecombineerd met incident meldingen en registratie door artsen.
(dit proefschrift)
Aanbevelingen uit incident analyses, M&M besprekingen, Safety Walk rounds en dergelijke moeten opgepakt 
worden door daarvoor aangewezen medewerkers in een vooraf bepaald tijdspad. Hun vooruitgang dient 
bijgehouden te worden en een onderdeel zijn van functioneringsgesprekken.  
(dit proefschrift)
De toepassing van human factors engineering en ICT technologieën is cruciaal om de medicatieveiligheid te 
verbeteren.
(dit proefschrift)
De beste manier om de veilgheidscultuur te meten? Slechts 1 vraag: “zou u zich helemaal veilig voelen als u hier 
behandeld werd?”
(dit proefschrift)
“Geneeskunde is een gebrekkige wetenschap, een bedrijf met constant veranderende kennis, feilbare individuen, 
en tegelijkertijd levens die op het spel staan. Er zit wetenschap in wat we doen, ja, maar ook gewoonte, intuïtie 
en soms gewoonweg gokken.”
atul gawande; Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science. 2002, New York, USA.  
“Alhoewel het gebrek aan verbetering op grote schaal een redden voor bezorgdheid is, is het geen bewijs dat de 
huidige inspanningen om de veiligheid te verbeteren vergeefs zijn”
landrigan cp, Parry GJ, Bones CB, Hackbarth AD, Goldmann DA, Sharek PJ. Temporal trends in rates of patient 
harm resulting from medical care. N Engl J Med. 2010 Nov 25;363(22):2124-2134.
“Medische opleidingen moeten geherstructureerd worden, om te verminderen dat de focus bijna volledig ligt 
op het vergaren van wetenschappelijke en klinische feiten en om de nadruk te leggen op het ontwikkelen van 
vaardigheden, gedrag en attitudes die artsen nodig hebben”. 
leape l, Berwick D, Clancy C, Conway J, Gluck P, Guest J, et al. Transforming healthcare: a safety imperative. 
Qual Saf Health Care. 2009 Dec;18(6):424-428.
“Langdurige yoga training vermindert de mate van geestelijke onrust, angst, boosheid en vermoeidheid niet 
alleen op de korte en middellange termijn, maar ook op de lange termijn.”
yoshihara K, Hiramoto T, Sudo N, Kubo C. Profile of mood states and stress-related biochemical indices in long-
term yoga practitioners. Biopsychosoc Med. 2011;5(1):6.
 “We moeten een einde maken aan traditionele 24-uurs diensten, de effectiviteit bestuderen van verschillende 
manieren om dit te bereiken en de beste manieren verspreiden zodat we betere en veiligere zorg kunnen leveren 
in alle intensive care units en ziekenhuizen van het land.”
landrigan cp. Resident sleep deprivation and critical care: the unintended consequences of inaction. Crit Care 
Med. 2010 Mar;38(3):980-981.
Alle mensen worden vrij en gelijk in waardigheid en rechten geboren. Zij zijn begiftigd met verstand en geweten, 
en behoren zich jegens elkander in een geest van broederschap te gedragen.
artikel 1 van de universele verklaring van de rechten van de mens. 
propositions
Preventable mortality fails to be an adequate outcome of quality and safety of care in pediatric ICU patients. 
(this thesis)
There is no “gold standard” for detecting adverse events; therefore the best combination of detection methods 
should be used to capture as many injuries as possible: the trigger tool methodology combined with incident 
reporting and physician registration. 
(this thesis)
Recommendations from incident analysis, M&M conferences, Safety Walk rounds etc should be adopted 
by appointed employees with a set time frame. Their progress should be monitored and be a topic in their 
performance reviews. 
(this thesis)
The application of human factors engineering and ICT technologies is pivotal to successfully improve 
medication safety.
(this thesis)
The best way to assess safety culture? Just one question: “Would you feel perfectly safe being treated here?”
(this thesis)
“Medicine is an imperfect science, an enterprise of constantly changing knowledge, uncertain information, 
fallible individuals, and at the same time lives on the line. There is science in what we do, yes, but also habit, 
intuition, and sometimes plain old guessing.” 
atul gawande; Complications: A Surgeon’s Notes on an Imperfect Science. 2002, New York, USA.  
“Although the absence of large-scale improvement is a cause for concern, it is not evidence that current efforts 
to improve safety are futile.”
landrigan cp, Parry GJ, Bones CB, Hackbarth AD, Goldmann DA, Sharek PJ. Temporal trends in rates of 
patient harm resulting from medical care. N Engl J Med. 2010 Nov 25;363(22):2124-2134.
 “Medical education needs to be restructured to reduce its almost exclusive focus on the acquisition of 
scientific and clinical facts and to emphasize the development of skills, behaviours and attitudes needed by 
practising physicians”. 
leape l, Berwick D, Clancy C, Conway J, Gluck P, Guest J, et al. Transforming healthcare: a safety imperative. 
Qual Saf Health Care. 2009 Dec;18(6):424-428.
“Ongoing yoga training reduces the level of mental disturbance,anxiety, anger, and fatigue not only over the 
short- or intermediate-term, but also over a long term”.
yoshihara K, Hiramoto T, Sudo N, Kubo C. Profile of mood states and stress-related biochemical indices in 
long-term yoga practitioners. Biopsychosoc Med. 2011;5(1):6.
 “We must eliminate traditional 24-hr shifts, study the effectiveness of diverse approaches to doing so, and 
disseminate best practices so that we can achieve better, safer care in our critical care units and
hospitals nationwide.”
landrigan cp. Resident sleep deprivation and critical care: the unintended consequences of inaction. Crit Care 
Med. 2010 Mar;38(3):980-981.
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
article 1 of the united nations universal declaration of human rights
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